nader seems to think we live in a democracy, hence all that rhetoric about "reclaiming our democracy." but when did we ever have it? we have capitalism and we have voting, the first which is wholly inconsistent with any meaningful conception of democracy and the second which is rendered almost a mere formality by the first. of course, nader would not agree with this assessment because, as he has indicated numerous times, he believes there is nothing wrong with capitalism in and of itself. we just need better laws to control its excesses.
his position on israel is...well, shameful. i was gonna say "especially as a palestinian" but ralph is pretty much a white guy. i mean, there is no indication from his 30-plus years on the political scene that he has any appreciation of how race and class work in this country. look at all those "inside baseball" Public Interest organizations he has spawned. which one is even thinking about race? yes, on the campaign trail, he several times made some bodacious sounding remarks about america having "affirmative action for white men" for 300 years but it was never followed by any substantive discussion about the topic and he was clearly very careful about where he said it. the brothers and sisters, radical or liberal, who saw him speak, were variously unimpressed, though a handful nevertheless voted for him.
cornel west, it is clear, realy likes the sound of his own voice. he is a smart man. but he has written or co-written a number of middling to awful books that reflet little or nothing of his deepest insights. the only reason i can imagine he would do that, besides some vague notion of aiding the struggle, is to keep himself in the spotlight. west makes political allegiances like he chooses co-authors: his choices don't seem to based on any principle except keeping him in favor with the broad left. suggestive of fredrick douglass' relationship with lincoln, he explained his support for bill bradley, a neo-liberal who can make himself sound leftish at times, as based on bradley's sensitivity to african-american concerns, and specifically his support for affirmative action. but after bradely was done for, west rather quickly, and somewhat shamelessly, switched his allegiances to nader, a man with a rather different political history and profile who has spent little time working ! on 'black issues' (except as a lawyer in the 60's). since the nader camp was a little desperate for african-american support, no one asked any difficult questions. i would not signal west out for doing what everybody else in the world of electoral politics does except west pimps himself as being about something more than political business as usual...
there is so much more to say about nader but since i'm getting depressed thinking about it, i'll just say one more thing: the nader campaign wanted to have its cake and eat it, too: they did not want to alienate potential white supporters by reaching out too explicitely to the black community (an old problem for the democratic party) but they also wanted the black communities votes. their strategy, in so far as it was thought out, seemed to be: get as many black progressive heavies as you can to support nader so that you look like your all about helping the hood and indicate support for vague "feel good" policies like "ending racism" or "support affirmative action."
a neo-white man's populism for a post-civil rightr america. yuck.
chris niles
> >
> > First, what the Nader campaign accomplished, on its own terms: "We got on
> 44
> > state ballots [including Washington, D.C.], raised almost $8 million,
> > mobilized 150,000 volunteers, started 500 local Green groups and 900
> campus
> > chapters, and brought in one million new voters," said Theresa Amato,
> > Nader's campaign manager. "Ralph raised his agenda for a working democracy
> > in fifty states, and we were the only campaign talking about issues like
> the
> > death penalty, fair trade, campaign finance reform, universal health care,
> > and media concentration. We trained a new generation of activists to
> follow
> > through on the Seattle movement, gave great visibility to the Green Party
> > and highlighted some of its local candidates. And we raised awareness of
> the
> > corrupt Commission on Presidential Debates, filed two lawsuits against it,
> > and also brought nine lawsuits seeking to open up state ballot access."
> >
> >
> > It's an honorable list. Nader ran a serious campaign that carried forward
> > the torch of reform lit earlier in the year by Republican John McCain,
> > adding his own distinct anti-corporate critique and challenging many
> > Americans to consider their stake in fostering a "deep democracy."
> >
> >
> > While many Democrats and their liberal interest group allies are consumed
> > with vitriol for Nader's renegade campaign, a few calmer heads have
> > recognized his impact on the election and the future. After all, he did
> get
> > more than 5 percent of the vote in 11 states (and D.C.) and more than 4
> > percent in 7 others -- giving him the potential to be a swing vote in
> > perhaps 100 Congressional districts.
