Korea's blessing

Brad De Long delong at econ.Berkeley.EDU
Mon Jun 26 09:58:44 PDT 2000



>In the event, the allied preparations for the surprise attack were
>extensive. Republican spokesman John Foster Dulles had visited Seoul to
>pledge support for the south, 500 US military intelligence officers were
>posted on the border and British Field Marshall Slim was in conference
>with Australian defence chiefs in the weeks before the war.

One might imagine from this paragraph that John Foster Dulles was part of the U.S. government in 1950...


>
>
>The point of MacArthur's retreat was to keep the case for the
>implementation of NSC 68, with its extensive commitment to militarising
>the Pacific alive. Red scares galvanised the US establishment. US
>General Van Fleet said in 1952 'Korea has been a blessing. There had to
>be a Korea either here, or some place in the world.' (UP, 19 January
>1952)

I understand Heartfield's motivation. Stalin's arming of Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung's strike across the 38th parallel that nearly conquered the entire peninsula, and then Mao's intervention all seem as if calculated to rally U.S. Congressional support for the U.S. national security state. It is surely the case that the defense program of NSC 68 had no chance of enactment before Kim Il Sung struck in Korea, and every chance of enactment once U.S. forces were in retreat from the Chosin Reservoir.

So there is this deep suspicion that somehow Truman and Acheson *tricked* Kim Il Sung, Stalin, and Mao into providing this excuse for NATO and for a U.S. defense budget of 10% of GDP.

But it is hard for who has actually worked for a government to believe that such a cross-continental black deception operation could have actually been carried out...

Brad DeLong



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