> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-lbo-talk at lists.panix.com
> [mailto:owner-lbo-talk at lists.panix.com]On Behalf Of Michael Pollak
> On Mon, 3 Jan 2000, Nathan Newman wrote:
>
> > Despite the calls in Putin's new Presidency for a return to Russian
> > leadership and power against the West, the reality of the Chechnyan war is
> > that it is asserting Russian nationalism at the expense of Russian influence
> > and power in the world.
>
> This is not at all clear to me Nathan. Other powers are letting them have
> their way in something they think matters. If that's not power and
> influence, what is? If Russia manages to reverse the inroads of GUUAM and
> NATO's Partnership for Peace in the Caucasus; and if it manages to change
> the pipeline-laying plans in its favor, it will have served both its
> material interests and military interests.
That regaining control of internal territory within Russia (not even within the boundaries of the old Soviet Union) is a sign of power just marks how far Russia has fallen. Yes, there are basic interests involved but on the global stage, this short-term material win by being couched in anti-Islamic terms is undercutting potential alliances in other areas. And while Chechyna has just clear material self-interest, Russia's position in Kosovo was much more ideological, which is what I think makes the combination so harmful to Russia's interests.
>> Against a
> > history where the Soviet Union had made great inroads in the Islamic
> > world - especially in the Middle East with alliances with Iraq, Syria,
> > Egypt and others over the years - the last year has seen Russia
> > obliterating much of that historical good will in the name of a
> > retrograde nationalism that undermines, rather than serves the
> > country's interests.
>
> I think you are making two errors here. One, you are conflating two parts
> of the world. Russia has always been anti-Islamic on its borders.
> Remember Afghanistan? There is no font of good will to for the Russians
> to obliterate in this part of the world.
The Taliban has few friends in the Islamic world, so Afganistan is a special case. The rising Islamic movement of the Caucasus is a far different phenomenon with allies throughout the Islamic world.
> As for the Middle East, they've lost their appeal there because they are
> out of money and unwilling to give away weapons. They have little
> influence and they have little to lose.
Maybe true, but they still have a UN veto and other tools, yet if they are seen as unreliable, those countries will tilt towards nations that may back them in other areas. The US obviously has bought influence in the Middle East - most dramatically with Syria where during the Gulf War it bought its cooperation with debt foregiveness and a green flag for takeover of Lebanon - but I do believe ideological alliances matter as well. Russia is positioning itself against the rights of Islamic forces, while the US has supported Islamic groups -- in a selective manner of course, but that is its application of power.
> The second and deeper problem with your argument, IMHO, is that you seem
> to be tacitly accepting your opponents' view of Islam as a monolith.
> Being seen as an enemy of Afghanistan doesn't make Russia an enemy of
> Iran. On the contrary, it puts them on the same side. Iran and
> Afghanistan hate each other with personal venom precisely because Islam is
> not a monolith.
As indicated, Islam is not a monolith and a whole variety of other nationalist and materialist interests great great tensions between different Islamic countries - the Gulf War was an obvious example of that. But power and alliances are based on many strings and tensions and Islam is a powerful one. The point is that to the extent that Islam wields ideological loyalty, Russia is positioning itself as a loser in regard to its application in the region, while the US has been gaining credibility.
While folks tried to explain Kosovo in terms of traditional materialist or geographical applications of power by the US, my point is that this ideological positioning was a much more important outcome.
> To argue that support for Islam is a good in
> itself seems just as wrong as saying that opposing "Islam" is a good in
> itself. And when you argue that the most important aspect of
> interventions in particular countries is how it will play to the Islamic
> grandstand, conceived of as a whole, your argument seems to contradict
> itself.
First, I don't say any imperial positioning by the US is a "good in itself." That the US gained credibility among Islamic forces by its actions for imposing corporate neoliberalism in other areas is a bad thing in my mind, but it is the reality of that enhanced credibility that I am noting, not its normative good. And while anti-Islamic prejudice is an evil, Islamic ideology itself (like a lot of religious ideology) does in many cases divert people from more radical critiques of the global economic and political system.
But the fact remains that while Islam is not everything in understanding the dynamics of geopolitics with "Islamic countries" - thus no monolith - it is also not nothing either. It is a real force with meaning and how Russia and the United States (and other countries like China- an open question so far) deal with it does and will matter. What is notable is that the United States, after an initial politics of hostiility and opposition to political Islam, has rather adroitly come to an accomodation with the more moderate wings of political Islam. It is even slowly reaching reapproachment with Iran.
Given this, the interesting question is how the Left positions itself in regards to both the US and political Islam to create resistance to global neoliberalism. One reason Russia matters, is that there is residual loyalty to it and its allies such that parts of the left implicitly follow its lead in geopolitics. Unfortunately, much of the global left seems to be on the anti-Islam side in Kosovo (especially with the amount of racist propaganda that circulated against the Kosovars) and is not particularly vocal on the Chechnya issue - a positioning that matters to me far more that of Russia. There was an implicit enemy (Serbia-Russia) of my enemy (US) is my friend argument going on in these conflicts and my point is that in a multi-polar world, that can miss the fact that relationships with other forces (ie. political Islam) are also tied up in such conflicts and such bi-polar positioning is myopic.
-- Nathan Newman