Well one could spend an entire lifetime discussing this one but this is going to be my last post on this thread.
Obviously, I don't think Singer's philosophical construction is as air tight and you and Justin seem to think it is. I totally disregard his concept of "personhood." Is it scientifically possible at this point to determine that the intelligence of an under 28 year old infant is below a cat's intelligence? Based upon what? Because Singer says so? And even if it were possible, I'd say so what? The under one month old infant qualifies in my book as a person. I held my daughter in my hands at birth and I KNOW in the deepest sense that she recognized me. So we have a basic disagreement. I find Singer an elite bore and you two find him fascinating philosopher.
No one has answered this question - if you accept Singer's definition of personhood, how is it that a 29 year old day infant differs from a 28 day old infant? How is it that one day or even a week makes the infant transform from a "nonperson" into a "person"? Because Singer says it does?
If a parent does not want a disabled infant, it can be placed for adoption. A friend of mine adopted a Korean baby who has cerebral palsy. More disabled people are determining that they would rather have a disabled child. If no one adopts a child from an orphanage, the infant can grow to maturity and adopt its own family along the way. Who can say it would be better off dead?
The brand(s)of utilitarianism espoused by Dr. Singer, as it is popularly understood, can too easily be used to justify the removal of those deemed too expensive or inconvenient, under the pretext doing the greatest good for the greatest number. And there is undeniable historical precedent for the danger of such views.
Bioethics closes itself off to a lot of considerations -- the power issues disabled activists are looking at, the culture, the way language constructs things. Singer seems disinterested in the political economy - I can find no discussion of how class or power relations factor in to "happiness". Let's remember he is a middle class elite academician.
Marta
Ken Hanly wrote:
> Many thanks for the quotes. I find Singer rather cavalier and careless in these
> passages but I will make specific comments later. First I would like to commend
> Justin's post. I agree with most of his points-so naturally I would commend them:)
> Just a couple of quick comments though.
> Justin seems to hold that Singer is just a consistent utilitarian and this is the
> reason that his arguments come into conflict with our intuition. I do not believe
> that SInger is a consistent utilitarian or that he even wants to be. He is quite
> "pragmatic" about theory. Sometimes he does argue on utiltarian grounds to
> conclusions that may be a shock to common intuitions but other times he adopts
> non-utilitarian principles when his own intuitions support this. I think Justin
> himself mentions his criterion for being a person. This criterion is not utilitarian
> it is based upon an analysis of intuitive requirements for having certain interests
> such as a right to life. A strict utilitarian would simply assign rights to life to
> living things on the basis of whether doing so would maximise happiness or whatever
> the good is. This non-utilitarian concept of a person causes real problems for Singer
> as well as his utilitarian assumptions. As for those utilitarian assumptions I do not
> think that they imply many of the conclusions SInger draws. For example, I think it
> highly implausible that one could argue that the general happiness would be maximised
> by having laws
> that allowed for involuntary euthanasia of disabled infants. For most cases in which
> severe disabilities might be an issue modern technology would reveal these and the
> woman could have an abortion. Giving power to doctors or parents to terminate infants
> is surely fraught with grave risks not to mention the hurt that disabled feel. It is
> natural for them to think that such a policy degrades their worth and to feel
> themselves threatened even though as Justin rightly points out with respect to any
> disabled person who has enough capacity to even understand the issue there is no
> threat whatsoever. Quite the opposite, Singer's position demands that their special
> needs be equitably met. From a utilitarian consequence all these and other negative
> consequences would have to factored in. All in all I do not see a policy even as
> broad (or narrow) as Singer's being warranted under his utlitarian assumptions. Now
> just a few summary points about Singer's ethics:
>
> As I understand it there are at least three different groupings of humans
> relevant to understanding Singer's ethics:
> 1) Members of the human species defined biologically by unique DNA. For the
> orthodox RC position on abortion, this is the defining property for having the same
> rights to life as any other member of the species.
> For Singer this membership is wholly irrelevant to moral issues.
> 2) Members of the human species who have developed sentience who can suffer. For
> Singer this is the
> criterion for equality of moral consideration and the basis for animal rights.
> Intelligence, sex, race, have nothing to do it. To treat beings inequitably because
> of sex, race, intelligence is discrimination. To treat animals differently than
> humans simply because they are animals solely upon the basis of bias and without good
> reasons is speciecist discrimination and equally inequitable.
