Carrol Cox:
> Let's be accurate. The debate had nothing to do with the boundlessnes or
> boundedness of human desires or desire. It had to do with which noun
> (desire or desires) most accurately name reality. Some of us argued a
> nominalist position on this. One could speak of desire for X or desire
> for Y but *not* for desire in the abstract. There is simply no
> significant relationship between, say, my desire to have the desk space
> surrounding me in somewhat more orderly condition, my desire to own
> Edelman's *The Brain* (not in stock at the local Barnes & N), and my
> desire for the mosquito bite on my right forearm to stop itching.
> Probably it would be possible to establish a number (perhaps a very
> large number) of categories, each of which would indicate significant
> relationship among the indefinite number of particular desires it
> contained. But it is prima facie sheer nonsense to *start out* with any
> abstract conception, Desire, and expect there to be anything significant
> to say about it. There is simply no evidence, empirical or theoretical,
> for any such Platonic Form. Let me repeat. I do not say the evidence is
> insufficient, I say there is *no*evidence whatsoever that there exists a
> topic of rational conversation here.
Will. Will to power, will to be, will to will. Everyone experiences it, so it's concrete enough. I don't think this is Platonic, though -- in the not too Platonic Bible, the first thing that happens other than some moving over the waters is the utterance of an imperative, an order, the exertion of will.