> >
> >
> > "We are witnessing the birth pangs of a reform movement in America intent
> on
> > ending the corruption of our democratic system by money," former Clinton
> > Labor Secretary Robert Reich observed in the current issue of the American
> > Prospect, adding that "this is the hour for reform, not recrimination."
> >
> >
> > From the right, historian Kevin Phillips noted in the Los Angeles Times
> that
> > the combined vote for Al Gore and Ralph Nader was 52 percent, the highest
> > since LBJ's 1964 landslide. "Nader and his voters may now be what George
> C.
> > Wallace was after in 1968: a pivotal force to be courted," wrote Phillips.
> >
> >
> > But while the first draft of history is still being written, it's worth
> > taking a close look at the course of Nader's campaign. It may be that
> > nothing could have been done differently or that external conditions
> beyond
> > the campaign's control mattered more than anything else. Certainly, no one
> > could have predicted that Patrick Buchanan would put in such a weak
> > performance -- especially after polls last year showed him drawing into
> the
> > low double-digits as a third-party candidate. (Though, ironically, it
> > appears that Buchanan "cost" Bush more states -- Iowa, New Mexico, Oregon,
> > and Wisconsin -- than Nader did Gore, assuming for the sake of argument
> that
> > every one of their voters would have gone to the major party candidate.)
> >
> >
> > Had there been a genuine four-way race, with a four-way debate, Nader
> might
> > have avoided the ugly endgame with the Democrats which dominated his
> > campaign's final weeks. And, certainly, no one thought the race between
> Gore
> > and Bush would be so close -- another factor that ultimately depressed
> > Nader's vote totals.
> >
> >
> > "The most disappointing thing to me," Nader said during an hour-long
> > conversation just before Thanksgiving, "was the way the polls shrank. They
> > gave every indication to me of holding, going into the last weekend before
> > election day, even surging in some places." He sighed. "There's this
> > psychology among voters not to stray from the major parties."
> >
> >
> > Nader blamed that mindset for his disappointing totals, along with the
> fact
> > that the so-called Molly Ivins Rule -- whereby fence-sitters in "safe
> > states" were urged to support the Green candidate -- was mostly a failure.
> >
> >
> > "People don't think about the electoral college at all," he complained.
> > (Well, that was then!) Obviously, what Nader and many other people
> misjudged
> > was the reluctance of many liberals to abandon the Democratic party, and
> the
> > effectiveness of the Gore campaign's scare tactics in the final weeks of
> the
> > election.
> >
> >
> > Still, a full postmortem requires an honest look at the mistakes the Nader
> > campaign made on its own, ranging from its late start, weak
> > vice-presidential candidate and problems created by the Greens, as well as
> > the stumbles of an inexperienced staff that didn't maximize the campaign's
> > message. Finally, it's worth questioning whether Nader was too "left" or
> too
> > "Green" a candidate to reach most voters -- a topic of great importance if
> > he and the Greens are to prosper in the future.
> >
> >
> > Last Into the Pool
> >
> >
> > The first error, and the biggest, was starting so late. While Nader had
> told
> > a few people (off the record) as early as June of last year that he would
> > run, he didn't begin hiring a campaign manager until early 2000, and his
> > official announcement wasn't until February 21st. The result was a
> cascading
> > series of blown deadlines and late starts on everything from ballot access
> > to fundraising, compounded by Nader's decision to spend most of the first
> > three months of his campaign -- from mid-March to mid-June -- flying
> around
> > the country keeping his promise to campaign in all fifty states.
> >
> >
> > It wasn't until late July that the funds really started pouring in,
> enabling
> > Amato to triple the staff to over 100 by the end of August, including
> hiring
> > field coordinators in many states.
> >
> >
> > It was, in effect, as if the Nader campaign didn't really get out of first
> > gear until Labor Day. Asked in mid-October about what he would have done
> > differently, Nader admits he should have started earlier, but isn't so
> sure
> > how much better things could have been.
