On Tue, 20 Jun 2000 14:27:56 +0930 Catherine Driscoll <catherine.driscoll at adelaide.edu.au> wrote:
> doesn't the idea of formal elements presenting such a protective measure
require 'public'/'social' consent that they are 'guaranteed' and 'effective'
the capacity to make choices is always under the constraint of regimes of
discipline surely anything resembling the subject of free will has to be more
than just fantastic but also constrictive insofar as it will not name anything
but a 'public' subject of 'consensus'??
Yes, and I suspect that Castoriadis (died in 1997) was wise enough not to think that these measures aren't coercive on some level. But in the words of Monty Python - "We've got to protect the public!" Castoriadis is profoundly influenced by Freud... well, ok, he was a practising psychoanalyst in the 70s (he also worked as an economist). For CC, most of our relationships are imagined (hence, The Imaginary Institution of Society). And we lean on this imaginary element of society - this isn't necessarily a good thing, but it is unavoidable. We invented the idea of democracy, and reason and love and all of that stuff. Now we have to work through what it means to "ground" society in something that does not exist. All of his work emphasizes one key element: the project of autonomy. He was popular among anarchists for this very reason, because his notion of autonomy was heavily injected with a strong notion of heteronomy (he was, after all, influenced by Lacan). I'm not sure the question, for CC, is a question of free will, rather, the capacity to have greater decision making ability. Habermas charges him with subjective idealism... and I suspect that JH is right about that... but he's got some good ideas.
> >Internal or immanent understand lacks productive distance from that which is
to be understood. External understanding lacks distance from its own language
of critique.
> ok. in what way is this different from positing that the self and the
law/State are different relations to any 'understanding' (consensus, public
truth-claim)?
I don't understand your question. You're saying that there is a difference bewteen understanding between two people and understanding between the self and the law (which simply tells one what to do)? Let me stab at it.
The law (as in state law) is like a non-intersubjective Other. We don't interact with it (unless we're pissed off about it in which case we start a riot or grab some solidarity and work toward change). For the most part, however, we have a cynical distance toward this kind of Otherness: either as something in me that is not me or as something foreign (ie. we don't take responsibility for it) --> I'm not responsible! I'm just doing my duty! The problem here isn't the law as such, but how we relate to it. That's where ethics comes in. The interesting question is why we "internally" fuse our horizon with the law... and likewise, why we sometimes break the law simply because it is the law. It's all very Oedipal, methinks.
> >[both together] "We agree that no means no!" There is consensus present in
the symbolic fomulations.
> how about 'your yes means no'; 'I agree her yes means no'' [both together];
'we agree she is incapable of saying yes or no'. that is -- the subject of
consensus is not any or even The subject, and so lacan won't do...
Welcome to liberal democracy! And Lacan does perfectly well here. To say that no means no is to say, precisely, that no *never* means no (which is why you have to negate the first no with a second). The second no "returns to itself" in a destructive fashion: in other words: WE BELIEVE THAT NO MEANS NO - BUT WE DON'T TRUST ANYONE WHO SAYS NO! The example you cite above, "We agree she is incapable of saying yes or no" *is* the exact implication of no means no. What is key here is that in "no means no" - no "no" can every mean no (whoops, sorry about that formulation). Take the awesome US definition of pornography: pornography is pornographic (I don't know what it is, but I know it when I see it). This renders what is and is not pornographic arbitrary. This cuts two ways at the same time: if the definition if rigorous -- nothing will ever be deemed pornographic, on the other hand, it gives the state free reign to transgress this definition at will.
So why won't Lacan do?
> > Consensus, then, is always based on a necessary misrecognition of what we
say and mean in language.
> this is way too Romantic. consensus is based on law about what can be agreed
to. surely.
We're using two different notions of consensus: consent versus consensus building. The above refers to consensus building. The consent to which you are refering (hit delete key if I'm wrong about this) is a double edged sword: you are damned if you consent, you are damned if you dissent. This is an excellent definition of power (in my humble opinion).
For example: taxes. If you pay them, you end up supporting programs that are inevitably not only against your best interests, but also really really violent. If you don't pay them, you go to jail. So what's it going to be? Pay them and kill your neighbour, or don't pay them and imprison yourself.
However, the idea of consent here is an interesting one: because it demands responsibility even for those things of which you had not choice in the matter. Paying taxes is a bit like causality. It is "forced" upon us. And yet, we still feel a bit guilty whenever we cut a cheque. Why? That's interesting -- recall Kant's definition of freedom: we are more unfree that we know, and much more free that we believe. We take responsibility for the network of cause and effect - which is, appropriately, the creation of responsibility out of nothing. Isn't this, if nothing else, what subjectivity is? You absolutely must read Zupancic's Ethics of the Real. Even if you disagree with everything, it's a thrilling ride.
> politics very often if not almost always involves no others. only the
subject of consensus and its inverse, the subject who does not consent
But we still hold the 'big Other' accountable for the "forced choice." In other words: in consent or dissent, we rage against the machine (law) inside the ghost (big Other). Maybe I need to get out more.
> but the law determines both who is 'we' and what is 'desire' and which we is
capable of desire and what things will be relations to desire
Yes, desire is always the desire of the other. The crucial point here, and this is where we will likely disagree, is that this goes in two directions. Is the subject of desire the substance of desire (Butler) or is the subject of desire the effect of the law. From the sounds of it, you are leaning toward the former and I'm definitely in the latter. I'm completely persuaded by Lacan's inverted "I think therefore I am." Desire is created by the law (state or paternal), but this is not to be equated with subjectivity per ce. The subject is a desiring subject but the subject is not desire. The subject does not exist, it is a pure moment of negativity --> which is the *only* way for the subject to be an ethical subject. This is explained best in Renata Salecl's essay on hate speech (either in Copjec's Radical Evil or in Salecl's (Per)Versions of Love and Hate). See also the intro to Ticklish Subjects by Zizek.
> understanding is always understanding of our understanding of the other
(more circle and less Romance)
Why am I thinking about Lacan's "There is no sexual relation" each time you mention the term Romance... Understanding of our understanding is a negative gesture... if you have the interest, Zizek's Tarrying With the Negative and For They Know Not What They Do have excellent sections of Hegelian dialectics, tautology and all that jazz.
> I mean 'her' desire isn't referenced in the law, because the law doesn't
reference desires of selves only of the consenting Subject
Ok... here's something. The law tells you to consent. But more than that, it tells you that ENJOY conseting. In other words, you aren't simply supposed to follow the law to the letter (which is impossible anyway, because of the imaginary nature of meaning) but also tells you to love following the law. So you aren't simply not supposed to J-walk, you are supposed to ENJOY not J-walking. The law, here, serves to convict the subject of their desires, because it only addresses the consenting subject (of which it demands more than just consent)...
> and you've been watching too many Lacan videos
La la la KEN!
When I was six years old they tried to test my IQ. They gave me three apples and a pear and asked me, "Which one is different and does not belong?" They taught me different is wrong. - ani difranco