>>> The moral has to be performed, not declaimed.
> I agree that taken as an ethical maxim, there's a problem of
self-referentiality in my statement. :) Perhaps on this subject, the less
said, the better. But I meant it as a suggestion for an instrumentalist
approach (= shaping means to an end). Suppose your intention is to encourage
ethical conduct. Which do you think is better -- discuss what is or isn't
moral or hope to lead by examples, so to speak?
At first glance it might appear to be Machiavellian... but it isn't. It's Hobbesian: you, who are incompetent, should trust in me to secure what is best for yourself. We need a leader who will be brave enough to do the right thing, and we need others to take the fall when things run awry. And you have no right to question my actions, because I am a moral leader, through my actions I shall be known, and you ought follow me or else face instrumental actions... (at least Machiavelli knew, implicitly, that the actions of the prince were evil).
Even more glaring is the instrumentalist approach compined with the pseudo-intentionalism of paternalist enlightenment.
Doing the right thing, because it is the right thing to do (as a maxim) doesn't tell you what the right thing to do is! (ie. except through a miracle - you can never actually accomplish a *moral* act). That's the anti-Sadeian rub of Kant. The above is profoundly anti-Kantian in this regard. Do you (moral) duty. Let me, a heterogenous authority, lead the way. You are hiding behind self-referentiality - but your point is that moral actions constitute substance - which compromises the form of moral performance.
hostile witness, ken