>Lacan's theories are not only silly but aggessively corrupt and corrupting.
Let me cite a couple of instances where the use of freudian and lacanian theory does not make you upset:
- when Yoshie uses the word 'problematic' -- a concept taken from Althusser in his attempt to group lacanian and marxist understandings of the practice of reading.
- when various people speak of such-and-such being 'symptoms' of such-and-such. A formulation which is apparently acceptable when it comes to defining and construing -- oh, let's pick something at random --'pomo' as an inverted/perverted/diverted understanding of reality but not to be applied to anything else.
The first you either don't notice or you conveniently forget its theoretical lineage, and so assume it's not that awful lacanian stuff.
The second, well, what that does show is that it's quite permissible to use the word 'symptom' as derision, but once anyone begins to use the accompanying framework in which such a word gained its meaning (the explanation of content by way of form), then you instead think that this constitutes merely derision, and becomes thereby unacceptable.
The concept of 'symptom' is not far removed from 'psychotic', since in order for A or B to be symptomatic of C or D, then a process of distortion is assumed to have taken place.
I've a specific question though, for both Carrol and Ken: What are the specific differences between the concepts of 'false consciousness' and 'psychosis'?
Why, for instance, is the former acceptable to Carrol, whereas the latter isn't? (I'm assuming, of course, that it is acceptable to Carrol since he's never gotten upset by its use.)
Why is the latter acceptable to Ken, whereas the former isn't?
What are the _specific_ differences between the concepts, if any?
Angela