On Mon, 31 Jan 2000 16:02:21 EST JKSCHW at aol.com writes:
>
>
>
> >
> > Rawls theory and socialism may be compatible but given the
> historical circumstances the theory's main practical effect would be
> to justify liberal intervention in a capitalistic economy and also
> bourgois democratic ideals.
>
> Well, I'm a big fan of bourgeois democratic ideals myself, so I
> don't think that is a problem. Anyway, you mighta s well say, Marx
> may be compatible with a libertarian socialism, but given the
> historical realities, his main practical effect is to provide a
> gloss for Stalinism.
>
> > The hypothetical choice of principles of justice assume a Caspar
> Milquetoast verison of rational economic individuals not
> indifferent to the effects of distributions on their own welfare.
>
> And, so? Rawls rightly rejects Sandel's claim that he thinks we are
> like the parties to the original position.
>
> >>Rawls thinks that means that the "natural distribution" of
> whatever (talent, wealth, etc.) has no moral claim to be respected
> whatsoever. If things "happen" to be unjust, we have to rearrange
> things so that they are just.
> >
> > So what is the natural distribution of whatever? For example
> raspberries.Some people have them because they stole them, some
> because they bought them, some because they picked them in the wild.
> Which of these are natural? Why? Have none of these any moral claim
> to justice or entitlement?
>
> To be precise, Rawls talks about the natural distribution of
> talents, which end up in different people because of genetics,
> naturally in that sense. Rawls thinks that pace the libertarians, we
> shouldn't distribute goodies according to talents alone.
That is an interesting point in light of the earlier thread on determinism, retribution and desert. Rawls does not think that people justly deserve shares of goodies on the basis of talent alone. And as Justin quite correctly notes this is contrary to libertarian views of the matter. Libertarian critics of Rawls have taken issue with the communitarian conception of the self that his argument seems to presuppose in their view. Rawls it is argued seems to presuppose that human talents are at least in the original position treated as the collective property of society, and this is viewed by libertarians as objectionable on the grounds that talents always exist attached to specific individuals. In fact for libertarians, talents are an intrinsic part of the individual and so to treat them as a form of collective property as Rawls seems to do (through his use of the veil of ignorance in the original position) is criticized by them as being profoundly anti-individualist and contary to their understanding of human agency. Most libertarians insist upon the existence of a contracausal free will which provides the metaphysical basis for moral responsibility. So that as a collary people are entitled to the consequences of the exercize of their talents whether those consequences be good or bad. Rawls is criticized as presupposing quite a different conception of human agency.
As it so happens a hard determinism such as the kind defended by Ted Honderich would seem to offer a way out of this problem since it provides a way for grounding a conception of human agency that seems to be presupposed by Rawls in his description of the original position with its veil of ignorance. And in fact Honderich does in fact take such a view. BTW Honderich in *Conservatism* and other writings makes it clear that he is an admirer of both Rawls and Dworkin.
Jim F.
. --jks
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