> This is not a philosophical but a political question, and quantity does
> enter. Indonesian Nationalism affects the population of Indonesia,
> a few hundred million. U.S. nationalism affects (at a conservative
> estimate) around 5 billion people.
that doesn't make a decision about it qualitative though; it makes it strategic. strategically, it makes more sense and is more important to focus on US nationalism; but that does not make a critique of indonesian nationalism -- or any other smaller nationalism -- void, and certainly it doesn't provide a sufficient argument for rendering those other nationalisms (even if they might be shown to be nationalisms constituted by reference to an anti-US imperialism) worth uncritical support, remaining silent about or rendering it as a proxy to class struggle.
more to the point, the claim that some nationalism might be more progressive than others may well be true; as true as the claim that some capitalists are more progressive than others, indeed that capitalism is contradictory.
> To relate this to the current thread, I would argue that neither
> Angela nor I can make a principled judgment on the correctness
> or incorrectness of Indonesian nationalism.
indonesia is in the process of fragmenting, and indonesian nationalism only survives as a strong political committment in the indonesian military. indonesia is actually a good example of the infinite regress of nationalist claims: acehnese nationalism fighting for an islamic state; javanese sovereignty over the archipelago hoisted into indonesian nationalism by a certain dutch company; ambon, east timor, et cetera.
> 'You have to know something about a country before assuming that your
> Marxist template applies to it.'"
indeed you do, and it's surprising that you then cite indonesia. it's important to be clear about what those nationalist movements in indonesia (as well as yugoslavia) have done. the fragmentation of indonesia would have remained a cultural (rather than political-economic) aspiration were it not for asian financial crisis. the anti-austerity movements were decomposed into nationalist movements, as they were in yugoslavia, where different factions of the state bureaucracy, military, and sponsored overseers (eg, the carrascolaos in east timor) either scrambled for an increasing share of the surplus, or decreased the revenues to outlying territories, or threw their lot in with nationalist movements in the hope of restoring properties. (eg, the re-alignment of the UDI toward the CNRT.)
given the inability of the indonesian ruling class and military to deliver enough to make indonesian nationalism worthwhile, those smaller nationalisms acheived a boost as the ruling class itself fragmented and took up different flags. nationalism, in this context, has amounted to a decomposition, as the lines of allegiance (nationalist allegiance) between workers and ruling class are being reworked into smaller units. undoubtedly, unless those smaller nationalisms can deliver, that might well signal a refusal of the nationalist character of indonesian politics. but, given the flexibility of nationalism, and indeed its ability to render 'foreigners' as the cause of any inability to deliver, i doubt that's possible in the near future.
already, the deflection of an anti-capitalist struggle into racism is well established in the cycle of indonesian class struggles; just as it is in russia and (ex)yugoslavia.
Angela _________