***** The particular situation in which Spinoza found himself was brought about by a mixture of political and religious factions and alliances that were ripping apart the Dutch republic, which had only recently won its independence from Spanish domination. The republican government, ruled by a merchant class favoring decentralization and moderate liberal policies in religion, was opposed by a royalist faction headed by the House of Orange, which wanted to transform the republic into a monarchy....The republicans sided with the more "liberal" Remonstrants, whereas the monarchists favored the more orthodox Contra-Remonstrants....
...[T]o whom is this book [_Theological-Political Treatise_] addressed? That Spinoza wrote it in Latin immediately rules out two groups: 1) the masses, or "vulgus," who, not knowing this language, would not be able to read the _TTP_; and 2) the Jews, most of whom did not know Latin. The former are, according to Spinoza, incapable of either understanding or appreciating the ideas in the _TTP_; moreover, if they did understand some of its contents, they would be utterly unreceptive to it and vigorously oppose it. Throughout the _TTP_ Spinoza exhibits a not too well disguised disdain for the masses. Assuming his theory of human nature, worked out in detail in Parts 3-5 of the _Ethics_, Spinoza claims that most people are ruled by passion, and hence are in "bondage." One specific consequence of this "imprisonment" is their addiction to superstition, false beliefs based on the unrestrained exercise of the imagination, and fanaticism. Since the road to liberation is long and difficult (_Ethics_ 5.42, Scholium), Spinoza had no illusion that most people would either undertake or complete this journey....
For those who have, either through their own efforts or from study of Spinoza's philosophy, emancipated themselves from prejudice and superstition, the _TTP_ is superfluous....They have already been convinced that philosophy, which is concerned only with truth, is not harmful either to the state or to true religion. It leads to freedom and tranquility. If the masses, the Jews, and the philosophers are not, for diverse reasons, the audience for the _TTP_, who, then, are its intended audience?...[T]here is hope that an open-minded, educated person will be persuaded by arguments based upon logic and facts. (xvi-xix) *****
Just as Hume rails against fanaticism and extremism ("Perhaps the _levellers_, who claimed an equal distribution of property, were a kind of _political_ fanatics, which arose from the religious species," _Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_) in his defense of inequality, Spinoza's argument against fanaticism is in part motivated by the fear of the masses & of their demand for economic justice:
***** Indeed, those who have experienced the fickleness of the masses are almost reduced to despair; for the masses are governed solely by their emotions, not by reason; they rush wildly into everything, and are readily corrupted either by avarice or by luxurious living. Every single man thinks he knows everything, and wants to fashion the world to his liking....Vanity makes him despise his equals, nor will he be guided by them. Through envy of superior fame or fortune -- which is never equal for all men -- he desires another's misfortune and takes pleasure therein. There is no need for me to go through the whole catalogue, for everyone knows to what wickedness men are frequently persuaded by dissatisfaction with their lot and desire for change, by hasty anger, by disdain of poverty, and how their minds are engrossed and agitated by these emotions. (Spinoza, _Theological-Political Treatise_, p. 193) *****
Now, as for the claim that Spinoza is less absolutist than Hobbes with regard to the State power, that is nonsense. For instance, here's Spinoza on treason:
***** A subject is said to have committed this crime [of treason] if he has attempted for any reason to seize for himself the sovereign power's right or to transfer it to another. I say 'if he has attempted,' for if men were to be condemned only after the deed was done, in most cases it would be too late for the state to try to do this after the seizure of its right or its transference to another. Again, I say without qualification 'he who for any reason attempts to seize for himself the sovereign power's right,' thus making no distinction between cases where either injury or gain to the entire state would have unquestionably resulted. Whatever be the reason for the attempt, he is guilty of treason and is rightly condemned. In war, indeed, there is complete agreement that this is fully justified. If a man leaves his post and approaches the enemy without his commander's knowledge, even though he has ventured on this action with good intentions -- but nevertheless his won -- and has overcome the enemy, he is rightly condemned to death because he has violated his oath and the commander's right. Now it is not universally realised quite so clearly that all citizens without exception are always bound by this right, yet the point at issue is exactly the same. For since the state must be preserved and governed solely by the policy of the sovereign power and it is covenanted that this right belongs absolutely to it alone, if anyone embarks on some undertaking of public concern on his own initiative and without the knowledge of the supreme council, he has violated the right of the sovereign power and is guilty of treason and is rightly and properly condemned, even if, as we have said, the state was sure to gain some advantage from his action. (Spinoza, p. 187) *****
In many ways, Spinoza is much closer to Rousseau on the matter of sovereignty (which is to say, more illiberal & less hedonistic) than Hobbes is.
It is interesting that our contemporary philosophers are creating something of a Spinoza renaissance, but the politics attributed to the born-again Spinoza -- who becomes, in the hands of Eugene Holland for instance, a patron saint of grassroots micro-politics & Spinozian Marxism -- bears little resemblance to what Spinoza actually stood for.
Yoshie