----- Original Message ----- From: James Hughes <jhughes at changesurfer.com> To: Asdnet (E-mail) <asdnet at igc.topica.com> Cc: CT Greens News (E-mail) <grns-ctgreens-news at judi.greens.org> Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2000 9:34 PM Subject: [ASDnet] What Went Wrong for Ralph?
> What Went Wrong for Ralph?
> Micah L. Sifry, NewsForChange.com
> November 28, 2000
>
> Two-point-seven percent.
>
>
> What happened? Why didn't Ralph Nader get the five percent that polls
> suggested lay in reach, as late as the weekend before the election? And
> regardless of the final vote, what did his campaign accomplish? Where did
it
> fall short?
>
>
> Based on comprehensive interviews with Nader and much of his core campaign
> staff, along with an array of Green activists and others who intersected
> with the campaign over the last year, some early conclusions can be drawn.
>
>
> First, what the Nader campaign accomplished, on its own terms: "We got on
44
> state ballots [including Washington, D.C.], raised almost $8 million,
> mobilized 150,000 volunteers, started 500 local Green groups and 900
campus
> chapters, and brought in one million new voters," said Theresa Amato,
> Nader's campaign manager. "Ralph raised his agenda for a working democracy
> in fifty states, and we were the only campaign talking about issues like
the
> death penalty, fair trade, campaign finance reform, universal health care,
> and media concentration. We trained a new generation of activists to
follow
> through on the Seattle movement, gave great visibility to the Green Party
> and highlighted some of its local candidates. And we raised awareness of
the
> corrupt Commission on Presidential Debates, filed two lawsuits against it,
> and also brought nine lawsuits seeking to open up state ballot access."
>
>
> It's an honorable list. Nader ran a serious campaign that carried forward
> the torch of reform lit earlier in the year by Republican John McCain,
> adding his own distinct anti-corporate critique and challenging many
> Americans to consider their stake in fostering a "deep democracy."
>
>
> While many Democrats and their liberal interest group allies are consumed
> with vitriol for Nader's renegade campaign, a few calmer heads have
> recognized his impact on the election and the future. After all, he did
get
> more than 5 percent of the vote in 11 states (and D.C.) and more than 4
> percent in 7 others -- giving him the potential to be a swing vote in
> perhaps 100 Congressional districts.
>
>
> "We are witnessing the birth pangs of a reform movement in America intent
on
> ending the corruption of our democratic system by money," former Clinton
> Labor Secretary Robert Reich observed in the current issue of the American
> Prospect, adding that "this is the hour for reform, not recrimination."
>
>
> From the right, historian Kevin Phillips noted in the Los Angeles Times
that
> the combined vote for Al Gore and Ralph Nader was 52 percent, the highest
> since LBJ's 1964 landslide. "Nader and his voters may now be what George
C.
> Wallace was after in 1968: a pivotal force to be courted," wrote Phillips.
>
>
> But while the first draft of history is still being written, it's worth
> taking a close look at the course of Nader's campaign. It may be that
> nothing could have been done differently or that external conditions
beyond
> the campaign's control mattered more than anything else. Certainly, no one
> could have predicted that Patrick Buchanan would put in such a weak
> performance -- especially after polls last year showed him drawing into
the
> low double-digits as a third-party candidate. (Though, ironically, it
> appears that Buchanan "cost" Bush more states -- Iowa, New Mexico, Oregon,
> and Wisconsin -- than Nader did Gore, assuming for the sake of argument
that
> every one of their voters would have gone to the major party candidate.)
>
>
> Had there been a genuine four-way race, with a four-way debate, Nader
might
> have avoided the ugly endgame with the Democrats which dominated his
> campaign's final weeks. And, certainly, no one thought the race between
Gore
> and Bush would be so close -- another factor that ultimately depressed
> Nader's vote totals.
>
>
> "The most disappointing thing to me," Nader said during an hour-long
> conversation just before Thanksgiving, "was the way the polls shrank. They
> gave every indication to me of holding, going into the last weekend before
> election day, even surging in some places." He sighed. "There's this
> psychology among voters not to stray from the major parties."
