>The point about the Timor approach and the "less offensive" use of
>Australian and NZ troops in a "humanitarian" exercise is that the West
>learned lessons from Somalia.
>
>The interesting thing about the US intervention in Somalia was that they
>could mess it up so badly and get away with it. I think this is a result of
>Africa's relative marginalisation from the world economy and the lack of any
>real political opposition to this kind of intervention (even from the
>"humanitarian" NGO lobby). This allowed America in particular to utilise
>Somalia as a testing ground for new kinds of intervention. The fact that
>America's "Operation Restore Hope" (note the humanitarian title)
>intervention was a total disaster and set off a chain of events which
>ultimately led to the collapse of the Somali state - but more importantly,
>that this collapse has had no serious political repercussions for the West -
>shows just how they used Africa in particular to conduct their experiments
>in how to manage a new world order.
>
>This led them to develop new forms of 'pro-active' intervention e.g.
>genocide prevention. Subsequent events saw the flooding of a country like
>Burundi with an army of Western conflict resolution experts after the Rwanda
>disaster. The way things look for Africa is that they will in future
>utilise a Western-trained African army (South Africa is already scheduled to
>play the leading role in this as the junior partner in a perceived special
>relationship with the US) as a conflict resolution mechanism. Reduced
>western rivalry in Africa - there is much greater consensus at present on
>this kind of intervention - also makes this kind of approach easier.
>
>Russell
I think this is broadly a correct analysis. The US was undoubtedly bruised in Somalia, which turned out to be much more difficult than Grenada. In opposing US hegemonism we do not have to make out it is omnipotent, and has no limits to its domination. It certainly has difficulties that constrain it, and global campaigning can further constrain its freedom of action.
Conflict resolution measures seem to be compatible with a marxist approach: they define interest groups which have material needs. They avoid idealising peace, and argue that it is an alternative to war, and another way of managing conflict. The main weakness of conflict resolution discourse at the moment is its lack of specific reference to classes. But progressive influence could help shape that.
I agree Africa has become something of an urgent test ground for this. Conflict resolution measures are widely seen as having helped the end of Apartheid in South Africa. That was not a free gain - tens of thousands lost their lives in the so-called black on black violence during the negotiations. I agree there are invidious issues like the involvement of Nigeria at the front of the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone, but at least it was not US troops.
The line of demarcation with imperialism on intervention is not intervention as such but is on the economic programme of reconstruction that usually follows intervention. In many ways the referendum in East Timor is part of the fragmentation of the Indonesian state into different areas often defined by religion. This process has been accelerated by the crises of international finance capital. Finance capital cannot provide the answers about how different communal groups can live and productively work together. A more radical democratic economic programme should accompany these interventions, calling for preservation of the security of livelihood of the poorest people of the territory.
By contrast with some relative stabilisation in West Africa, in the Congo contrasting alliances of African states are carving out spheres of influence as if it was 19th centruy Poland. The only forces that benefit from this in the background are old fashioned imperialist interests using it to promote inter-imperialist rivalry.
In Angola the fighting has deteriorated to such a point and with so little principle that an arguable international option is to cut off humanitarian aid to one side in the hope of accelerating a military victory. It is seriously argued that pumping western charity into Sudan perpetuates the apparently endless suffering from an unresolved conflict.
It therefore suggests that managing contradictions by non-violent conflict management is broadly progressive. Armed intervention forces, (preferably not those of the imperialist powers) may be beneficial at times so long as they do not try to deny the reality of the power structures on the ground.
There are five lines of demarcation with simplistic ultra leftists on these questions:
1) Demonising imperialism is not analysing imperialism
2) It is possible to call for reforms of the international policy of imperialist states even short of the socialist victory in each component country of the world.
3) that a process of understanding is developing which is the frame work of world governance.
4) that the marxist theory of the state, on the international level as well as the national, (and by that I mean the emerging forces of a global superstate) is not purely about a body of armed men capable of suppressing one group in favour of another. It is also about shaping and having an ideological framework of social justice, which to some extent has a life of its own, to which appeals can be made.
5) that to weaken imperialism and transnationals, world structures should be strengthened and redesigned to set a stadnard of accountability. One of the most important powers for a new world government is to be able to raise taxes directly to pay for its own independent intervention force.
Chris Burford
London