election demographics

Brad DeLong delong at econ.Berkeley.EDU
Mon Nov 13 16:54:02 PST 2000



> > >> If you lived in Florida, I would say that your *individual* vote was
>> >> *very* *very* substantial.
>
>> >On the contrary, before the votes are counted, one has only
>> >a certain probability of the election being decided by one's
>> >vote. It is very, very low, events in Florida notwithstanding.
>> >If one pretends to rationality, one must find another reason
>> >for voting than its significance in deciding large elections.
>
>Brad DeLong:
>> If one is an anomic, isolated, Hobbesian individual, you are right.
>>
>> You may be. But I'm not.
>
>I'd like to see a rational, materialistic demonstration of
>that. Short of some kind of electoral Quantum Mechanics, it
>seems that one's beliefs about one's vote wouldn't change
>its effects on the outcome of an election like the one we're
>discussing.

I have a feeling that this is closely tied to Newcomb's paradox. It involves whether one views oneself as an independent moral agent or as one of a group of people subject to common influences.

Let us suppose that there are two influences on how I vote. The first is my position as a bearer of certain attitudes and social forces that I share with others. Call this GW (for "General Will"). The second is my own idiosyncratic individualist beliefs: call them I (for "Individual"). Suppose that G and I are independently distributed, and each has a 50% chance of being positive and a 50% chance of being negative.

If G and I are both positive, then I vote "yes". If one of G or I is positive and the other is negative, then there is a 50% chance that I vote "yes" and a 50% chance that I am too apathetic to go to the polls. If both G and I are negative, then I am too apathetic to go vote. The total vote, however, is determined by G and not by I. If G is positive, yes wins. If G is negative, it does not.

Suppose that I am--before the election--debating how to vote. I reason as follows. 75% of the time that I vote "yes" it turns out that G was positive. 75% of the time that I vote "no" it turns out that G was negative. So when I go into the polling place to punch my card, my vote makes a difference in the sense that it alters the probability that "yes" wins--raises it from 25% to 75%.

Therefore whether I vote yes matters: if I don't care enough to go to the polls, then the chance of "yes" winning falls from 75% to 25%.

There does remain the question of whether this analysis does not apply if I use this correlation between my vote and the result to argue myself into voting. I can argue either side of that question...

Brad DeLong



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