> >
> >
> > "If we had started in November, it would have been better, but I'm not
> sure
> > the intensity could have been kept up with some people," he said, adding
> > that it would have been hard to get out the campaign's radical message so
> > early in the political season -- especially during the primaries, when
> many
> > of the mainstream candidates were touting their reformer credentials. "Too
> > many people were giving (campaign donations) to (Bill) Bradley and McCain.
> > That opened up substantially after March."
> >
> >
> > The consensus of Nader's inner circle is different. "Tactically, we were
> at
> > a disadvantage starting late," Amato concedes.
> >
> >
> > A Part-time VP
> >
> >
> > A second internal problem was the fact that the campaign had, essentially,
> a
> > part-time vice-presidential candidate in longtime environmental justice
> > activist Winona LaDuke, who had her third child early this year. Her
> > presence on the ticket was obviously reassuring to hardcore Greens
> concerned
> > Nader would neglect their broader platform in his efforts to focus on
> > corporate power and democracy issues. But while Nader in fact stood pretty
> > solidly with the Green platform throughout the campaign, LaDuke was
> nowhere
> > near as active on the campaign trail as the head of the ticket. Her
> absence
> > sometimes angered and confused women who came to rallies expecting to see
> > her speak.
> >
> >
> > Picture the alternative of someone like African-American scholar and
> > Nader-backer Cornel West stepping in to fill her shoes, potentially
> > broadening the Greens' appeal to more people of color. West came out for
> > Nader in August, after having stumped actively for Democrat Bill Bradley.
> > The day before Election Day, after he and Nader spoke at Al Sharpton's
> > headquarters in New York City, I asked him if he could imagine running for
> > the vice president with Nader. Laughing heartily, West said "Now that's
> > something I could wrap my mind around, my brother!"
> >
> >
> > Amato doesn't deny that LaDuke had a part-time role. But, she says, "She
> had
> > done more than she had committed to Ralph to do. And she did have other
> > commitments."
> >
> >
> > The Greens: A Blessing or a Curse?
> >
> >
> > Some of the campaign's day-to-day difficulties flowed from its
> relationship
> > to the Greens, who brought their own unique combination of enthusiasm and
> > amateurism to the effort. One close Nader adviser rattled off a quick list
> > of issues: "First, the timing and location of the convention [in Denver in
> > June] screwed the campaign out of plenty of matching funds [which are only
> > available until a party nominates its presidential candidate]. We could
> have
> > held it in September. And why not hold it in New York or California, where
> > more people would have attended?
> >
> >
> > "Second, in lots of places there was little focus on the presidential
> > campaign, with Greens more interested in local issues like animal rights
> or
> > power lines. Third, the 'Super Rallies' were a success despite the Greens.
> > We'd give them a bunch of tickets to sell and they'd stick them on the
> side
> > of the table. In many places, they haven't made the transition from being
> a
> > debating society to being a political party.
> >
> >
> > "Fourth," the advisor noted, "I don't know who put out that statement on
> the
> > Middle East and what they thought they were doing." Indeed, the
> Association
> > of State Green Parties issued a release October 24th endorsing a United
> > Nations resolution condemning Israel's handling of the Palestinian
> protests
> > and calling for an end to U.S. aid to Israel until the country agrees to
> > withdraw from the occupied territories and recognize the Palestinians'
> right
> > of return. The statement went beyond Nader's own position on the
> conflict --
> > he is against any immediate aid cutoff, and has only talked about phasing
> > down economic aid to the country, citing former Prime Minister Benjamin
> > Netanyahu's support for the notion.
> >
> >
> > Needless to say, the ASGP's statement was quickly added to anti-Nader
> > propaganda being circulated by Jewish Democrats -- including vicious
> e-mails
> > that not only gratuitously pointed out Nader's Lebanese heritage but also
> > claimed his father had refused to serve Jews in his Winsted, Connecticut
> > restaurant. The result? According to the Voter News Service exit poll,
> Nader
> > only received one percent of the vote of a very liberal minority that had
> > earlier disproportionately supported his candidacy.