> 3) Members of the human species who are persons. For simplicity sake. I will just
> take the suggested criteria in the quotes below as setting forth the requirements for
> being a person: rationality, autonomy,
> and consciousness. As noted earlier this is hardly utilitarian. It sounds more like
> Kant than Bentham.
> Only humans who are also persons may have a right to life since such a right
> presupposes that one could envision ones future existence and desire future happiness
> etc.
>
> To address some of the points made by Yoshie and others:
> With respect to the humanity of any human, meaning a member of the human species
> Singer never questions that. With respect to the second sense he does not question
> the disabled with respect to that nor require reason as a conditon for equal
> treatment. As our discussion of earlier passages has shown. His arguments are
> precisely against the whole tradition that equal treatment requires this. Finally,
> with respect to the third sense of
> human as person he does privilege reason, autonomy etc. even sentient fetuses,
> newborn infants, and severely disabled humans incapable of any autonomy,
> self-consciousness, etc. will not be persons in this sense. This privileging is not
> all that counter-intuitive. If a person is completely incapable of control we do not
> hold them criminally responsible. They do not have a right to be punished but to be
> treated. We would expect them to be found not guilty in a court of law. We would not
> give a person in a mental institution who is clearly unable to understand the nature
> of voting a right to vote. This is not an unreasonable privileging of reason. (NOTE:
> However many who are mentally "ill" are quite capable of voting and should vote. In
> Manitoba the Election Act used to prohibit, prisoners, residents of mental
> institutions and judges from voting. When I was on the Law Reform COmmission we
> recommended that all of these groups be given the right to vote but residents of
> mental institutions only insofar as there was some evident capacity to have at least
> some understanding of voting. The NDP government implemented our recommendations.
> Some governing parties have worried about extending the vote like this thinking that
> criminals and mental patients will vote for the opposition. Some polling shows that
> prisoners and mental patients vote pretty much the way the general public does.)
>
> Just a few comments after sections:
>
> Marta Russell wrote:
>
> > Here are some Singer quotes:
> > The following excerpt is taken from "Practical Ethics", by Peter Singer.
> > It's the second edition and its latest printing is from this year (2
> > printings in 1997). Chapter 7, which
> > this is taken from, is titled "Taking life: Humans". The text below can
> > be found on pages 182-186.
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> >
> > In Chapter 4 we saw that the fact that a being is a human being, in
> > the sense of a member of Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of
> > killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and
> > self-consciousness that make a difference.
>
> Singer's first sentence is a crystal clear rejection of the basic orthodox RC and
> conservative assumption that it is biological membership in the human species that is
> a necessary and sufficient condition for an equal right to life of any other member
> of the species. I totally agree with Singer here. To give the same moral status to a
> zygote barely visible and the pregnant woman is surely far and away as
> counterintuitive as any of Singer's most radical conclusions.
>
> > Infants lack these
> > characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing
> > normal human beings,or any other self-conscious beings. This conclusion
> > is not limited to infants, who, because of irreversible intellectual
> > disabilities, will never be rational, self-conscious beings. We saw in
> > our discussion of abortion that the potential of a fetus to become a
> > rational, self-conscious being cannot count against killing it at a stage
> > when it lacks these characteristics - not, that is, unless we are also
> > prepared to count the value of rational self-conscious life as a reason
> > against contraception and celibacy. No infant - disabled or not - has a
> > strong claim to life as beings capable of seeing themselves as distinct
> > entities, existing over time.
>
> Singer is sometimes a bit careless. Killing infants cannot be equated with killing
> normal human beings.
> I guess that means that all infants are abnormal human beings:)
>
> Most of this follows logically from Singer's concept of person. However, it should be
> remembered
> that the disabled, sentient fetuses, etc. still deserve equal consideration of their
> good. In this sense
> there is no difference as far as equality of treatment is concerned and he stresses
> this in the next sentence.
>
> >
> > The difference between killing disabled and normal infants lies not in
> > any supposed right to life that the latter has and the former lacks, but
> > in other considerations about killing.
>
> As I said they are treated equally. Neither an infant Einstein or an infant with
> severe brain damage are any different with respect to their status as persons.
> Neither is a person. Neither has a right to life. Singer is simply not giving any
> special weight to intelligence, race, or gender, or abilties, in this judgment. To
> suggest otherwise is simply not to follow his argument.
>
> > Most obviously there is the
> > difference that often exists in the attitude of the parents. The birth of
> > a child is usually a happy event for the parents. They have, nowadays,
> > often planned for the child. The mother has carried it for nine months.
