You write a very long post. I'll take it a few nibbles here, a few nibbles there, and see where we get. But a preliminary. I find it interesting that people can have rather radically different views not just on psychoanalysis but on a number of even more fundamental issues and yet have considerable political unity. (People, of course, can have considerable political unity and fail to recognize that fact -- to consider themselves in fact to be bitter opponents, but that's another story.) I have no immediate interpretation of these political/ philosophical phenomena.
I'm writing this Monday evening but will not send it today because I am already overposted. The following remarks are off the top of my head, conversational rather than systematic.
So:
Kelley: ya lucked out carrol, the kid was home with the flu today. so.
i wrote,
>> mike: psychoanalytic theory IS a theory of how the social shapes the
>> individual.
and carrol said,
>Kelley, this may be. It is *a* theory.
yup
The question is is it a correct
>theory -- and the basis for saying that it is not a correct theory is
>that it is not, from its foundations, based on anything real,
how do you know what is and isn't correct? do you actually think that the correctness of a theory is contained within the operations of theory itself? ------
Carrol: Whoa. The arguments (the basis for "knowing") haven't come yet. But I don't understand your second sentence. But if someone offers a theory of God's activity in Asia it can be ignored as theory because it posits a non-existent entity. However interesting her statements on Asia, she does not have systematic knowledge to offer. ------
Kelley: let me ask you carrol, what is a capitalist economy? what is the state? patriarchy? can you see it, taste it, touch it, fuck it? i'm with bhaskar here: the social sciences [and i consider psych a social science] "create" their objects of investigation. nay, ALL sciences create their object of investigation. ------
Carrol: What if there is a disagreement about the legitimacy of that creation? How is that disagreement resolved? ------ Kelley:
indeed, the edifice of that "social institution" we call academia is premised on the notion that these objects are identifiable, isolatable and, of course, largely assumed 'til now to be "real" "natural" "out there". ------
Carrol: That an academic department is devoted to the study of X does not guarantee the existence of X. Theology departments are prime examples. ------ Kelley:
that assumption, of course, has been called into question on a number of fronts from marxism to feminism to interpretivism to pomo/poststruc. they are inventions, which doesn't mean that we can't pursue them and that we ought to toss them to the dustbin of history. ------
Carrol: Yes and no. I have never particularly liked the phrase "dustbin of history," but I rather foresee the disappearance of departments of theology and of (writing) composition. They both deal with imaginary entities which cannot be systematically studied (or taught). ------ Kelley: i.e., you can't see an electromagentic field or gravity but that doesn't stop people from studying them. ------
Carrol: Pish Posh. Objects of study, real or imaginary, ar(being abstractions) never visible. That is not the question we are dealing with. We study physics, which has as its object (I will leave it to some physicist to define it). That object (that abstraction) includes the phenomena you refer to as gravity, etc. ------ Kelley:
and they study them through their effects and that's *all* we can do. what such an acknowledgement means is that we need to "do" theory differently before and it is summed up in the pulp culture intro: "pulping" theory is about examining a theory's presuppositions and the conditions of its possibility.
The reason why the social sciences aren't quite up to the prediction and control you demand ------
Carrol: Who says I demand prediction and control? Different sciences (systematic studies) have different criteria, though the criteria for all include the existence of an object of study -- which theology, astrology, and psychology do not satisfy. Neither does political science, though that field is so incredibly sloppy that individual practitioners can redefine its subject so as to give it content. Sociology seems to be a jumble of real and imaginary subjects, but it has no core subject (or object) of study. ------
Kelley;
is that the natural sciences work in closed systems: that is, their applications [which is the equivalent, i guess, of your "correctness" or perhaps efficacy, efficiency, what works as a test of theory] are judged as successful in closed systems. Theories about physical processes are applied in the construction and design of refrigerators and automobiles. Voila! they work, right? yeah, until you leave the fridge door open for two days or never change your oil ------
Carrol: The question of the existence of an object of study is quite different from the question of the correctness of a given theory of that object. History, probably anthropology, some parts of sociology have real objects of study. Psychology does not, so the correctness of a psychological theory is not a relevant question. It has nothing to be correct or incorrect about.
There seems to be a Platonic assumption operating here that if it has a name it exists. Russell's discussion of golden mountains is interesting in this respect. Psychology is in somewhat better shape than golden mountains, because though it can have no standing as theory (there being nothing for it to be a theory of) psychologists can nevertheless pile up highly interesting empirical matter. I would guess offhand that your special concern, popular culture, offers similar scope. Popular Culture as such cannot be studied, for it does not exist, but the phrase names huge areas of empirical interest and thus offers immense possibilities for the production of important footnotes for disciplines that have real objects. Literature of course is very much the same. Literature does not exist (no one has ever succeeded in giving even a rough definition of what it is) but students of Literature can find indefinitely many things to say interesting things about.
Some disciplines without an object (e.g., the teaching of writing) are not as harmless as literature or pulp culture. ------
Kelley:
the social sciences have no such luxury --because they must deal with history and social transformation-- with open systems, if you will. [prediction and control is what you seem to be into below, for you are essentially holding psychoanalytic theory to a positivist model of knowledge. so let me point out right here, right now that *I"M NOT INTO THAT. ------
Carrol: Neither am I. But rejecting positivism does not involve accepting theology, astrology, phrenology, et cetera. ------
Kelley:
but i know how to take it on and argue with it if that's what we need to do right now. it sounds like this is where you're going.] ------
Carrol: Nope. Attacks on positivism do not affect my argument. As far as I can tell psychology just keeps swinging wildly between religion and a vulgar biologism. Freud was a positivist. What I consider proper objects of study would not appeal to positivists. In fact I've often thought your analyses tended too much towards positivism, since I identify pragmatism and positivism as not ultimately different.
------
Carrol: on that score, i would recommend bhaskar's "on the possbility of social scientific knowledge and the limits of naturalism" in _Issues in Marxist Philosophy_ v II, edited by John Mephan and David Hillel Ruben. A bit obscure, as in difficult to find, i imagine. he's written similar things in his own books, but i don't have copies on hand right now since they're in storage. maybe yoshie can help you out with suggestions.
marx *does* posit an account of the relationship between selves and societies. ------
Carrol: NO. No. No. There cannot be a relationship unless the things related have a separate existence. Selves simply do not exist in abstraction from social relations. And what we call selves are all unique histories, embedded in an endless web of contingencies. There can be no science of the "Self," and the very phrase, "science of selves," sounds weird. ("Society" is a tricky term. I prefer to speak of "social relations" or History.) ------
Kelley:
whether you agree with it and how it has been developed in the hands of others is another question. and i said *posit* for a reason. his is an account, not a theory. ------
Carrol: Both an account and a theory demand something to be an account or theory of. I don't care whether you call it an account or a theory, Capitalism is a real object of study. The Psyche is not. Capitalism of course is not visible but an abstraction, which is why positivism cannot really see it.
TO BE CONTINUED SOME DAY.
Carrol