> >"There is an illusion that consists of the supposition that
> >science is grounded in the plenitude of a concrete and lived
> >experience; that geometry elaborates a perceived space, that
> >biology gives form to the intimate experience of life, or that
> >political economy translates the processes of industrialization
> >at the level of theoretical discourse; therefore, that the ref-
> >erent itself contains the law of the scientific object." --MF
>
> Do _all_ or even _most_ of today's scientists suffer from an illusion that
> "the supposition that science is grounded in the plenitude of a concrete
> and lived experience"? In any case, I think, unlike Foucault, that you
> ought to distinguish the ideology of scientism from the truth work of
> science, unless you think there is no difference, for instance, between the
> theory of evolution and creationism.
if you're asking me, i'd say absolutely, since scientific practice is still based on the act of witnessing an event or process. that what's witnessed is now more likely to be an array of statistics less directly apprehensible than a bird dying for want of oxygen in a bell jar doesn't change that constitutive act. and that the witnesses now assemble their ranks through the bureaucratized mediations of peer review, rather than personally in a room for a candle-lit drama, doesn't change that fundamental structure, either.
but if you're asking foucault, he didn't say 'scientists believe,' he said 'there is.' not a subtle difference. it is, however, significant that you missed (or mangled) it, because your rather apocalyptic conclusion seems to be a bit like this: 'if we allow anyone but the experts to con- trol scientific discourse, the world'll go to hell in a handbasket.' again, the same routine:
> Also, to dismiss, as Foucault does, as an illusion the idea that "the
> referent itself contains the law of the scientific object" without
> explaining what he thinks of as the true relationships between scientific
> laws and referents won't do, unless you want to ditch causality (and ideas
> of it) altogether, which noone is capable of doing.
this is just silly, a sort of duded-up version of the old 'well, mr. smartypants, if you're so clever why don't *you* explain it' chestnut.
one definite advantage the hard sciences have over the human sciences is that it isn't customary for the peanut gallery to demand that, when one debunks a hypothesis, one therefore has to offer an alternative hypothesis 'because it's implicit in the critique anyway so just spit it out.' the main purpose of that addendum is, afaict, to shut critics up by hook or by crook.
cheers, t -
Physical things have causes, but human things reasons
--even when they have physical causes. --m. sahlins