Date: Thu, 30 Mar 2000 12:15:48 -0800 (PST) From: Miles Jackson <cqmv at pdx.edu> X-Sender: cqmv at freke.odin.pdx.edu To: lbo-talk at lists.panix.com Subject: Re: Popperism (was Chomsky -- Put up or blah blah) In-Reply-To: <524AA6DB83604D1178E40005B8876857 at smartens.moncourrier.com> Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.4.21.0003301207220.7848-100000 at freke.odin.pdx.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
On Thu, 30 Mar 2000, Scott Martens wrote:
> > I thought that the view that scientific theories had to be
> > falsifiable was no longer held by most philosophers of
> > science. The Lakatosian position as I recall is that there
> > is a core of theory that is not regarded as falsifiable.
>
> This is not the position generally held by scientists. There may be
> some portion of a theory that isn't falsifiable, but if the portion
> that is falsifiable is falsified, the theory is unlikely to last.
> For example, Newton made no effort to verify the law of conservation
> of mass and energy, and his theory was accepted anyway. It turns out
> this law isn't true. What can't be falsified now, may be falsifiable
> later.
>
> Remember, you can't ever be certain that a scientific theory is true,
> you can only be certain that it is false.
>
Whoa Betsy. If only it were that simple! Can we ever be absolutely certain that data inconsistent with a theory are accurate? Sampling bias? Measurement problems? Errors in data analysis? Only somebody like Popper with an idealized view of science would buy into this kind of simple falsificationism. (Although I should be fair: this is more of a problem I see in overzealous Popperians than in Popper's writing itself).
Miles