East Timor, Clinton, & the World Bank

Rakesh Bhandari bhandari at phoenix.Princeton.EDU
Thu Sep 16 17:49:51 PDT 1999


Some time long ago Angela rightly questioned my assertion that the US would get Japan to pay for its organization of security forces in Indonesia one way or another (holding on to US securities, further expansionary policy, further trade or financial liberalization).

Just to make my seemingly wild assertion a bit more plausible, I forward here a few examples of how the US has parlayed military hegemony into financial power before.


>From Susan Strange in her last book *mad money*:

"The implicit bargain--that the United States provided security and Japan paid for it--became more evident in the 1992 Gulf War. In the end, Japan paid some $13 billion of the costs of Desert Storm. Some calculations even suggested that the US showed a net profit out of the Gulf War. Every year, moreover, Japan was paying almost 3/4 of the onon salary costs of US bases in Japan, most of them in Okinawa, so that it was cheaper for the US Defense Department to keep soldiers in Japan than form them to stay at home. That the the Japanese govt raised no objection, even when the Okinawans did, could be explained by their continued reliance on the US forces, especially the US Navy, to act as a police force in the Pacific.

"Six years after the Cold War ended, there was rising tension between Taiwan and mainland China. In February 1996, the Japanese were understandably reassured by an American show of intermediating force in the shape of the aircraft carrier Nimitz steaming through the Taiwan staits. North Korea was another source of insecurity. Would its weak but repressive govt, facing a collapsing economy, be tempted to use nuclear weapons against the South? There were also unresolved conflicts between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands, and with China over the Spratlys." p. 45-6

And an example from almost 30 years ago:

"In Feb 1965 de Gaulle attacked the 'extraordinary priviliges' of the dollar in the international gold exchange standard, set up under the Bretton Woods Agreement back in the 1940s. He compared this system unfavourably with one traditionally based on gold. But his fond dream of a united European front agains the US and the almighty dollar soon faded away when the Germans failed to stand by the French in the debates on intl monetary reform. Germany owed its security fromt eh Red Army to the US nuclear umbrella; the price, as the US repeatedly made clear, of the implicit bargain was German membership and support for NATO and compliance with US interests in the management of money and finance. Gewrman leaders all understood this, so that, later, before Nixon unilaterlly devalued the dollar in 1971, Germany was the first western ally after Canada to agree not to embarrass Washington by asking for gold in return for the dollars it held in its growing monetary reserves." p. 64-5

rb



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