> >Second - Lacan wasn't a postmodernist.
> Perhaps not since he preceded most of them generationally
but I think it is fair to say that he has been influential
in pomo circles. Furthermore, his attitudes to science
seem very much in line with pomo views.
Yes, but we could consider this: that the position traditionally attributed to Lacan is actually closer to Foucault. Zizek charges Judith Butler with this mistake.
> >Third - Lacan used numbers not because they meant anything,
> >but because they *didn't* mean anything. Also, because he
> >got kicks from doing so.
> Well bully for him but why then should the rest of us bother
to read his musings on mathematics? And what significance
do they have intellectually, especially since he didn't
have a good grasp of basic math concepts?
Hegel didn't have a good grasp of African history, does this mean that we don't read Marx?
> >Fourth - In order to accept the principle of falsification
> >you have to accept the principles of science as valid.
> Which would bring him close to the pomos.
Why? Does postmodernism have the final say on critical thinking? What about Horkheimer? What about Adorno's critique of Popper, or Habermas's?
> >Fifth - There is no fifth.
> I am sure that was funnier in the original French. -:)
Have my collected works been translated so quickly?
> >On science. Lacan wrote, in 1977, that "psychoanalysis is
to be taken seriously, even though it is not a science."
So he's not providing a scientific basis for the field.
> That would of course put Lacan very much at odds with
Freud.
It's been said before and it merits being said again.
Freud was wrong. I think Freud failed to realize the normative dimension present within his own work, by associating it, incoherently, with an objectivist methodology.
> Of course many people including Lacan have argued
both psychoanalysis is not a science and that it is
nevertheless a valid inquiry into human nature. This
was not Freud's understanding, many people, however, think
that Freud was in error on this point and they argue
that his praxis was in contradiction with his professed
philosophical views.
I suspect Freud didn't grasp the hermeneutics of it all (Ricoeur). Self-knowledge through reflection is knowledge (Gadamer). Art is cognitive (Adorno).
> Concerning Marxism, I would disagree with the contention
that it or at least historical materialism is not a
science.
I would say that it has both objectivating and subjectivating moments. There is a new book by Hans Herbert Kogler which defends this kind of thesis (The Power of Dialogue: Critical Hermeneutics after Gadamer and Foucault) - which sets Habermas in the background of both. It's quite good.
> Grunbaum on the other hand while finding psychoanalysis
to be a scientific theory, finds it to be very much a
flawed one because of serious weaknesses in psychoanalysis'
methodologies for validating hypotheses.
It's always been difficult to measure understanding, but this shouldn't take away from the attempt (to understand things).
> >On language. When Lacan stated the the unconscious is
> >structured like a langauge, he basically mean that language
> >makes up the unconsciousness.
> Other structuralists too like Levi-Strauss made similar
moves, although I am not sure whom influenced who in this
regard.
They influenced each other.
> >2. If he can't express himself clearly, then it must be
> >muddled thinking.
> Of course the failure of a writer to express himself clearly
does not prove that his thought is muddled but it does
give us good grounds for suspicion when this does occur.
I'm usually more suspicious of people who write clearly.
> In other words Lacan is impervious to criiticism.
Not remotely.
> Anyone who criticizes him is automatically assumed to
have misunderstood him. Isn't this really the old
children's game "I am rubber, you are glue whatever you say
bounces off me and sticks to you" transferred to
intellectual discourse?
No, not at all. My posts on Lacan have attempted to clarify what is at stake in Lacan's work, rather than just defaulting to guilt by association (with postmodernism, with linguistics, with structuralism...). Most of the criticism leveled against Lacan here doesn't even come close to any resemblance to what he wrote. Even though I'm guilty of this myself, I try not to target people whose work I haven't taken seriously.
The problem is, criticism which sets up red herrings doesn't do anyone any good, and it engages in the very thing which people who write the critique's often despise (muddled thinking, word games, abstraction).
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