Fw: East Timor Massacre Plans Known Months Ago

rc-am rcollins at netlink.com.au
Mon Sep 13 12:18:27 PDT 1999


[when information on this was leaked to the Aust Opposition last month, namely that the Defense Minister had information on this in July, his first response was to deny it, his second response (challenged for having lied to the parliament) was to say that many papers passed across his desk and he didn't have time to read them all... one of the more lame excuses, since it was already obvious the Aust govt were lobbying the UN hard to not move in an armed presence during the ballot. the fwd below also notes the coffee plantations as central pieces in the determination of the TNI campaign...

Angela _________

----- Original Message ----- From: Bob Olsen <bobolsen at interlog.com> To: <mai-not at flora.org> Sent: Tuesday, 14 September 1999 2:43 Subject: East Timor Massacre Plans Known Months Ago

The following report indicates that the massacre

of East Timorese peoples was planned months in

advance and "Western intelligence services knew

about it."

The Toronto Globe and Mail is Canada's daily

conservative business newspaper.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/gam/International/19990913/UDILIN2.html

see also: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/gam/International/19990913/UEASTN.html

The Globe and Mail] Monday, Sep 13, 1999

How the Indonesian army plotted to destroy a nation

For nearly a year, generals hatched murderous plan

to block independence for East Timor -- and Western

intelligence services knew about it

London Observer Service; With reports from John Aglionby in

Jakarta, Jason Burke in London, Christopher Zinn in Darwin,

Eduardo Gonzales in Lisbon, Ed Vulliamy in New York.

Monday, September 13, 1999

The morning dawned bright and

humid. The dirty, dusty streets of

Dili were emptier than usual. It

was Tuesday, Aug. 31, and the

people of East Timor had woken to

an uncertain future.

The day before, they had voted

overwhelmingly for independence

from their Indonesian overlords.

The result of the poll, though

some days away, was obvious. As

far as the people of East Timor

were concerned, their days of

bondage were over.

But in the anonymous military

headquarters in Dili, a small

group of men was deep in talk. For

them, rule from Jakarta was

anything but finished. The men

were the leaders of Indonesia's

military machine on the island and

the chiefs of the three biggest

militia gangs. And the topic was

the total eradication of the

pro-independence East Timorese

population.

Documentary evidence, clandestine

intelligence intercepts and

eyewitness accounts show that the

atrocities in East Timor have been

carefully conceived for nearly a

year by the Indonesian army. The

aim, quite simply, is to destroy a

nation. Our investigation has also

revealed that Western intelligence

services were also aware of the

army's plans -- and warned the

United Nations, many months ago.

At military headquarters in Dili,

a greying, tight-lipped Indonesian

soldier, Major-General (Zacky)

Anwar Makarim, outlined what he

wanted done. The militias were to

conduct house-to- house searches

in pro-independence towns and

villages and put Dili under siege.

All routes in and out of the city

were to be blocked, and water and

electricity supplies cut. All

communications with the outside

world would be stopped.

Then, the commanders were told,

their men would have to round up

thousands of women and children

who would be trucked across the

border into Indonesian West Timor.

Thousands of people who were more

amenable to rule from Jakarta

would be shipped in to replace

them. Finally, and crucially, the

United Nations and all journalists

would be forced out. The generals

wanted no witnesses to the

killings.

For the Indonesian military, a

year of planning was about to bear

fruit. For the people of East

Timor, a nightmare was about to

start.

The townspeople living near the

Indonesian army base at Atambua,

just inside West Timorese

territory, have grown used to the

occasional helicopter and the

Indonesian army patrols. If there

is a sudden surge in activity, the

pro-independence Falantil

guerrilla commanders are informed.

For years, such reports have been

rare. In November, they increased.

Around the same time, 5,000 West

Timorese -- who are almost

identical to East Timor's

population in ethnic background,

but Muslim rather than

predominantly Roman Catholic --

were recruited into new militias

by the Indonesian army. To

reinforce their numbers, more

recruits were brought from the

Indonesian heartland of Java.

Though concerns were growing in

East Timor, the purpose of the

troops and the militiamen and

their eventual destination

remained unclear.

