Margins of Being "Human" (was Re: Peter Singer & Vegetarian Dogs)

Marta Russell ap888 at lafn.org
Tue Mar 7 14:55:28 PST 2000


OK here it is and really, this will be my last post. Singer does assign value to the disabled/nondisabled status of the infant. This is a quote from Singer at a Princeton event where he debated Adrienne Asch, a bioethicist who is blind:

"If there is one point with which I and the anti-abortion forces can agree, it is that birth does not really mark a sudden change in the nature or status of the neonate (of the fetus or newborn). On the contrary, there is basically a continuation through that point. And so, I think that indeed it's a reasonable view to take both during pregnancy and with the immediate newborn that the life has barely begun if it's beginning in a very clouded way (with prospects that are clouded), then it's reasonable to say no, better not to go on with this- better to consider starting again.

Now is that an unreasonable prejudice or bias against having a disability? Let me say that I think parents ought to be well advised about the nature of the future of their child. And I agree (and I think I have perhaps learned from the disability advocacy movement) that doctors are not always well-informed about this and it's a good idea to bring in organizations or people from organizations concerned with a particular disability of a child if parents are in any doubt and get some advice and information from them. But I don't think I am therefore required to deny the view that other things being equal, it's better not to have a disability. "

Marta

Marta Russell wrote:


> Ken Hanly wrote:
>
> >
> > THe standard of humanity you are criticising has to do only with
> > personhood. But this has nothing to do with placing any particular moral worth
> > on reason, autonomy etc. either. Singer's criteria are conceptual, not moral
> > requirements, for having a right to life. He is not saying that the normal
> > infant is more valuable than the
> > disabled infant. He is saying that neither has a right to life. Why? Because
> > neither is capable of envisioning a future that it would lack if killed or can
> > desire such a future etc. Now this may be stupid or whatever, but it has
>
> > nothing to do with placing more value on the normal than disabled infant- even
> > though it does have ethical implications. These ethical implications are just
> > as negative for normal as for the disabled since both lose any appeal to a
> > right to life to protect them against being killed.
>
> Ken, we are still in disagreement over this. If we read between the lines by
> examining what Singer discusses and how he discusses it, Singer *singles out*
> disability as a basis for killing when he does not give the same weight to killing
> nondisabled infants. He cloaks this in the rationale of "suffering" -- whatever
> he thinks suffering is. I can find no passage where Singer goes on and on,
> paragraph after paragraph about the "quality of life" of the nondisabled infant.
> He does not talk about killing black babies, or female babies, or poor babies,
> only disabled babies. What about homosexual babies who make their parents unhappy
> when they discover this factor later in life? Well since one cannot "see"
> homosexuality at birth Singer conveniently escapes that one.
>
> Marta

-- Marta Russell author Los Angeles, CA Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract http://www.commoncouragepress.com/



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