Adam wrote:
>I didn't say that 15th or 16th century Spain or France were _republics_,
but that they were nation-states. <
I think they were states, but not nation-states. I wrote: "neither Spain nor France in the 15th century... purported to represent the Spanish of French _people_". it's not a question of republic versus monarchy, since citizenship laws also exists in ostensibly monarchical countries (australia being one). I think it's a question of recognising that states have not always had a national demeanor and legitimation, and what we may now define as national has not always taken the form of a state. (it might well be the case that citizenship becomes subjectivity in order to found a nation-state, but that's another though related story about the oscillation between subjectivity and citizenship.)
> Well, I didn't say anything about a 'national strategy' against global
capital, so I'm not really sure what you're asking. Please explain.<
you wrote in your previous post: "now that global capital has become so powerful, the nation-state is the only institution strong enough restrain it -- through capital controls, etc". this is a national strategy against global capital you are outlining here, is it not?
there are a few unstated assumptions here: that national and global capital are distinct (from the perspective of workers); that the state stands aside or above the struggles between capital and labour rather than being an inherent moment in (global) capitalist relations; that any national controls on capital movements are not an attempt by certain nation-states to hold a greater share of a global surplus but rather an attempt to retain a greater portion of a national surplus... etc.
how, for instance, is it possible to claim that the source of capital (of the surplus) is national and thereby to claim a need for greater national controls?
when you sit down at the computer to work, isn't this made possible by international exploitation and international labour, perhaps in a dead form, but still the labour of countless others is assumed?
and when different states and regions vie for capital investments, does this capital (surplus) originate in those countries or regions, or is it already global?
or, when you {generic 'you', since I'm not sure what you mean by capital controls} claim therefore that profits made in a country should be reinvested in that country, you have to pretend that the world market and the global labour in which and through which these 'national profits' are made, and which they presuppose, don't exist and should have no bearing on how one would claim the right to 'apportionment'.
oiboy wrote:
> Very interesting. I did not realize that Louis II (r. 1461-1483),
arguably the founder of the modern nation-state (read "Rosebush of War"),
had global-capitalism intentions. In fact, my impression was that he was
concerned with strengthening France against foreign interventions/invasions
and cutting down the power of local nobles in favor of a centralized
administration which could then implement infrastructure improvements
France-wide. <
I'm not that familiar with French history, but there was certainly a very lengthy conflict between Burgundy, Valois (the Louis'), etc dynasties (and not a consolidation against 'foreign' interventions) -- ie, it was a struggle over which royal house was to prevail over various discrete vassalages and dynastic estates. (and I do recall that Swiss and German mercenaries were crucial to the successes of Valois rule, and Burgundy was allied with Anglo forces in its wars against Valois power, which renders the 'foreign'/'national' distinction somewhat redundant.) it's true that consolidation of 'France' under absolutist rule occurred sooner than many other places, but later than Louis II (?), and I think it's important to recall in this discussion a) the context for that consolidation; and b) the extent to which subjects regarded themselves as 'french'.
a) I already mentioned in a prior post that the occasion for the emergence of the nation-state is "as a response to the de-territorialisation of (eg) feudal systems of exploitation", the struggles of the peasantry against feudal forms of exploitation. that is, the emergent bourgeoisie and sections of the nobility conceded to absolutist rule (the pre-figurement of national concentration) as a bulwark against an insurgent (and de-territorialised) peasantry.
Perry Anderson wrote "By 1653, Mazarin and Turenne had stamped out the last refuges of revolt. The progress of administrative centralisation and class reorganisation of the French monarchy revealed its efficacy... the propertied classes were now more united. The annealing process permitted by the co-existence of the two systems within a single State thus ended by ensuring much prompter solidarity against the masses. The very depth of the plebian unrest revealed by the Fronde shortened the last emotional breakaway of the dissident aristocracy from the monarchy: although there were to be further peasant risings in the 17th century, no conflux of rebellion from above and below ever occurred again. ... [Certain centralising] measures against refractory particularism of traditional institutions and groups provoked, of course, resentment both among the princes and peers, and the provincial gentry. But they did not alter the objective bond between the aristocracy and the State, henceforth more efficacious than ever in protecting the basis interests of the noble class." (_Lineages of the Absolutist State_, pp.99-101)
b) it was I think the French Revolution, and the pre-history of that (which includes the above), which asserted a connection between territory and the nationality of the population, as in 'Frenchmen'.
Angela _________