Yoshie Furuhashi wrote:. Comment is after section.
>
> The same argument based upon the premise that some humans are only
> "marginally" human is used by Peter Singer. The problem stems from the
> fact that, despite their arguments against "speciesism," both Singer and
> Tom Regan are (paradoxical as it may sound) deeply committed to the
> traditional humanist question: "what is human?" Both of them think that
> what defines a "normal" human being (in Singer's terms a "person," as
> opposed to a "non-person" who is merely biologically human) is the presence
> of rationality, self-consciousness, and autonomous agency. Biologically
> human beings who can be said to lack them -- infants, the mentally ill, the
> very old, etc. -- become by definition "marginal" cases, since the standard
> of what being human means (in terms of moral considerations, not in terms
> of belonging to the species Homo sapiens) is, to begin with, set by *the
> idealized view of what a healthy and intellectually capable adult must be
> like* (in other words, a fictive person [independent individual] who is a
> bearer of rights in abstract individualism -- a persona indispensable for
> both Kantians and utilitarians). This standard of humanity has been
> criticized by feminists as well. For instance, the fictive person who
> matters in liberal political theory doesn't get pregnant. And that is why
> I think mature Marx's revision of humanity (concrete individuals =
> ensembles of social relations) is important, in that it de-emphasizes the
> humanist problematic of what is "essentially" human and what is
> "marginally" human.
>
>
> I must be in Yoshie's kill file. This post ignores the detailed tripartite
> division of senses of human that Singer distinguishes. In this post Yoshie
> mentions only two and ignores the class of humans who are sentient. Sentience
> is the basis of moral considerability. We went through a long series of posts
> where I tried to show how you misintepreted passages from Singer etc. Just to
> repeat:
Equality of consideration has nothing to do with reason, colour, gender, or species. The disabled fetus and the normal infant are in the same boat. You correctly characterise a person but it is not necessary to be a person to have moral standing. Suffering is the criterion. Why do you continue to misrepresent Singer? Not that you are alone. THis misrepresentation is common in anti-Singer quarters.
Neither Justin nor I agree with SInger's position that parents or doctors sould be allowed to kill some disabled infants but what we have been insisting upon is that opponents at least be fair to Singer. We have not been successful.
THe standard of humanity you are criticising has to do only with personhood. But this has nothing to do with placing any particular moral worth on reason, autonomy etc. either. Singer's criteria are conceptual, not moral requirements, for having a right to life. He is not saying that the normal infant is more valuable than the disabled infant. He is saying that neither has a right to life. Why? Because neither is capable of envisioning a future that it would lack if killed or can desire such a future etc. Now this may be stupid or whatever, but it has nothing to do with placing more value on the normal than disabled infant- even though it does have ethical implications. These ethical implications are just as negative for normal as for the disabled since both lose any appeal to a right to life to protect them against being killed. THe criterion of personhood is relevant to having certain rights such as the right to vote, to be held criminally responsible and so forth, and also the right to life. SInger concludes that it is not wrong to kill a disabled infant because this would violates the infants right to life. But as I and Justin have both pointed out this is just as true of an infant Einstein as an infant with severe spina-bifida. However I think Justin is rather misleading when he says that it follows that it is ethical to kill either infant. All it implies is that it is not unethical as violating a right to life since neither has such a right.
But both infants are still human in the sense of sentient members of the human species and this means that we must give equal consideration of the good of each of their lives. This is why under one version of utilitarianism only if you could show on balance that the life of the disabled infant was not worth living or clearly negative as far as happiness was concerned would it be legitimate to kill the infant. This being so my own view is that the dangers of giving doctors or whomever the task of making these predictions and the possible misuse of power by authorising killing of infants shows that even in utilitarian terms a law allowing such termination is unjustified.THe substitution argument is subject to the same type of objections. HOwever, my main point is that you are not fair to SInger. The disabled fetus is still sentient and so deserves the same consideration of its good as that of a non-disabled infant. You cannot just ignore the disabled infants good. That is why SInger argues in the one form of utilitarianism that you must be able to show that the disabled infant would not have a life worth living before it would be ethical to kill the infant.. He is showing an equal concern for the good of the disabled infant. Now his conclusions may be wrong but they are not based upon some biasing of the good of the disabled in favor of the normal child and they have absolutely nothing to with giving any special value to autonomy, or intelligence any more than race or gender. The principle of equality that is being applied here specifically rejects such considerations. As both Justin and I have pointed out neither of us agree with Singer but surely the demand to treat him fairly and not caricature his views is reasonable enough. This is surely not to unfairly privilege "reasonable" :)
Cheers, Ken Hanly