The Ottawa Citizen
MULRONEY TOAST OF REAGANITES
Brian Mulroney's election was a 'great victory' for Americans,
and they agonized over ways to make him look good at home,
confidential White House documents reveal
By Lawrence Martin
Push Canada toward American market values. "Prod" the Canadian government to jack up military spending. Move on free trade because it's a "great victory" for the United States. Thank God, Trudeau is gone. Thank heavens for Brian Mulroney. He is "ideologically on our wavelength." With him, the U.S. can bring about a "revolution in Canada-U.S. relations." But he should be thrown a bone or two so that he doesn't look like a "lackey."
Such are some of the highlights from White House memoranda just released by Washington's National Security Council under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The documents cover relations between prime minister Mulroney and president Ronald Reagan. They have been released eight years after a July 1991 application by this reporter
The documents provide strong confirmation that, in American eyes, Canada's move from Pierre Trudeau to Mr. Mulroney was a change from the worst of times to the best of times.
In the White House papers, Mr. Trudeau comes in for a drubbing. His protectionist policies "led to a massive capital flight out of Canada," says an internal security council study prepared for Mr. Reagan. The same study accuses Mr. Trudeau of overseeing "16 years of neglect of Canada's military structure." As a result, Mr. Trudeau "sharply reduced Canada's ability to play a security role commensurate with its resources."
In minutes of a high-level meeting, then-secretary of state George Shultz describes Mr. Trudeau as "particularly obstinate on North-South matters." Memos decry his penchant for trying to play the role of "interpreter" between the Soviets and the U.S.
Many of the released documents cover American preparations for the 1985 Quebec City meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Mulroney, which was dubbed the "Shamrock Summit" and which opened the door to free-trade negotiations. Correspondence with NSC director Robert McFarlane reveals that the Americans wanted to move early on free trade -- earlier than Canada. But they feared, as a memo put it, that "the Canadians do not appear to be ready to move that far."
However a declaration of intent on liberalized trade was agreed to before the summit took place. Mr. McFarlane then received a memo from his top Canada-desk official, Tyrus Cobb. "The declaration on trade came together nicely and represents a major victory for the United States," the memo said. Trade ambassador Bill Brock expressed similar enthusiasm, telling Mr. Reagan at a cabinet session that the trade declaration is "an exceptional agreement" from the U.S. standpoint.
Viewing Mr. Mulroney's highly co-operative approach on trade and investment, military spending, and American foreign policy, Mr. Cobb wrote in March 1985 that "we have what amounts to a revolution in U.S.-Canadian affairs." Mr. Shultz called it "a potential watershed."
The Americans agonized about giving Mr. Mulroney something in return so he would look good on his home turf.
The matter is raised repeatedly in the memoranda, particularly in respect to the issue of acid rain. Mr. McFarlane is told in a memo: "It is imperative that we demonstrate sufficient flexibility in Quebec on this issue to permit Mulroney to claim that he can influence our actions. Unless we can make some accommodation, Mulroney will be seriously embarrassed, public reaction in Canada will likely focus disproportionately on his failure, and his ability to deliver in the future on other issues of concern to us will be damaged."
At the same time as they recognized that Mr. Mulroney did not want to be seen "as a 'lackey' of Washington," the Americans were not exactly prepared to trade favours. The internal NSC study said that "we will also wish to disabuse the Canadians of any expectations that recent policy changes which accommodate U.S. interests necessarily entail corresponding reciprocity from our side."
At Quebec City, the two sides appointed special envoys to study the acid rain problem. The Americans saw this as being enough to mollify the Mulroney government at that time. Mr. Reagan, as is clear from the memoranda, wasn't convinced acid rain was a problem. At an NSC meeting he pointed out that "we haven't had air as clean as we now have for decades." The correspondence suggests that the two overriding priorities of the Americans were to drive Canada toward open markets and to push it toward a much larger military and defence role.
At a meeting on Feb. 19, 1985, deputy treasury secretary Richard Darman told Mr. Reagan that "he should attempt to move the Canadians even further toward a market economy."
The NSC internal report recommends that "the president may wish to put forward our view that a Canadian economy completely free and open to outside investors is a major avenue available for improving Canada's economic situation."
The Americans were delighted with Mr. Mulroney's accommodations on military matters. He is saluted for increased military spending and his "courageous" effort in supporting, unlike other NATO allies, some aspects of Mr. Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, or Star Wars, program.
Minutes of an NSC meeting record Mr. Reagan as pointing out that "the prime minister recently announced a significant increase in Canada's troop commitment to Europe -- something on the order of 1,200 additional troops. This is the sort of positive direction we want to encourage with Canada. For that reason (Mr. Reagan) indicated he was not inclined to lean too heavily on the prime minister in areas where they were not as forthcoming as we would wish, such as investment and energy."
But after the Shamrock Summit, Washington wanted to keep up the pressure on military spending and defence co-operation. An NSC strategy paper made the following recommendation: "Use every summit and every meeting between the secretaries of state and defence with their Canadian counterparts to prod the GOC (Government of Canada) on this subject."
The summit in Quebec City was the one where Mr. Mulroney called Mr. Reagan down on stage for their celebrated rendition of When Irish Eyes are Smiling. Briefing papers for Mr. Reagan didn't specify the sing-song would take place, but advised him to prepare for something. "In the last act, you and Mulroney will appear on stage with the performers, so you might want to practice your 'buck and wing.' "
U.S. officials were concerned that Canadian issues had been overlooked for a long time, and with the advent of Mr. Mulroney decided to initiate a major review. Notes for a McFarlane talk with Mr. Reagan suggest that he say to him: "Mr. President, Canada is, as you have pointed out, our most important ally. However, we have not seriously addressed U.S.-Canada relations in over a decade."
The documents reveal that if Canada had suffered benign neglect in the past, such was not the case during the Reagan-Mulroney period. The internal study on Canada was supplemented by many high-level meetings among Reagan administration officials on a wide range of Canadian concerns.
Mr. Mulroney had come to power only seven months before the Shamrock Summit. As is indicated in a McFarlane memo to Mr. Reagan on the eve of the summit, the turnabout in relations was not only sudden, but unprecedented.
"Your trip should open a new chapter in Canadian-American relations, building on your excellent personal relationship with the prime minister. Mulroney has increasingly taken a pro-U.S. stance in foreign affairs and has been more forthcoming on many bilateral issues. The result has been the establishment of a greater degree of harmony in our ties than ever existed before."