On Sun, 6 Feb 2000 05:30:45 -0500 Rob Schaap <rws at comserver.canberra.edu.au> wrote:
> As Justin says - this is difficult stuff. For my part, I think it IS a
> moral choice.
What constitutes its morality?
I understand morality to be constituted by imperatives (demand), which is linked to the law - specifically, the imaginary. So, "I ought to be a good person" is a moral imperative - in the same way that "I ought to be a bad person" is. One might consider, moral for whom? For Hegel, the Absolute, the Althusser, the Subject, for Habermas, the Unlimited communicative community. In short - the Other. In this way, moral imperatives law any substantial content, because they are always tautological. "Goodness for the sake of goodness alone" - "duty for the sake of duty alone" - that sort of thing (the moral core is the Master Signifier). There is no content, no substance of the good or of duty in this imperative. In order to bring substance into the imperative, the abstract tautology must be translated into practical advice or action. "I ought to do X in this particular situation." But this translation *always* contradicts the imperative - because the imperative is nothing more than that - an imperative. In the translations then, one *fails* to accomplish a moral act and is left with an ethical choice. An ethical choice is constituted by less than perfect solutions, in Kantian terminology, two radical evils. As such, ethical decisions are matters of praxis and contingent judgement.
In this way, we could say that the legalization of abortion is an ethical judgement. But, strictly speaking, it would not be a moral one. In one were to actuall fulfill their moral obligation, the Other, the objective cause of their morality would disappear. The self would be assimilated into the Other (as is the case in psychosis). As ethical judgements, we are always called to be responsible for our transgression - and the power contained / manifest within such choices.
ken