>It seems to me that rumours of the independence of the Indonesian
military (or some violent factions) from civilian control are being used
a. to buffer Habibie from criticism and b. to suggest that these
military factions are out of Habibie's control (and thus US pressure on
him is not likely to help). This is the rumour that is allowing the US
to justify its not imposing stringent economic sanctions<
yes, this is what i argued. but i'm not sure how you get from this, to arguing that this serves as a pretext for a _US_ deployment of 'asian' troops (?). let's be more than clear about what has been happening: no govt has been itching to send in the troops, at least until the indonesian military has done its bloody work. there has been high level collusion in the timing. the rest is just show to placate demands to 'do something', but not for all that sever military and economic ties. and this, more than anything suggests why support for sending troops in is by now extraordinarily ill-timed, and why it has become a neat diversion. the ASIO (aust 'intelligence') mouthpiece, the _Australian_, have been pushing the line that this situation proves australian needs to boost its military capabilities in order to be able to act without the support of the US. this too is crap. everyone knows that the only thing the indonesian military has going for it in these terms is sheer numbers -- they're a muscle-bound internal police force and have never engaged in fighting anything other than civilian populations. where they have been fighting resistances (in aceh, irian jaya, east timor) these resistances are poorly-armed and have still managed to inflict serious damage and (in the case of the last two) been able to withstand the indonesian military for decades. the militarisation of the region is an index of the distance from direct US control, not a feature of it, even though the US and britain might well gain some bucks in selling arms.
> and giving it an excuse to organize a deployment of troops in East
Timor (the ground troops will certaintly be Asian as a consequence of
the Vietnan syndrome but the backup will be red, white and blue).<
>The US is giving itself an excuse for a massive deployment in East
Asia, and my suspicion remains that Japan will end up paying for it one
way or another (more financial liberalisation, holding on to US
securities, compliance to US conditions for bailouts, etc).<
no doubt the US will try to lever its capitals into a better position, but i strongly doubt that Japan will, as you say, end up paying for this. but y0u may well be right in the sense of relative economic power in the region between japan and the US, but i can't see how and where it translates easily into informing the strategies as they are now unfolding.
i'd written:
> >in *july*, the australian
>> govt, the US and the UN had documents which detailed the campaign of
>>terror and displacement that would occur if east timorese voted for
>>independance. everyone knew, a military force could have been put
>>together then, or, alternatively, the UN could have refused to hold
the
>>ballot knowing what it did, and waited for the situation within east
>>timor to shift ground a little.
> But doesn't this support Chomsky's implicit point that the imperialist
countries should have been prepared for the slaughter and already warned
Habibie that there would be significant economic sanctions if East
Timorese independence was met with murderous reprisals? The US in
particular did not warn Habibie and even today is unwilling to use
substantial economic sanctions to end the slaughter.<
yes. but chomsky's analysis is a rhetorical one as far as i can tell, of pointing out the contradictions within the stated aims of humanitarian intervention. a worthwhile endeavour for someone wishing to note the extraordinary lies of the rhetorics of the US and others, but it does lead implicitly (i've not seen him claim it explicitly so far) to the conclusion that in order to not embody such contradictions, the US and others should really intervene in a humanitarian capacity, and not simply pick and choose according to kissingeresque calculations. in short, chomsky wants the militaries of the US and others to be true liberals and not fake ones. and in order for this to offer itself as coherent, you'd have to understate the close collusion between the regular players in the scheme which became apparent in july.
> This suggests to me that the US needed a humanitarian pretext for
militarizing the region in the shadow of the Vietnan syndrome. What
better and more cynical cover than protection of the East Timorese whom
the US is allowing AGAIN to be slaughtered though this time in order to
justify militarization in the name of humanitarian intervention?<
let's note another moment in history: the US did not care in 1974 who was in control of east timor. it only cared that it was not a non-aligned country in the region, nominally open to the invitations of russia. in this sense, australian and indonesia carved up the pacific between them. the deal was done there: australia okayed indonesian annexation in the final analysis, not the US. here's a passage worth citing again (Whitlam was the Labor PM):
"The meeting between Suharto and Whitlam was held in Jogjakarta early in September [1974]. At the time Indonesia was taking soundings on the Timor question from its neighbours and other powers. What happened in Jogjakarta was summed up by Peter Hastings in _Australian Outlook_ with the comment that, uninvited, Whitlam 'practically gave East Timor to Indonesia'. The impression was conveyed that Indonesia could do what best suited it in Timor and Australia would not object. As a political scientist at the University of Indonesia, Juwano Sudarsono, told me in Jakarta on 24 February 1975, 'The Australian Government will, at the least, tolerate subversive operations [by Indonesia in Timor]. But if the Australian press shouts about it then the Australian Government will have to do something. But would it do more than verbally criticise Indonesia and at the same time tolerate Indonesian subversion? There is a high degree of co-operation between Australia and Indonesia at present. Mr Whitlam may have to put up with criticism from the left of his party. However, Timor is not a major issue in Australian politics, certainly not an election issue. So the Australian Government will allow Indonesia to do, to a certain extent anyway, what it likes with Timor'. "
- from Bill Nicol's _Timor: The Stillborn Nation_, 1978.
> Minerals, raw materials and oil from Indonesia may seem insubstantial
in a value sense (due to declining terms of trade), but they are crucial
physical inputs (moreover, much world trade goes through Indonesia). The
world economy cannot run without stability in South East Asia (see
writings
of Gabriel Kolko). There are many threats of instability due to recent
horrendous leaps into poverty in the region. This is what the US will
provide for a price (though the ground troops will indeed be Asian).<
yes, and all of this is important. last time i looked, the largest volume of world trade goes through these parts. but an open militarisation of the region, in the sense of overt military control in jakarta, means instability, not stability. if the indonesians see the possibility of democratisation closed off, and if this is not undertaken through the pretexts of nationalism and chauvinism (against, say, ethnic chinese or 'the west') then it will be more of a problem for stabilising the trade routes. the connections that have been established and nurtured between the indonesian middle classes and the military/capitalists will break. the impoverishment in the region made this possible, but it was deflected by the pretense of a transition to democracy. this seems to me quite pivotal.
Angela _________