But a few days later, the riddle

was solved. On Nov. 4, 1998, 400

elite troops from Indonesia's

notorious Kopassus Group 4 unit --

crack soldiers trained to track

down and eliminate political

dissidents -- arrived in the port

town of Atapupu. Some of them were

immediately stripped of their

uniforms and went into East Timor

in disguise and plainclothes.

Others started transporting arms

to the border.

On Jan. 27, President B. J.

Habibie took the world by surprise

in announcing that East Timor --

under violent occupation since the

Indonesian invasion of 1975 --

would be allowed to choose between

political autonomy within

Indonesia or independence. No one

in East Timor expected the

announcement, but the Indonesian

army had been worrying about such

an eventuality for months.

The coffee estates of Ermera,

nearly 30 kilometres south of

Dili, paint a fertile green swath

through the barren landscape. They

might not look like it, but the

estates are one reason the East

Timorese are dying in their

thousands. They are among

thousands of properties owned by

the Indonesian military in East

Timor.

If East Timor goes, the army's

argument runs, everything will

fall apart as the Indonesian

archipelago's multitude of

minorities press for their own

autonomy.

The preparations to launch a

campaign of terror in East Timor

were spotted as early as July,

1998, when it was reported that

the Indonesian army was starting

to establish civilian armed

militias in East Timor. No one

paid any serious attention to the report.

The nation of 210 million people

was in political and economic

turmoil, and Mr. Habibie had been

in office for slightly more than

two months. Even when U.S.

satellites spotted Indonesian

troop movements along the frontier

with East Timor late last year,

little notice was taken.

But by the end of January, when

Mr. Habibie made his offer of a

plebiscite, it was clear something

serious was developing. Militias

were not only active in all the

western districts, but they were

also starting to terrorize and

kill.

Covalima, a district in the

southwestern corner of the

territory, was chosen as the

testing ground for the army's

strategy. Within days, thousands

of people had fled to the district

town, Suai, and set up a camp in

the grounds of a half-built

church. Witnesses interviewed in

the church at the time said the

soldiers had clearly been in

charge of orchestrated attacks.

The growing fears of the East

Timorese were reinforced when it

was learned that Gen. Makarim was

to be the senior military adviser

of the Indonesian government's

plebiscite team in East Timor. A

U.S.-trained intelligence

specialist, he had done several

tours in East Timor and had a

reputation for callous violence.

Many of his troops were also

U.S.-trained.

The truth of what was about to

happen was dawning outside East

Timor, too. On March 4,

representatives of Australia's

Defence Intelligence Organization

in Jakarta cabled their

headquarters that the Indonesian

military was "clearly protecting

and in some cases operating with"

the militias.

Basing their reports on

intercepted satellite telephone

conversations between senior

officers in Dili and Jakarta, they

said the militias would implement

a scorched-earth policy if the

vote went against them.

The Australian government passed

the damning information on to the

UN.

The UN also received documents

from resistance sources revealing

the Indonesian plans. Even their

own security briefing for the

third week of August noted

preparations for a "full-scale

offensive after the [plebiscite]."

By this stage, there were militias

in each of the territory's 13

districts, their leaders carefully

chosen by the army. The boss in

Dili was Eurico Guterres. Reports

say Gen. Makarim personally gave

Mr. Guterres a list of 370 people

to eliminate.

Further orders were given in early

May in an army document obtained

by pro-independence leaders.

"Massacres should be carried out

from village to village after the

announcement of the ballot if the

pro-independence supporters win,"

it said, adding that the

independence movement "should be

eliminated from its leadership

down to its roots."

-----------------------------------

Copyright © 1999 Globe Information Services

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/gam/International/19990913/UEASTN.html

[The Globe and Mail] Monday, Sep 13, 1999

'UN betrayed Timorese,' Canadian charges.

Election official regrets his role.

Walter Dorn told the people of

East Timor not to worry. They

could vote in peace, he said, and

the United Nations would help

protect them against reprisals.

..... snip ........

.............................................

Bob Olsen, Toronto bobolsen at interlog.com

.............................................



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