Nader cost himself federal funds (Re: election demographics

Nathan Newman nathan at newman.org
Fri Nov 10 21:31:14 PST 2000


----- Original Message ----- From: "John Gulick" <jlgulick at sfo.com> To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com>

Nathan sez:
>But Nader supporters have got to recognize that Gore and liberal Dems
didn't
>"steal" Nader votes either. Nader lost those votes by ignoring their
>concerns and alienating them by campaigning in swing states.

-Nathan, many of the so-called "swing states" (such Washington, Wisconsin, and -Michigan) were "swing states" precisely _because_ Nader had natural -constituencies there. Nader didn't specifically -target these states to endanger Gore, but b/c he had lots of potential -support there. -In essence what you're saying is that Nader should have conceded those -states where he was bound to do best.

Every candidate has to make decisions about which voters to mobilize and if mobilizing one group of supporters will alienate other potential voters. All I am arguing is that I think Nader could have won more than 3% of the vote, but he made a strategic mistake. If he had conceded the swing states (yes), he could have mobilized more in the safe states. Maybe that's an inaccurate assessment and 3% was all Nader could have managed in this election. But I would note that Nader barely campaigned in the South or other areas where there was no chance of endangering Gore, so he seemed to forego mobilizing a lot of potential voters.

That's a strategic decision, but my point was that just as I agree that Gore made strategically bad decisions that cost him a lot of votes, so too did Nader.

For all people taunt me for being a slavish Gore supporter, I am completely willing to note Gore's political shortcomings and his strategic mistakes. Most of the Nader supporters seem unable to admit Nader might have contributed in any way to his poor showing and to treat any criticism of Nader's strategic choices as evidence of neoconservative leanings.

Let me be clear- Nader is one of the great political figures of the last forty years and he continues a vital role today. My first political experience was in the Naderite PIRGS and in my more recent work against Microsoft, I worked closely at time with Nader's people, who with Nader did outstanding work. I don't think Nader was running his campaign as an ego trip but as a real expression of his political convictions. But I think it was a misguided and disasterous strategic decision to campaign as he did, a disaster in contributing to Gore's possible defeat and disasterous in alienating Nader's allies at a time when non-electoral movements partly led by Nader were achieving greater unity on the left.

This is not a personal insult to Nader but a criticism of his strategy. I have been equally free with my criticism of Gore. Hell, don't people remember that my criticism of Gore was so severe that I bet Seth that Gore would lose because he was such a lousy candidate, despite all the advantages of peace and prosperity he had to run on.

So I continue to be bemused that my strategic criticisms of Nader evoke such strong defensiveness (and occasional offensiveness) by Nader supporters. Any movement whose candidate failed at his stated goal, in this case the 5% threshhold, should be able to engage in a discussion of the strategic shortcomings of the campaign.

-- Nathan Newman



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