>
>
> Nader blamed that mindset for his disappointing totals, along with the
fact
> that the so-called Molly Ivins Rule -- whereby fence-sitters in "safe
> states" were urged to support the Green candidate -- was mostly a failure.
>
>
> "People don't think about the electoral college at all," he complained.
> (Well, that was then!) Obviously, what Nader and many other people
misjudged
> was the reluctance of many liberals to abandon the Democratic party, and
the
> effectiveness of the Gore campaign's scare tactics in the final weeks of
the
> election.
>
>
> Still, a full postmortem requires an honest look at the mistakes the Nader
> campaign made on its own, ranging from its late start, weak
> vice-presidential candidate and problems created by the Greens, as well as
> the stumbles of an inexperienced staff that didn't maximize the campaign's
> message. Finally, it's worth questioning whether Nader was too "left" or
too
> "Green" a candidate to reach most voters -- a topic of great importance if
> he and the Greens are to prosper in the future.
>
>
> Last Into the Pool
>
>
> The first error, and the biggest, was starting so late. While Nader had
told
> a few people (off the record) as early as June of last year that he would
> run, he didn't begin hiring a campaign manager until early 2000, and his
> official announcement wasn't until February 21st. The result was a
cascading
> series of blown deadlines and late starts on everything from ballot access
> to fundraising, compounded by Nader's decision to spend most of the first
> three months of his campaign -- from mid-March to mid-June -- flying
around
> the country keeping his promise to campaign in all fifty states.
>
>
> It wasn't until late July that the funds really started pouring in,
enabling
> Amato to triple the staff to over 100 by the end of August, including
hiring
> field coordinators in many states.
>
>
> It was, in effect, as if the Nader campaign didn't really get out of first
> gear until Labor Day. Asked in mid-October about what he would have done
> differently, Nader admits he should have started earlier, but isn't so
sure
> how much better things could have been.
>
>
> "If we had started in November, it would have been better, but I'm not
sure
> the intensity could have been kept up with some people," he said, adding
> that it would have been hard to get out the campaign's radical message so
> early in the political season -- especially during the primaries, when
many
> of the mainstream candidates were touting their reformer credentials. "Too
> many people were giving (campaign donations) to (Bill) Bradley and McCain.
> That opened up substantially after March."
>
>
> The consensus of Nader's inner circle is different. "Tactically, we were
at
> a disadvantage starting late," Amato concedes.
>
>
> A Part-time VP
>
>
> A second internal problem was the fact that the campaign had, essentially,
a
> part-time vice-presidential candidate in longtime environmental justice
> activist Winona LaDuke, who had her third child early this year. Her
> presence on the ticket was obviously reassuring to hardcore Greens
concerned
> Nader would neglect their broader platform in his efforts to focus on
> corporate power and democracy issues. But while Nader in fact stood pretty
> solidly with the Green platform throughout the campaign, LaDuke was
nowhere
> near as active on the campaign trail as the head of the ticket. Her
absence
> sometimes angered and confused women who came to rallies expecting to see
> her speak.
>
>
> Picture the alternative of someone like African-American scholar and
> Nader-backer Cornel West stepping in to fill her shoes, potentially
> broadening the Greens' appeal to more people of color. West came out for
> Nader in August, after having stumped actively for Democrat Bill Bradley.
> The day before Election Day, after he and Nader spoke at Al Sharpton's
> headquarters in New York City, I asked him if he could imagine running for
> the vice president with Nader. Laughing heartily, West said "Now that's
> something I could wrap my mind around, my brother!"
>
>
> Amato doesn't deny that LaDuke had a part-time role. But, she says, "She
had
> done more than she had committed to Ralph to do. And she did have other
> commitments."
>
>
> The Greens: A Blessing or a Curse?
>
>
> Some of the campaign's day-to-day difficulties flowed from its
relationship
> to the Greens, who brought their own unique combination of enthusiasm and
> amateurism to the effort. One close Nader adviser rattled off a quick list
> of issues: "First, the timing and location of the convention [in Denver in
> June] screwed the campaign out of plenty of matching funds [which are only
> available until a party nominates its presidential candidate]. We could
have
> held it in September. And why not hold it in New York or California, where
> more people would have attended?
