***** ...I have argued that the chief metaphilosophical error in prevailing accounts of science is the analysis, definition or explication of statements about being in terms of statements about our knowledge of being, the reduction of ontology to epistemology which I have termed the 'epistemic fallacy'. As ontology is in fact irreducible to epistemology, this functions merely to cover the generation of an implicit ontology, on which the domain of the real is reduced to the domain of the actual (actualism) which is then anthropocentrically identified with or in terms of sense-experience or some other human attribute. Operating hand-in-hand with this overt collapse, engendered or masked by the epistemic fallacy, is its practical counterpart, the ideology of the compulsive determination of knowledge by being -- for instance, in the guise of reified facts or hypostatized ideas -- in what I have characterized as the 'ontic fallacy'. (Bhaskar, _Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, 1993) *****
So, there is no denying ontology, and denying it rhetorically makes your account of ontology merely implicit.
Let's take a look at Daniel's pronunciamento:
> I am also a class-traitor who thinks -- who knows -- that
>"bolshevism" in-thought (at the level of thought or intellectual practice),
>is deeply reactionary. And that references to the "objective interests"
>of "the" working class are more phantasy than reality.
It is his implicit ontology that makes him confidently assert that "references to the 'objective interests' of 'the' working class are more phantasy than reality" -- he must think he knows the objective reality of the world to make this totalizing truth claim about class (or perhaps he is merely shooting from the hip or repeating what some postmodern philosopher said about class in the last century). BTW, I wonder why he is sure that he is a "class-traitor" (to which class?) when he also says that it is only in fantasy one can make a reference to the objective interests of the working class.
Yoshie