1. << Isn't that the more fundamental issue for us, ie., not
whether or not someone should be punished for criminal acts (which seems
to get us ranging round debates not much beyond 'free will' and
'determinism', punishment and rehabilitation, etc), but what is and is
not constituted as a criminal act?
I don't know what this means, unless the question is which acts should be punishable by the criminal law,a nd I don't think that is what Angela means. I certainly agree, and have aid here, that I think we should not punish some things we do, such as light drug use or possession, we shoulkd punish some things we don't, such as various kinds of corporate malfeasance, and in thi society our penalties are disproprtioonately harsh as rule.
>We should say things that are false but useful,
> at least in public?
(You've only now just noticed this?)
I disagree. I think we should always strive to say true things. One may have to deliberately oversimplify to makea point in some contexts, but leaving out the qualification si not the same as lying.
> But is it plausible to draw such a firm line between
individual and society when it comes to responsibility?
How firm a line do you think I draw? What sort of line do ytiuy think I draw? All I said was that people can't get off the hook for what they do because their choices and desires are influenced by society.
> Isn't this line
drawn in such a way because what has to be decided in any trial is
whether or not AN INDIVIDUAL bears responsibility sufficient enough to
warrant punishment, incarceration, the death penalty?
Well, in a criminal proceeding, the individual and not society is on trial. Most of the procedural safeguards around a criminal trial exist to make sure that the government proves its case against that person.
Society is on trial for producing criminal behaviors in the political arena, not where the liberty or life of a particular person is at stake.
> In any case, the only reason I might think that this connection between
individual responsibility and justice has anything to do with the
operations of the law is if I presuppose that the law is capable of
meting out justice, which I don't think it is.
Well, the law is a blunt instrument and the justice it metes out is rough and ready. But surely you would not think it right to say that we should not try to catch murderers and robbers and lock them up if they can be proved to have murdered and robbed merely because we cannot do perfect justice?
--Justin