>
>
> "Second, in lots of places there was little focus on the presidential
> campaign, with Greens more interested in local issues like animal rights
or
> power lines. Third, the 'Super Rallies' were a success despite the Greens.
> We'd give them a bunch of tickets to sell and they'd stick them on the
side
> of the table. In many places, they haven't made the transition from being
a
> debating society to being a political party.
>
>
> "Fourth," the advisor noted, "I don't know who put out that statement on
the
> Middle East and what they thought they were doing." Indeed, the
Association
> of State Green Parties issued a release October 24th endorsing a United
> Nations resolution condemning Israel's handling of the Palestinian
protests
> and calling for an end to U.S. aid to Israel until the country agrees to
> withdraw from the occupied territories and recognize the Palestinians'
right
> of return. The statement went beyond Nader's own position on the
conflict --
> he is against any immediate aid cutoff, and has only talked about phasing
> down economic aid to the country, citing former Prime Minister Benjamin
> Netanyahu's support for the notion.
>
>
> Needless to say, the ASGP's statement was quickly added to anti-Nader
> propaganda being circulated by Jewish Democrats -- including vicious
e-mails
> that not only gratuitously pointed out Nader's Lebanese heritage but also
> claimed his father had refused to serve Jews in his Winsted, Connecticut
> restaurant. The result? According to the Voter News Service exit poll,
Nader
> only received one percent of the vote of a very liberal minority that had
> earlier disproportionately supported his candidacy.
>
>
> Then there was the inexperience of the campaign staff, which showed in
every
> department. Some field staff were hired haphazardly, the campaign's Web
site
> languished for months and campaign manager Amato was more of an
> administrator than a strategist.
>
>
> These sorts of problems crop up in all kinds of seat-of-their-pants
> campaigns, and while painful, they don't have to be fatal. But indecisive
> leadership and sloppy work in Nader's headquarters led the candidate to
> unleash his legendary aptitude for micromanaging. After some press
releases
> were sent out with typos, for example, Nader insisted on personally
> approving every outgoing communication -- dramatically slowing reporters'
> ability to get timely responses from the campaign.
>
>
> Media Confusion
>
>
> The team's flaws were most noticeable when it came to getting the
campaign's
> message out. There's no question the mainstream media was disdainful of
the
> Nader campaign until the end. With a few exceptions -- USA Today, the
> Fort-Worth Star-Telegram, the Hartford Courant, and ABC News -- Nader was
> nothing more than an occasional feature story. The New York Times set the
> tone with its sneering editorials and skimpy news coverage. But with some
> creative campaigning, Nader might have been able to break-through this
media
> brownout.
>
>
> Despite pressure from several close supporters and campaign advisers,
> however, Nader refused to elbow his way into front page-hogging sagas like
> the Elian Gonzalez war or Texas' controversial execution of Gary Graham --
> even though in both cases he had an excellent opportunity to distinguish
his
> stance on the issues from those of Bush and Gore. For Nader, these stories
> were distractions from his core message about corporate power and its
> stranglehold on American life.
>
>
> Since he couldn't count on the automatic daily coverage that is a perk of
> being a major party candidate, Nader needed to continually find targets
that
> could both illustrate his message -- we need to save democracy from
> corporate power -- while also affecting the larger Gore-Bush horse race
upon
> which nearly all of the media coverage was focused. He hit the occasional
> bulls-eye, such as a trip to East Liverpool, Ohio, where for eight years
> protesters have ripped Al Gore's broken promise to prevent the opening of
an
> incinerator cheek-by-jowl with a public school. But most of the time
Nader's
> message was more diffuse and less "newsworthy."
>
>
> Nader also never really succeeded in crafting a more positive message from
> his relentless critique of the status quo. While he listened to those who
> urged him to speak more to the "joy" in his avowed "politics of joy and
> justice," he frequently fell back into a well-worn groove of excoriating
the
> major parties -- particularly the Democrats, for betraying the party's
> ideals.
>
>
> Nader was also distracted by personal attacks -- the New York Times in
> particular got under his skin -- which sometimes blurred his focus, as did
> his tendency to speak too long, testing the patience of his most adoring
> crowds. His flip remark that Roe v. Wade would simply 'revert to the
states'
> if overturned by a Bush-stacked Supreme Court didn't help either, in
> dispelling the fears of many liberals. Anti-Nader Gore-ites like Gloria
> Steinem had a field day with it.
