Amnesty in Algeria

Ulhas Joglekar ulhasj at bom4.vsnl.net.in
Sun Jan 23 17:45:09 PST 2000


The Hindu on indiaserver.com Sunday, January 23, 2000

Amnesty in Algeria With the masses turning against them, the militants were like fish in a drying pool, KESAVA MENON on the hopes for peace in Algeria. ONE SIGHT that cannot be missed by a visitor motoring down the winding streets of Algiers is the clumps of young men hanging around street corners with apparently nothing to do. Given the ubiquitous presence of footballs these young men perhaps dream of becoming another Zinedine Zidane and taking the soccer world by storm. Even those who are not that ambitious know that ferries to Europe ply every day from the bay on the other side of the hills from the city's poorer neighbourhoods. Escape from the reality of Algeria, either in fantasy or physically, might be the foremost thought in the minds of Algerian youth but the Government will know that it has truly won hearts and minds when the youth can be persuaded to stay. This is likely to be the major challenge before the Algerian Government in the immediate future. The idleness or disinterestedness of the youth is one clear sign that the high tide of Islamic militancy is over. If the call of the militants still had some resonance the youth on the street would have been more sullen, more menacing. But as early as April last year, before Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika became President, the mood appeared to be one of indifference to politics. There was no future in militancy both because the Government had already gained the upper hand and because it was clear by then that the militants really had no ideas about a fulfilling future. The militants' inability to present any plans for a better future for Algeria and the intense brutality of their campaign provided cause for alienation. Through their use of extreme violence, appeal to local loyalties and the rural population's abhorrence for the Algerian security forces, the militant groups were able to sustain themselves in the field. But when quantum of available force made for the main difference between the two sides the better organised institutions of the state were bound to prevail. This war of attrition could, however, have continued for indefinitely longer if the Algerian Government had not been able to present the right formula, and at the right time, to swing popular support (even if marginally) to its side. With the masses turning against them, the Algerian militants were like fish in a drying pool. Soon after becoming President, Mr. Bouteflika presented his plan for ``peace and civic concord''. Its basic element was the offer of a partial or complete amnesty to those militants who laid down arms and were believed to have not committed murders and rapes or carried out bombings. It was believed that important elements in Algeria's power structure - the senior army officers and bureaucrats who wield power behind the scenes - were not too happy about Mr. Bouteflika's plans. But he appeared to have finessed them when he called a referendum and won endorsement. Mr. Bouteflika had set a January 13 deadline for the militant groups to lay down arms. Even when the plans were first announced it was taken as a fair guess that Mr. Bouteflika was primarily targeting the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). This was the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which had fought and almost won the 1992 parliamentary polls till they were cancelled because the Algerian establishment did not want an Islamic force to take over. For the Government, the AIS was a preferable interlocutor from the militants side for several reasons. Firstly because with the mass mobilisation that it had achieved till 1991 the FIS could claim linkages with people at large and not remain merely a group of ideological die-hards. As its military wing, the AIS could at least lay claim to some popular base. Secondly, the FIS and later the AIS as well had been engaged with the Government for quite some time. Despite the collapse of some tentative understandings arrived at earlier, the AIS had declared a unilateral cease-fire back in 1998 itself. There was of course the catch that the AIS, like the other militant organisations, did not appear to be completely monolithic but it at least had a leadership willing to explore the possibilities of a compromise. Groups of AIS fighters began laying down arms soon after the peace and civic accord plan was endorsed in the referendum. However, the basic core of a few thousand fighters held out till just a few days before the deadline for the closure of the amnesty offer. They and the Algerian authorities are understood to have been engaged in negotiations till the last minute, with the AIS pressing for a complete amnesty for all its fighters. Eventually, on the eve of the January 13 deadline, the AIS declared that it was dissolving itself and within a few hours Mr. Bouteflika was to follow by granting an amnesty to all AIS cadres. Some of the older AIS fighters, or those who were wounded, were allowed to go home while others were made to fight alongside the Government's forces. Besides the AIS, another smaller group, the Islamic League for Preaching and Combat, was also reported to have availed of the amnesty offer. It is unclear whether it got the same treatment as the AIS. Two hardline groups, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, remain in the fray. The GIA in particular is understood to have been the main force which perpetrated the most barbarous incidents during the nine- year insurgency. It has perhaps calculated that the amnesty offer will make little sense when there are so many who will be hungry for revenge. As of the moment, the Algerian security forces appear well set to liquidate the hardcore militant bands. The Government, however, has its task cut out in rehabilitating the militants when large numbers of their own personnel have themselves been directly affected by the violence. Beyond these immediate tasks lies the more important one of ensuring that Algeria's youth have a better future to look forward to.

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