> > >From birth, a natural affection begins to bind the parents to it. So one
> > important reason why it is normally a terrible thing to kill an infant is
> > the effect the killing will have on its parents.
> > It is different when the infant is born with a serious disability.
> > Birth abnormalities vary, of course. Some are trivial and have little
> > effect on the child or its parents; but others turn the normally joyful
> > event of birth into a threat to the happiness of the parents, and any
> > other children they may have.
> > Parents may, with good reason, regret that a disabled child was ever
> > born. In that event the effect that the death of the child will have on
> > its parents can be a reason for, rather than against killing it. Some
> > parents want even the most gravely disabled infant to live as long as
> > possible, and this desire would then be a reason against killing the
> > infant. But what if this is not the case? In the discussion that follows
> > I shall assume that the parents do not want the disabled child to live. I
> > shall also assume that the disability is so serious that - again in
> > contrast to the situation of an unwanted but normal child today - there
> > are no other couples keen to adopt the infant. This is a realistic
> > assumption even in a society in which there is a long waiting list of
> > couples wishing to adopt normal babies. It is true that from time to time
> > cases of infants who are severely disabled and are being allowed to die
> > have reached the courts in a glare of publicity, and this has led to
> > couples offering to adopt the child. Unfortunately such offers are the
> > product of the highly publicised dramatic life-and-death situation, and do
> > not extend to the less publicised but far more common situations in which
> > parents feel themselves unable to look after a severely disabled child,
> > and the child then languishes in an institution.
>
> As a utilitarian Singer must take account of the effect of keeping the child alive on
> the general happiness.
> He assumes you already agree that the infant does not have a right to life as it is
> not a person. Of course
> many people have a strong intuition that the infant does, and that is why at this
> stage people begin to get so excited by Singer's appeal to the happiness of others
> and social costs. But if the infant is not a person with a right to life then
> Singers' argument is quite sensible. He is making the same sorts of arguments that
> very many would feel are quite legitimate reasons for having an abortion: the mental
> or physical health of the woman economic factors, but of course for the infant
> adoption is possible but as he notes there may not be enough people willing to adopt
> a severely disabled child.
>
> >
> > Infants are sentient beings who are neither rational nor
> > self-conscious. So if we turn to consider the infants in themselves,
> > independently of the attitudes of their parents, since their species is
> > not relevant to their moral status, the principles that govern the
> > wrongness of killing non-human animals who are sentient but not rational
> > or self-conscious must apply here too. As we saw, the most plausible
> > arguments for attributing a right to life to a being apply only if there
> > is some awareness of oneself as a being existing over time, or as a
> > continuing mental self. Nor can respect for autonomy apply where there is
> > no capacity for autonomy. The remaining principles identified in Chapter
> > 4 are utilitarian. Hence the quality of life that the infant can be
> > expected to have is important.
>
> To sum up: The principles that apply here are those that arise from the principle of
> equal treatment.
> These principles will apply to infants and also to animals. Here many people's
> intuitions will again
> bristle. Putting infants in the same moral category as animals! Indeed. But remember
> Singer is for animal rights. He wants to upgrade animal moral status rather than
> downgrade infant status. Singer is not suggesting Swift's Modest Proposal was morally
> sound!
>
> >
> > One relatively common birth disability is a faulty development of the
> > spine known as spina bifida. Its prevalence varies in different
> > countries, but it can affect as many as one in five hundred live births.
> > In the more serve cases, the child will be permanently paralyzed from the
> > waist down and lack control of bowels or bladder. Often excess fluid
> > accumulates in the brain, a condition known as hydrocephalus, which can
> > result in intellectual disabilities. Though some forms of treatment
> > exist, if the child is badly affected at birth, the paralysis,
> > incontinence, and intellectual disability cannot be overcome.
> > Some doctors closely connected with children suffering from severe
> > spina bifida believe that the lives of the worst affected children are so
> > miserable that it is wrong to resort to surgery to keep them alive.
> > Published descriptions of the lives of these children support the judgment
> > that these worst affected children will have lives filled with pain and
> > discomfort. They need repeated major surgery to prevent curvature of the
> > spine, due to the paralysis, and to correct other abnormalities. Some
> > children with spina bifida have had forty major operations before they
> > reach their teenage years.
