<< Yes, that crude empiricism again. David Laibman told me, after
> hearing my criticisms of efficient market theory, that you can't
> refute a theory with empirical observations, only with another
> theory. I think that's silly, but I guess I'm just a crude empiricist.
And I disagree with Laibman. Are you sure that's what he said? Did he
ever write that anywhere? Silly may be too kind of a word for such a
statement. >>
At the risk of being condemned as silly myself, lwhile I don't know if Laibman said this, I think it is a perfectly sensible thing to say. It is a central lesson of Kuhn and the no-longer-new philosophy of science. If you have a theory that is pretty deeply embedded in your work--not just anoither hypothesis within the framework of such a theory, then you will explain away apparent empirical counterexamples. They will be unimportant, illusory, results of countertendencies. You will require, if you can be induced to give up the deep background theory at all, a theory that is at least as powerful and either explains the stuff your theory expalined PLUS the counterexamples, or offers a whole different way of looking at things that is more attractrive.
That is part of why, for example, neo-classical economists have on to a theory that us riddled with empirical counterexamples and ceteris paribus clauses--they thing there is nothing better to replace their theory. Same deal with Marxists,w ho are stuck with a creaky 19th century apparatus that nonetheness does some pretty good work; if faces what from the outside can be regarded as devastating problems, but people habg on to it. See the ongoing debate about FROP. The Marxists quite properly ask, what have you got that is better?
--jks