><< You miss Kant's point. There is absolutely nothing wrong about struggling
> and enjoying it or struggling for benevolent reasons. Just don't expect
> any Brownie points. Action in accordance with duty is fine but doesn't get
> you any moral merit badges.
> Cheers, Ken Hanly
> >>
>
>Nicely put. I was trying to say that, but I failed to express it so elegantly
>and clearly. --jks
Kant is inconsistent on the question. On one hand, practical reason is a noumenal affair, thus he says that "no-one can have certain awareness of _having fulfilled_ his duty completely unselfishly....Besides, the non-existence of something (including that of an unconsciously intended advantage) can never be an object of experience" (Kant, _On the Common Saying: 'This may be True in Theory, but does not Apply in Practice_). On the other hand, Kant insists that we must still strive for moral purity, purged of all inclinations that compromise it, despite his equally strongly-worded insistence on the aforesaid impossibility: "...the true value of morality consists in the purity of its concept. Perhaps no recognized and respected duty has ever been carried out by anyone without some selfishness or interference from other motives; perhaps no-one will ever succeed in doing so, however he tries. But by careful self-examination, we can perceive a certain amount. We can be aware not so much of any accompanying motives, but rather of our own *self-denial* with respect to many motives which conflict with the idea of duty. In other words, we can be aware of the maxim of striving towards moral purity" (emphasis added, _On the Common Saying: 'This may be True in Theory, but does not Apply in Practice_). Therefore, our *self-denial* serves as a means by which we become aware of our "striving towards moral purity." A very Protestant notion that befits Kant's upbringing.
In other parts of his works, Kant is even more rigorist: "To be beneficent where one has a duty; and besides this, there are many persons who are so sympathetically constituted that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading joy around them and can rejoice in the satisfaction of others as their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however dutiful and amiable it may be, has nevertheless *no true moral worth*. It is on a level with such actions as arise from other inclinations...; for its maxim lacks *the moral content of an action done not from inclination but from duty*" (emphasis added, Kant, _Groundings for the Metaphysics of Morals_). Here, Kant presents duty and inclinations as if they are diametrically opposed.
Yoshie