Chechnya (was Re: Slobbo, Rwanda and the Surreal)

Yoshie Furuhashi furuhashi.1 at osu.edu
Sun Oct 8 19:06:17 PDT 2000



>Nor in the effort to oppose ones own imperialism should leftists
>fail to address the problem that fascism may emerge with a left face
>as well as a right face. In the turmoil of post socialist societies
>in eastern Europe that is a particular danger. For example I regard
>the quietness of western left-wingers about the brutal suppression
>of the Chechens as ominous and a mark of political inability to
>criticise the appeasement face of western imperialism as vigorously
>as the aggressive face of western imperialism.
>
>Chris Burford

As for "the quietness of western left-wingers," that is because much of the Western Left has come to be pretty much media-driven. Wait until CNN, etc. spend more time on Chechnya and _frame it nicely_ so that leftists can know which side is good and which evil. Then, they'll make up their minds, and we'll hear no end of it.

Another reason is that even cruise-missile liberals have to think twice before going to war with Russia. It still has nukes & other scary stuff, the Kursk notwithstanding. Yugoslavia doesn't have nukes, in contrast, so unleashing NATO on it didn't make Western leftists feel unsafe.

Perhaps, I was wrong to suggest that many Western leftists are beautiful souls in the Hegelian sense. Maybe they are just lazy souls.

I salute you, Chris, for your consistency at least, though I completely disagree with you.

Yoshie

P.S. Also, it is possible that some liberals actually like Putin better than the Chechens, given the tone of discussion, for instance, in _The Nation_:

***** The Nation July 24/31, 2000

Putin's Choice

...Moreover, the struggle over Russia's future leadership and direction is being fought against the backdrop of two huge unresolved problems--the economic depression and the war in Chechnya. Although there is still much spinning about a new economic "boom"--largely from Western financial institutions and the media--Putin punctured the bubble in his bleak address, pointing out that "economic growth is on the brink of collapse." As for the war, no end is in sight. Chechen fighters have stepped up their guerrilla war, and the number of Russian casualties grows by the week. The war and the depression helped bring Putin to power, but if unresolved, they could undermine him.

Finally, as always in latter-day Russia, there is, for better or worse, the American factor. Apart from Washington's decisions regarding National Missile Defense and NATO expansion--both of which would further undermine any chance democratization has here--Putin's Kremlin cares far less about Washington's opinion than did Yeltsin's. Putin is focusing on Europe, especially Germany, and Asia. But it is said that he understands that any large steps he takes before November might influence the US election and thus US policy. If Putin adopts the "liberal" Gref program, it might be seen in Washington as validating the Clinton/Gore Russia policy. On the other hand, if he undertakes the statists' "strong hand" measures or renationalization of the oligarchs' property--no matter how much such measures are needed for Russia's recovery--it would suggest a failure of US policy that would benefit George W. Bush. At least in that regard, Russia is still a world power that matters.

Katrina vanden Heuvel *****

Why they like Putin but not Milosevic can be only explained by the presence of nukes in Russia & the absence of Washington's need to enlist liberals for either side at this point.



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