> > When the life of an infant will be so miserable as not to be worth
> > living, from the internal perspective of the being who will lead that
> > life, both the 'prior existence' and the 'total' version of utilitarianism
> > entail that, if there are no 'extrinsic' reasons for keeping the infant
> > alive - like the feelings of the parents - it is better that the child be
> > helped to die without further suffering. A more difficult problem arises
> > - and the convergence between the two views ends - when we consider
> > disabilities that make the child's life prospects significantly less
> > promising than those of a normal child, but not so bleak as to make the
> > child's life not worth living. Haemophilia is probably in this category.
> > The haemophiliac lacks the element in normal blood that makes it clot and
> > thus risks prolonged bleeding, especially internal bleeding, from the
> > slightest injury. If allowed to continue, this bleeding leads to
> > permanent crippling and eventually death. The bleeding is very painful
> > and although improved treatments have eliminated the need of constant
> > blood transfusions, haemophiliacs still have to spend a lot of time in
> > hospital. The are unable to play most sports and live constantly on the
> > edge of crisis. Nevertheless, haemophiliacs do not appear to spend their
> > time wondering whether to end it all; most find life definitely worth
> > living, despite the difficulties they face.
>
> Is Singer's description of haemophilia at all sound? I thought that it is not that
> difficult to control in general. Certainly there are milder cases of spina bifida. I
> expect that the range of likely candidates for jusfiiable mercy killing is much more
> restricted. That being said there are hard cases such as the father in Saskatchewan
> who gased his daughter. Her whole life was just one painful operation after another.
> The family had limited income and other children I believe. He is a farmer with
> limited resources and limited outside help, the life of his whole family was a
> nightmare. Her last operation had not been a success and she was due for another. At
> least it
> is understandable why he acted as he did. Of course the disabled organisations cried
> out for severe punishment but many people also felt for the parents and respected his
> motivation. So he ends up going to jail for a considerable number of years. The
> disabled are happy but a person is in jail who would probably never commit another
> crime, cannot support or even be with his family, and who could be self supporting
> rather than depending upon the public purse..
>
> >
>
> >
> > Given these facts, suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a
> > haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child
> > with this condtion, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be
> > defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm 'no', for the infant
> > can be expected to have a life that is worth living, even if it is not
> > quite as good as that of a normal baby. The 'prior existence' version of
> > utilitarianism supports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can
> > be expected to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To
> > kill him would deprive him of the positive balance of happiness.
> > Therefore it would be wrong.
>
> This is the line I was thinking he would take in an earlier post I made. Good guess!
> I haven't the book at hand so I am not quite sure what these different versions of
> utilitarianism are or why he distinguishes them but the context makes the distinction
> reasonably clear as he describes the "total" view below..
>
> >
> > On the 'total' version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot reach a
> > decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it
> > necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac infant would lead
> > to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In
> > other words, if the haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have
> > another child whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives?
> > If they would, is the second child more likely to have a better life than
> > the one killed?
> > Often it is possible to answer both these questions affirmatively. A
> > woman may plan to have two children. If one dies while she is of
> > child-bearing age, she may conceive another in its place. Suppose a woman
> > planning to have two children has one normal child, then gives birth to a
> > haemophiliac child. The burden of caring for that child may make it
> > impossible for her to cope with a third child; but if the disabled child
> > were to die, she would have another. It is plausible to suppose that the
> > prospects of a happy life are better for a normal child than for a
> > haemophiliac.
> > When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another
> > infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of
> > happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of
> > happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier
> > life for the second. Therefore, if killing the haemophiliac infant has no
> > adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to
> > kill
>
> Basically he is arguing that the increase in general happiness resulting from the
> happier life of the second outweighs the loss of a happy life for the killed disabled
> infant. This seems to be a case where the Kantian intuition that we ought not to use
> another as a means to an end, but this is precisely what Singer is doing.
> Yet, by Singer's lights, he is not doing this at all. Why? Because neither infant is
> a person, and Kantian intuition only applies to persons. WHat is relevant is if we
> correctly counted in the disabled persons good.
> We did not give special weight to the good of the disabled versus that of the
> "normal" infant. It is just a fact that there is much more likely to be more
> happiness in a normal child's life.
> I do not agree with SInger's conclusions but with Justin, I think we should be
> fair to Singer and his arguments. If post-modernists wrote as clearly and coherently
> as Singer, I might be able to read more than a page without throwing the book down
> and being so enraged I have to go for a walk with the dog or listen to Schonberg to
> soothe my nerves and create some sort of order in my brainwaves :)
>
> Cheers, Ken Hanly
-- Marta Russell author Los Angeles, CA Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract http://www.commoncouragepress.com/