> >
> >
> > Then there was the inexperience of the campaign staff, which showed in
> every
> > department. Some field staff were hired haphazardly, the campaign's Web
> site
> > languished for months and campaign manager Amato was more of an
> > administrator than a strategist.
> >
> >
> > These sorts of problems crop up in all kinds of seat-of-their-pants
> > campaigns, and while painful, they don't have to be fatal. But indecisive
> > leadership and sloppy work in Nader's headquarters led the candidate to
> > unleash his legendary aptitude for micromanaging. After some press
> releases
> > were sent out with typos, for example, Nader insisted on personally
> > approving every outgoing communication -- dramatically slowing reporters'
> > ability to get timely responses from the campaign.
> >
> >
> > Media Confusion
> >
> >
> > The team's flaws were most noticeable when it came to getting the
> campaign's
> > message out. There's no question the mainstream media was disdainful of
> the
> > Nader campaign until the end. With a few exceptions -- USA Today, the
> > Fort-Worth Star-Telegram, the Hartford Courant, and ABC News -- Nader was
> > nothing more than an occasional feature story. The New York Times set the
> > tone with its sneering editorials and skimpy news coverage. But with some
> > creative campaigning, Nader might have been able to break-through this
> media
> > brownout.
> >
> >
> > Despite pressure from several close supporters and campaign advisers,
> > however, Nader refused to elbow his way into front page-hogging sagas like
> > the Elian Gonzalez war or Texas' controversial execution of Gary Graham --
> > even though in both cases he had an excellent opportunity to distinguish
> his
> > stance on the issues from those of Bush and Gore. For Nader, these stories
> > were distractions from his core message about corporate power and its
> > stranglehold on American life.
> >
> >
> > Since he couldn't count on the automatic daily coverage that is a perk of
> > being a major party candidate, Nader needed to continually find targets
> that
> > could both illustrate his message -- we need to save democracy from
> > corporate power -- while also affecting the larger Gore-Bush horse race
> upon
> > which nearly all of the media coverage was focused. He hit the occasional
> > bulls-eye, such as a trip to East Liverpool, Ohio, where for eight years
> > protesters have ripped Al Gore's broken promise to prevent the opening of
> an
> > incinerator cheek-by-jowl with a public school. But most of the time
> Nader's
> > message was more diffuse and less "newsworthy."
> >
> >
> > Nader also never really succeeded in crafting a more positive message from
> > his relentless critique of the status quo. While he listened to those who
> > urged him to speak more to the "joy" in his avowed "politics of joy and
> > justice," he frequently fell back into a well-worn groove of excoriating
> the
> > major parties -- particularly the Democrats, for betraying the party's
> > ideals.
> >
> >
> > Nader was also distracted by personal attacks -- the New York Times in
> > particular got under his skin -- which sometimes blurred his focus, as did
> > his tendency to speak too long, testing the patience of his most adoring
> > crowds. His flip remark that Roe v. Wade would simply 'revert to the
> states'
> > if overturned by a Bush-stacked Supreme Court didn't help either, in
> > dispelling the fears of many liberals. Anti-Nader Gore-ites like Gloria
> > Steinem had a field day with it.
> >
> >
> > Strong Ad Campaign Never Happened
> >
> >
> > All of these stumbles still don't fully explain why Nader was not better
> > prepared for the inevitable tendency of third-party leaners to melt way on
> > election day. In this regard, the campaign made a strategic mistake when
> it
> > failed to budget and raise enough money for a substantial ad run in the
> last
> > two weeks before Election Day. "You need a field campaign, absolutely,"
> says
> > Bill Hillsman, the Minnesota ad whiz who produced Nader's TV and radio
> ads.
> > "But this was a case where we never reached critical mass with TV and
> radio.
> > Our message never made it out to the independents in the suburbs. It was
> all
> > focused on college campuses and urban centers."
