***** [Peter Sloterdijk's paper,] 'Regeln fur den Menschenpark: Ein Antwortschreiben zum Brief uber den Humanismus' (Rules for the Human Theme-Park: A Reply to the Letter on Humanism), was addressed to an international conference on 'Philosophy after Heidegger'Š.
In his conference address Sloterdijk seeks to problematize discussion of the ethics of gene technology. He mounts a critique of the legacy of humanism after Heidegger, which, he claims, misrecognizes and places artificial limitations upon the potential for human development. In opposition to this legacy, he attempts to establish grounds for alternative interpretive practices through which to think the effects of biological research. Much of the controversy arises from his use of the German terms _Zuchtung_ (breeding, cultivation) and _Selektion_ (selection) to elaborate an anti-humanist theory which would orient the use of gene technology.
Sloterdijk is Professor of Philosophy at the Fachhochschule in Karlsruhe. He became well known with the publication of his bestselling first book, _Kritik der zynischen Vernunft_ (1983, translated as _The Critique of Cynical Reason_ in 1987), in which he traces the fall of modern consciousness into a pervasive cynicism, understood as participation in a 'collective, realistically attuned way of seeing things'. Ironically, it argues, the success of enlightening and consciousness-raising critical interventions has been to make it clear to everyone that they are miserable, whilst not providing them with the means to change their situation. Thus, 'cynicism is _enlightened false consciousness_'. In response, Sloterdijk attempts to reanimate a positive mode of _kynicism_, taken from Diogenes, through which to phrase new and resilient modes of enlightenment. One of the main characteristics of this positive mode of cynicism is its emphasis on strategic, satirical provocationsŠ.
ŠSloterdijk inflects Heidegger's assertion of ontological difference in 'Letter on Humanism' with a specifically technological biasŠ.[H]e gestures towards the human genome as a kind of alphabet, a codex, from which human needs can be read and which can structure how they are met. His proposal is for a thorough technologization of humanity through genetic manipulation, generalized as a principle with which to govern the progress of society. In this technological dream of a new order, gene technology promises a recoding of the social/human according to a reductive model of the biologically determined organism, the body. The social ramifications of this recoding are entirely speculative.
The latter part of Sloterdijk's address is a meditation on the criteria for the selection of those that will govern via gene technology, and the characterization of the role they would have in shaping society. As such it has been received in the German press with alarm. Thomas Assheur (_Die Zeit_ 2 September) reads Sloterdijk as calling for an elite group of philosophers and 'appropriate' scientists to take up and transform the role of Plato's 'statesman' to make the decisions that will guide humanity into the future. But what would differentiate this group from those already guiding the situation? Sloterdijk gives only the vaguest cluesŠ
ŠAt the beginning of September, Sloterdijk published an extraordinary letter (_Die Zeit_, 2 September) accusing Habermas of agitating against him. The tone of the letter is petulant: 'you have talked _about_ me with numerous people, never _with_ me.' It appears that Habermas - who has not published anything on this affair - did, however, write letters and make phone calls to criticize the Elmau address. Sloterdijk also accuses him of sending copies of the text to ex-students working in the press, marked with instructions on how to misinterpret it. All of this is summed up in the claim that Habermas 'objectifies' Sloterdijk. Habermas's criticisms position Sloterdijk 'as a mechanism, not as a person'. This makes Sloterdijk feel free to vent his spleen: 'You belong to the inhuman heirs of the ideology critique style of thoughtŠ.You are, in this, only an average supporter of a problematic habit that one once glossed over with the honorary office of critique.' All very entertaining. The letter rises to its hyperbolic finale in which - on the grounds that Habermas chose to discuss his speech among colleagues and not directly with him - Sloterdijk accuses Habermas of performatively contradicting the premises of his own discourse theoryŠ:
Critical theory is, on this Second of September, dead. She was long since bedridden, the sullen old woman, now she has passed away completely. We will gather at the grave of an epoch, to take stock, but also to think of the end of an hypocrisy. Thinking means thanking, said Heidegger. I say, rather, thinking means to heave a sigh of relief. (_Die Zeit_, 9 September)
Even if we take Sloterdijk's letter seriously, it is still a source of surprise that the author of _The Critique of Cynical Reason_ is overcome in the face of the outrage his own provocation has caused. Manfred Frank (_Die Zeit_ 23 September), himself no fan of Habermas, dismisses Sloterdijk's claims as a 'pointless flirtation with embarrassing material'. Ernst TugendhatŠsays Sloterdijk's claims are 'rubbish', asking 'what have things come to when critique must always first obtain the consent of the author?' If significance is to be granted this exchange then perhaps it could be found in elaboration of Sloterdijk's failure to live up to his own call for bold, _kynical_, provocation?Š
All of the texts discussed here are available on the Internet at http://www.zeit.de, which has a webpage devoted to the debate. *****
Yoshie