> (Foucault is no Susie Bright, you see.)
Too bad, eh? Fisting fucking in the third trimester...
> Now, Lacan is another neo-ascetic. To escape what he says is the danger of
becoming the "instrument of the _jouissance_ of a God," Lacan proposes that
we look toward several mythical figures of sacrifice and renunciation...
I would have thought there was an obvious reason for this. First, God does not exist, so if you become the instrument of the jouissance of a God, you'd have to be crazy. Second, the political implications are nihilistic. I'm sure we can all agree that becoming the instrument of the Other, the will of another human being (unconditionally) isn't an intelligent thing to do. So "sacrifice" is the "giving up" of this overdeterminiation - castration. In other words, one stays true to their *desire* not its fulfillment (because the object cause of desire is always an illusion, an ideology).
> What interests Lacan is not mundane desires and pleasures that concern
utilitarians and (in a different way) Marxists; his interest lies in the
purification of desire beyond fear of death.
I'm not sure this is correct. Lacan in not under the impression that desire can be purified - and even if it could, this wouldn't be healthy. Desire is always corrupt, which is why Lacan talks about Sade and Kant in his Ethics. The "purity" of desire is the categorical imperative "ENJOY!" which Lacan explicitly argues that one should avoid fulfilling, lest desire itself be extinguished. In short, the truth of desire is the reproduction of itself, not its fulfillment in jouissance. Politically, castration is the path to jouissance (the impossibility of it all), not purity.
> (even if, or especially if, "traversing" Desire means death)
Where are you getting this? Desire and fantasy are not the same.
> A theme that is of interest to postmodern theologians, but inimical to
those of us who are of hedonistic persuasions.
Tell us more about postmodern theologians, which Zizek squarely sits against because of their ontological underpinnings (pomo theo usually uses one of two frameworks: the Other of the Other or the Other as vulnerable. The former is Lacan's definition of psychosis, the latter a colonial determiniation of what Otherness is (ie. if it is 'the Other' - how do you know that it is vulnerable?).
> Zizek's favorite philosopher besides Lacan & Hegel is Kant.
I doubt it. He's far more partial to Schelling, Althusser, Laclau and Mouffee, and Marx. Zizek has written much more about Schelling that he has about Kant.
> What matters for Kant is Law, not pleasures; and if the happiness (=
pleasures) of the people come into contradiction with Law, it is Law that
takes precedence. What philosophy can be more ascetic - and more
anti-revolutionary - than Kant's?
You've forgotten my posts about Kant... ethics is a viewpoint from the perspective evil. This is *completely* revolutionary - because the subject is always under the obligation to do more. The ethics of critical theory: "I am not a God" - which is the very point you quoted Lacan on above.
> To sum up, it is postmodern masters, not Marxists like us, who are
neo-ascetics.
Zizek isn't postmodern. He doesn't reduce politics to aesthetics - see his essay on Lacan's four discourses (Zizek, ed. "Four Discourses, Four Subjects" Cogito and the Unconscious"). You're going to have to do a lot more work to demonstrate the Zizek is postmodern, you haven't done it here. So far your arguments have been pieces and quotes and vague associations that do not consider the material on either side of the quote, red herrings as far as I can see. I'm open to the idea that Zizek is postmodern, but you're going to have to convince me.
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