> >
> >
> > Nader himself was never thrilled about having to buy TV ads -- in my first
> > conversation with him a year ago about the emerging campaign he refused to
> > commit to even doing broadcast ads, hoping as he was to run the whole
> thing
> > on a combination of grassroots organizing and free media coverage. And he
> > was unimpressed when his campaign spent $800,000 broadcasting the
> > critically-acclaimed "Priceless" ad (a parody of MasterCard's famous
> > campaign) during the August convention season, pointing out that "our poll
> > numbers went down afterwards."
> >
> >
> > Others in the campaign argued that those ads -- which drew secondary media
> > attention after a humorless MasterCard sued -- kept Nader on the playing
> > field during the onslaught of convention coverage, and that his numbers
> went
> > down because Gore began stealing his populist rhetoric, starting with his
> > nomination acceptance speech.
> >
> >
> > Nader disagreed, even after the election. "The clutter of ads at the end
> > were staggering," he said. "The Democrats spent $8 million in Michigan
> > alone." He prefers to point to places where extensive grassroots
> campaigning
> > by local Naderites had a big impact. "We got 14 percent in Great
> Barrington
> > and 33 percent in Sheffield" -- two towns in liberal western
> > Massachusetts -- "where we had two people going neighbor to neighbor for
> six
> > months."
> >
> >
> > Most of America is not like western Massachusetts, however, culturally or
> > even geographically. Mass political movements need to be organized, yes,
> and
> > that takes tens of thousands of individuals doing the hard work of talking
> > to their neighbors. But those people need to be motivated by the sense
> they
> > are part of something larger than themselves -- a sense an effective
> > national ad campaign might foster. As Hillsman says, "going from zero to
> > five percent is much harder than going from five to fifteen percent."
> Noting
> > Nader's reluctance to put more money into media, Hillsman concludes "I was
> > never sure about how committed the candidate was to getting the five
> percent
> > (needed for federal matching funds in '04)."
> >
> >
> > The lack of paid media may have tilted Nader's itinerary in the final
> weeks
> > more toward swing states. The campaign had decided that, in aiming for at
> > least 5 percent of the vote, it needed shore up its base in those states
> > where the ticket was already polling above that threshold -- a strategy
> > which meant going into some battleground states like Wisconsin and
> > Minnesota. The campaigners also believed they would drop out of the news
> if
> > they only went to "safe" states like Texas and New York.
> >
> >
> > To be sure, Nader did not get into the presidential race hoping he would
> > have a free and easy ride -- i.e., winning five percent of the vote
> without
> > affecting the Bush-Gore contest. It was clear he wanted to teach the
> > Democrats a lesson by hurting Gore, and the campaign never pushed the
> "safe"
> > states message as hard as it could have. On the other hand, if all Nader
> had
> > wanted to do was deny Gore the election, then he simply would have rented
> a
> > bus and campaigned solely in his strongholds in the Midwest and Northwest,
> > rather than taking multiple trips to New York and California.
> >
> >
> > In any event, the campaign had only about $200,000 for paid media during
> the
> > last two weeks, precisely when a host of Gore allies ranging from the
> Sierra
> > Club, the League of Conservation Voters and NARAL were spending millions
> on
> > ads directly attacking Nader and suggesting a vote for him would elect
> Bush.
> > And if there's one rule of thumb in politics today, it's that an attack on
> > television must be answered on television.
> >
> >
> > Nader did have a good response in the can -- an ad produced by Hillsman
> > depicting kids contemplating their future (a parody of a Monster.com ad)
> > that evoked the campaign's essentially humanistic and uplifting purpose.
> But
> > Nader worried that the ad would be seen as exploiting children and that as
> a
> > longtime opponent of commercialism and commercials aimed at kids, he would
> > be attacked as a hypocrite. Precious time was lost as the campaign debated
> > what to do; the ad finally ran here and there, but only in the last four
> > days of the election.