>
>
> Strong Ad Campaign Never Happened
>
>
> All of these stumbles still don't fully explain why Nader was not better
> prepared for the inevitable tendency of third-party leaners to melt way on
> election day. In this regard, the campaign made a strategic mistake when
it
> failed to budget and raise enough money for a substantial ad run in the
last
> two weeks before Election Day. "You need a field campaign, absolutely,"
says
> Bill Hillsman, the Minnesota ad whiz who produced Nader's TV and radio
ads.
> "But this was a case where we never reached critical mass with TV and
radio.
> Our message never made it out to the independents in the suburbs. It was
all
> focused on college campuses and urban centers."
>
>
> Nader himself was never thrilled about having to buy TV ads -- in my first
> conversation with him a year ago about the emerging campaign he refused to
> commit to even doing broadcast ads, hoping as he was to run the whole
thing
> on a combination of grassroots organizing and free media coverage. And he
> was unimpressed when his campaign spent $800,000 broadcasting the
> critically-acclaimed "Priceless" ad (a parody of MasterCard's famous
> campaign) during the August convention season, pointing out that "our poll
> numbers went down afterwards."
>
>
> Others in the campaign argued that those ads -- which drew secondary media
> attention after a humorless MasterCard sued -- kept Nader on the playing
> field during the onslaught of convention coverage, and that his numbers
went
> down because Gore began stealing his populist rhetoric, starting with his
> nomination acceptance speech.
>
>
> Nader disagreed, even after the election. "The clutter of ads at the end
> were staggering," he said. "The Democrats spent $8 million in Michigan
> alone." He prefers to point to places where extensive grassroots
campaigning
> by local Naderites had a big impact. "We got 14 percent in Great
Barrington
> and 33 percent in Sheffield" -- two towns in liberal western
> Massachusetts -- "where we had two people going neighbor to neighbor for
six
> months."
>
>
> Most of America is not like western Massachusetts, however, culturally or
> even geographically. Mass political movements need to be organized, yes,
and
> that takes tens of thousands of individuals doing the hard work of talking
> to their neighbors. But those people need to be motivated by the sense
they
> are part of something larger than themselves -- a sense an effective
> national ad campaign might foster. As Hillsman says, "going from zero to
> five percent is much harder than going from five to fifteen percent."
Noting
> Nader's reluctance to put more money into media, Hillsman concludes "I was
> never sure about how committed the candidate was to getting the five
percent
> (needed for federal matching funds in '04)."
>
>
> The lack of paid media may have tilted Nader's itinerary in the final
weeks
> more toward swing states. The campaign had decided that, in aiming for at
> least 5 percent of the vote, it needed shore up its base in those states
> where the ticket was already polling above that threshold -- a strategy
> which meant going into some battleground states like Wisconsin and
> Minnesota. The campaigners also believed they would drop out of the news
if
> they only went to "safe" states like Texas and New York.
>
>
> To be sure, Nader did not get into the presidential race hoping he would
> have a free and easy ride -- i.e., winning five percent of the vote
without
> affecting the Bush-Gore contest. It was clear he wanted to teach the
> Democrats a lesson by hurting Gore, and the campaign never pushed the
"safe"
> states message as hard as it could have. On the other hand, if all Nader
had
> wanted to do was deny Gore the election, then he simply would have rented
a
> bus and campaigned solely in his strongholds in the Midwest and Northwest,
> rather than taking multiple trips to New York and California.
>
>
> In any event, the campaign had only about $200,000 for paid media during
the
> last two weeks, precisely when a host of Gore allies ranging from the
Sierra
> Club, the League of Conservation Voters and NARAL were spending millions
on
> ads directly attacking Nader and suggesting a vote for him would elect
Bush.
> And if there's one rule of thumb in politics today, it's that an attack on
> television must be answered on television.
>
>
> Nader did have a good response in the can -- an ad produced by Hillsman
> depicting kids contemplating their future (a parody of a Monster.com ad)
> that evoked the campaign's essentially humanistic and uplifting purpose.
