I made an analogy involving Nazis and Jews. W demurred, I asked:
<< >But why was the analogy ill-conceived?
> Because it throws in a case that is so obviously evil that it shuts down
any rational debate (you know, the ifs, the demurers, the devil's advocates
etc.). I speak here as a reformed sinner - I think that Doug should impose
a $1 fine for every utterance of the N-word on this list (the proceeds can
fund a dunk-a-Nazi keg party in NYC for lbo-talk listers).
Fair enough. Make allowances if you will for my training as an analytrcal philosopher. We get used to extreme analogies and these lose their resonance. I think I realized thsi when I was murmuring blithely about objections to utilitarianianism to a class of intro students (this was back when I was a professor) and I said that as long it would maximize utility, a utilitarian would have to approve of boiling a baby. This drew gasps of horror from about a third of the young women in the class; at the time, I thought maybe I had got their attention, but afterwards, I think that maybe the image simply blew everything else out of the water, including understanding. I will attempt to remain Nazirein, however, unless the dicsussion really calls for dragging in the nasty bastards.
if
>some workers have views that are contemptuous of due process or bigoted
>towards persons of different race, they are wrong. Their views do not
deserve
>more consideration because they are working class.
> Getting to the issue of legitimacy inevitably implies some form of
omniscient normative rationality - a position that I deliberately tried to
avoid. More preceisely, you can call someone a bigot only if you assume an
omniscient knowledge of what that person means by doing and saying certain
things (a position that is typically implied by rat-choice theorists).
No, I think you can do it from where you are. by appealing to shared premises, etc. Usually. If the disagreements get deep enough, it gets trickier. I have actually written several papers on how you don't have to appeal to some sotry of omnescient normative rationality even in the hard cases.
However, this is getting too philosophical. When I disagree witha view, it's because I think it is wrong. I may not have any deep reason for this judgment--most people don't--beyond the arguments for their own views and the arguments against the other guys'. You statrt talking omniscienct etc. around most people, they will be lost. They will say, but we wer talking about racism or due due process, not general criteria for global judgment. I think that this is a healthy and sensible attitude. Being a philosopher by training, I have views about general criteria, etc. But I don't think these are necessary to makea judgment about whether someone;s view of race or law is right or wring.
> The position I take is that it may or may not be bigoted, despite its
appearances to me. So rather than labeling someone a bigot, I need to make
an effort to understand what that person really means, instead of imposing
my meaning on his/her words or actions.
Well, we surely mighjt always be wrong and that is something good to bear in mind. Moreover, it never hurts to try to understand what someone really means if you are talking with her and want to change her mind or even understand her. But if she thinks that blacks are lazy, aggressive, etc., she holds bigoted views, although it may not be diplomatic to say that to her just ther\na nd there. And of course, we might be wrong--aftera ll, it is logically possible that blacks are lazy and agressive, etc., but we don't think so.
> This example suggest that intellectuals and pundits (such as myself) not
only have no monopoly on interpreting someone else's "communicative
actions," but oftentimes they are too prejudiced and close-minded to make
what can bona fide qualify as an educated guess. In my experience,
intelelctuals are probaly one of the most rigid-minded people - mainly
because of their training that emphasizes adherence to intellecctual dogmas
and authorities.
Sure, this is a point Chomsky makes. He says he would rather be ruled by the fisrt hundred names out of the phone book than by the Harvard-MIT faculty.
>
>Perhaps you diasgree: Nazi views of justice, you might think, deserve no
>particular consideration,
In fact I do. I think that refusing to consider Nazi views (oops, here
goes my buck) is a part of a larger effort to portray nazism as a
historcial exception and thus mentally isolate and neutralize its
implications.
You are punning. By "consideratrion" I did not mean "unworthy of reflective thought and analysis for their hisrorical lessons". I meand "unworthy of serious considerationa s something taht might possibly be true."
> Maybe you area
>Lukacsian who believes in the Standpoint of the Proletariat
> Au countraire, as previously argued, I specifically argued against any
claims to superior rationality (in fact, the vanguard party position is a
reformulation of the old Catholic dogma of papal infallibility). I amay
also add that I am less and less certain what is "true and objective"
(perhaps an early sign of senility).
Though you could believe in the SotP without thinking that the Party occupied it. I think Marx did believe just that.
--jks