Moral disputes are disputes about what we ought to do. They are practical in that they are about how we ought to act, not about theory per se or what is. They are often solved not by some ultimate discusion of the good or the right but about what is the case. Claiming that disputes are not moral disputes if there is underlying moral agreement results in it being stipulatively true that probably the vast majority of what we now call moral disputes will not be such. I find this departure from ordinary discourse unhelpful and it certainly will not stop ordinary folk ( and everyone else I expect) from discussion these issues in terms of what ought to be done.
Cheers, Ken Hanly
gcf at panix.com wrote:
> Ken Hanly:
> > On what grounds does Habermas claim that science cannot be an arbiter of moral
> > disputes? Is this just a logical consequence of its being in a separate "sphere"?
> > I doubt that science can settle all moral disputes but it certainly could settle
> > some....
>
> At some point you reach intuitive, non-instrumental
> evaluations. There, science can't tell you what to value
> unless you arbitrarily decide to evaluate it into a
> moral arbiter.
>
> Gordon