Nazis etc.

Brad De Long delong at econ.Berkeley.EDU
Thu Feb 10 15:43:58 PST 2000



>[address oddity]
>
>Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 22:50:22 +0200
>From: jeffrey sommers <jsommers at latnet.lv>
>
>Brad,
>
>The Soviets, through Litinov, pleaded repeatedly for collective
>action earlier than this, and Churchill (not in power) wanted to
>cooperate with them. The Soviets were repeatedly rebuffed. The
>Soviets then completely lost confidence in Britain in France in 1938
>when they refused the Soviet offer to jointly stop Germany in its
>latest advance against Czechoslovakia. When England and France
>finally did declare war, it was the "Phony War," with no real action
>taken against Germany. The Soviets observed this all with great
>alarm. Seeing how swiftly France fell to Germany in 1940, the
>Soviets then grabbed the Baltics and prepared for a war
>they perceived would come after a German defeat of England. Their
>miscalculation on the chronology cost them untold lives lost and
>almost the war as Stalin refused to believe the war was at hand when
>the Germans invaded.
>
>Double-crossed many times by England and France, the Soviets by 1939
>thought it clever to turn the tables on them. Nothing admirable
>here, just realpolitik....
>
>Michael Jabara Carley's 1939: THE ALLIANCE THAT NEVER WAS (Chicago:
>Ivan R. Dee, 1999), is quite useful for surveying this history.
>
>Best,
>
>Jeff Sommers

Realpolitick, but counterproductive and ineffective realpolitik...

As I said: "Don't [Chamberlain and Daladier] get brownie points for being willing to take on the beast, given that everybody else waited for the beast to come after them?" Seems to me that the answer is "yes"...

Brad DeLong



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