> >
> >
> > Less than Three
> >
> >
> > And so he ended up with 2.7 percent. But all of this nitpicking begs a
> more
> > serious question: Regardless of any fine-tuning that could have been done
> on
> > the Nader campaign, is it possible he was just headed in the wrong
> > direction? Specifically, should he have run as less the progressive
> prophet
> > scolding the right-drifting Democratic party and more as the maverick
> > independent, zeroing in on the buy-partisan political establishment?
> > Especially as it became clear that Buchanan was not going to siphon off
> many
> > right-wing votes from Bush, leaving a leftist Nader in a much more exposed
> > "spoiler" position? Had Ralph mistakenly traded his "civic" armor built
> over
> > decades for a "green" suit that didn't fit?
> >
> >
> > Consider that in 1992 when Nader campaigned in the New Hampshire primary,
> > asking voters to write his name in "as a stand-in for
> 'none-of-the-above,'"
> > he received 2 percent of the Democratic vote AND 2 percent of the
> Republican
> > vote. This somewhat surprising appeal across party lines was reflected in
> > the large crowds who came to his rallies, ranging from middle-aged men
> with
> > gun racks on their pick-ups to young professionals bothered by high real
> > estate prices to the familiar ponytailed Birkenstockers. He had recently
> led
> > a successful populist uprising against Congress' attempt to vote itself a
> > pay raise and his stock was high on talk radio dials across America.
> >
> >
> > More recently, he continued to make odd-bedfellow alliances on issues
> > ranging from global trade agreements to getting Channel One out of public
> > schools (on which he worked with Phyllis Schlafly). But in the 2000
> > campaign, Nader came out as a full-blown progressive, taking strong
> > positions on the death penalty, the military budget, health care, gay
> > rights, labor organizing, racial profiling, reparations for slavery, hemp,
> > Palestinian rights -- you name it. And while he focused on a set of issues
> > surrounding corporate power and democracy that could appeal to a
> independent
> > skeptic, he saddled himself with the mantle of a fledgling social
> democratic
> > party whose core base is mostly crunchy granola.
> >
> >
> > "I always framed things as an appeal to traditional values," Nader
> insisted,
> > when asked if his campaign wasn't too much like 'Noam Chomsky for
> > President.'" "I would define the corporatists as the extremists, pointing
> > out their exploitation of children and commercialization of childhood, for
> > example. I was always careful to appeal to conservatives."
> >
> >
> > Perhaps. But exit polls show Nader's support came predominantly from the
> > left side of the spectrum; obviously, conservatives weren't hearing him.
> >
> >
> > Ultimately, there may be a hard lesson here for those of us seeking a way
> > out of the two-party duopoly. Yes, the mythic party of nonvoters
> outnumbers
> > that of the Democrats and Republicans, and is potentially more radical.
> But
> > there are also many independent voters who are open to new choices beyond
> > Tweedledom -- and these people vote more regularly than typical
> 'nonvoters.'
> > Thus it may make more sense to build a third-party campaign as an
> > independent-populist play rooted in the "radical middle" that came out for
> > Ross Perot in 1992 and Jesse Ventura in 1998.
> >
> >
> > Such a strategy doesn't have to mean jettisoning progressive principles --
> > indeed most of these speak to the majority of Americans when they are
> framed
> > as appeals to fairness, justice and democratic empowerment. But it does
> mean
> > taking very seriously the need to speak to Americans where they are,
> without
> > expecting them to come all the way over to the progressive side of the box
> > on their own.
> >
> >
> > Nader's gamble was that his 37 years as a citizen advocate, his convincing
> > fight for the "little guy" and his defense of civic values over corporate
> > values would transform the Greens into a new kind of
> > populist/social-democratic party. Clearly that didn't happen -- or at
> best,
> > it is only beginning to happen. Instead, in this campaign, Nader became a
> > "green" -- and despite his best efforts that term by itself still doesn't
> > resonate with most Americans.
> >
> >
> > Micah L. Sifry's book on third parties in American politics will be
> > published next year by Routledge.
> >
> > The preceding is a personal opinion. Try not to post more than daily.
> >
> > ___________________________________________________________
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