But
> Nader worried that the ad would be seen as exploiting children and that as
a
> longtime opponent of commercialism and commercials aimed at kids, he would
> be attacked as a hypocrite. Precious time was lost as the campaign debated
> what to do; the ad finally ran here and there, but only in the last four
> days of the election.
>
>
> Less than Three
>
>
> And so he ended up with 2.7 percent. But all of this nitpicking begs a
more
> serious question: Regardless of any fine-tuning that could have been done
on
> the Nader campaign, is it possible he was just headed in the wrong
> direction? Specifically, should he have run as less the progressive
prophet
> scolding the right-drifting Democratic party and more as the maverick
> independent, zeroing in on the buy-partisan political establishment?
> Especially as it became clear that Buchanan was not going to siphon off
many
> right-wing votes from Bush, leaving a leftist Nader in a much more exposed
> "spoiler" position? Had Ralph mistakenly traded his "civic" armor built
over
> decades for a "green" suit that didn't fit?
>
>
> Consider that in 1992 when Nader campaigned in the New Hampshire primary,
> asking voters to write his name in "as a stand-in for
'none-of-the-above,'"
> he received 2 percent of the Democratic vote AND 2 percent of the
Republican
> vote. This somewhat surprising appeal across party lines was reflected in
> the large crowds who came to his rallies, ranging from middle-aged men
with
> gun racks on their pick-ups to young professionals bothered by high real
> estate prices to the familiar ponytailed Birkenstockers. He had recently
led
> a successful populist uprising against Congress' attempt to vote itself a
> pay raise and his stock was high on talk radio dials across America.
>
>
> More recently, he continued to make odd-bedfellow alliances on issues
> ranging from global trade agreements to getting Channel One out of public
> schools (on which he worked with Phyllis Schlafly). But in the 2000
> campaign, Nader came out as a full-blown progressive, taking strong
> positions on the death penalty, the military budget, health care, gay
> rights, labor organizing, racial profiling, reparations for slavery, hemp,
> Palestinian rights -- you name it. And while he focused on a set of issues
> surrounding corporate power and democracy that could appeal to a
independent
> skeptic, he saddled himself with the mantle of a fledgling social
democratic
> party whose core base is mostly crunchy granola.
>
>
> "I always framed things as an appeal to traditional values," Nader
insisted,
> when asked if his campaign wasn't too much like 'Noam Chomsky for
> President.'" "I would define the corporatists as the extremists, pointing
> out their exploitation of children and commercialization of childhood, for
> example. I was always careful to appeal to conservatives."
>
>
> Perhaps. But exit polls show Nader's support came predominantly from the
> left side of the spectrum; obviously, conservatives weren't hearing him.
>
>
> Ultimately, there may be a hard lesson here for those of us seeking a way
> out of the two-party duopoly. Yes, the mythic party of nonvoters
outnumbers
> that of the Democrats and Republicans, and is potentially more radical.
But
> there are also many independent voters who are open to new choices beyond
> Tweedledom -- and these people vote more regularly than typical
'nonvoters.'
> Thus it may make more sense to build a third-party campaign as an
> independent-populist play rooted in the "radical middle" that came out for
> Ross Perot in 1992 and Jesse Ventura in 1998.
>
>
> Such a strategy doesn't have to mean jettisoning progressive principles --
> indeed most of these speak to the majority of Americans when they are
framed
> as appeals to fairness, justice and democratic empowerment. But it does
mean
> taking very seriously the need to speak to Americans where they are,
without
> expecting them to come all the way over to the progressive side of the box
> on their own.
>
>
> Nader's gamble was that his 37 years as a citizen advocate, his convincing
> fight for the "little guy" and his defense of civic values over corporate
> values would transform the Greens into a new kind of
> populist/social-democratic party. Clearly that didn't happen -- or at
best,
> it is only beginning to happen. Instead, in this campaign, Nader became a
> "green" -- and despite his best efforts that term by itself still doesn't
> resonate with most Americans.
>
>
> Micah L. Sifry's book on third parties in American politics will be
> published next year by Routledge.
>
> The preceding is a personal opinion. Try not to post more than daily.
>
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