>I am clueless, This seems to beg all the questions that I said it it. I
>am, say, a slavemaster. I say, Slave, build me a pyramid. You, the slave,
>say,, You know, Habermas teaches that you can't say that and expect to be
>understood without implicitly presupposing that we are free and equal
>particpants in a noncercive speech situation, so even talking to me shows
>that you are committed to the view that you have no right to give that command.
Actually, that would be the case. But let's be careful about this. Habermas argues that the *structure* of speech - the pragmatic function of speech as mediating our consciousness - is communicative. In other words, the telos of communication is understanding. Yes, this is an abstract proposition. What are two people doing when they talk to one another - whether they are friends or enemies - they are communicating, trying to understand one another. The communicative bond is at the heart of *all* social relations that have to do with human understanding. If a slavemaster speaks to a slave, they do so with the intention that the slave will understand them. This presupposes that the slave has the capacity to understanding. Even in a command, there is an expression of communicative solidarity. Now, please, think this through carefully. Communicative solidarity, which is a term I'm introducing here (it isn't found in Habermas) to express the idea that we speak in order to be understood. I submit that it is possible to speak without conscious intention, like when you stub your toe. I'm not going to include that as communication, even if these kind of expressions have meaning as such, it is accidental to the social relation. To give someone an order is to express an intention, the expression is linguistic in nature. It is through the very medium of the intersubjective relation, mediated by language, that the idealization takes place. One might object, but sometimes people know full well that what they say to people will not be understood (I'm rapidly getting that impression on this list) before they say something. And yet, they say it anyway; usually louder and slower than normal. I'd qualify this as magical behaviour, which is probably more idealistic than I'm interested in. But, to the commander. The command is spoken, with the intention that the slave will understand the order and obey. This is an idealization. Obvoiusly, if the slave disobeys, the commander can assume a variety of things, here is two the slave didn't understand (which will likely prompt anther command or the slave will be killed), the slave did understand and is refusing to obey orders (and the commander will likely kill the slave). In the first case, you can object: what if the slaveowner gave the command, and planned to kill the slave anyway, regardless of whether they carried out the order or not and regardless of whether they understood or not - this would seem to be the most instrumental use of language conceivable: from the perspective one prepared to act (to murder) - the linguistic utterance is irrelevant to what follows. But you can see, however, that whatever actions surround a speech act - the structure of understanding does not change. I fully acknowledge that we live our lives with instrumental intent.
If we accept that to learn a language one must learn the rules, which are always abstract and 'ideal' types. Communication is no different. In order to communicative, we have to know 'the rules.' These aren't 'rules' in the sense of a game, not really. They don't 'exist' in an objective sense, but they are constitutive of our interaction relations. Habermas is making a rather strong claim, that all forms of communication essentially function the same way. If you agree with Chomsky about his notion of language and linguistic competence of a language, then you won't have any real truck with Habermas, who simply calls linguistic competence communicative competence; he appropriates Chomsky's model for his own purposes. Drawing on a range of linguistic theories, Habermas argues that communicative structures are universal, in the same sense that 'grammar' is inherent to language.This is not to say that the grammar is identical in all places, which would be an absurd argument. But the logic of 'a grammar' in the context of language is coherent. Not being a linguistic, I can't say much about this. There was a prof here at the UofT in the Religious Studies department who argued that there are two kinds of languages - those based on an alphabet and those based on pictures (my apologies, I haven't read the book, I can't remember the name of the prof, I just recall something mentioned in a seminar as it came to a close some six years ago). The idea of a language based on pictures (there was a technical term, with a latin root I think) does not contradict Habermas's thesis, it contradicts Chomsky's (I haven't read Chomsky either, I'm relying on Habermas's account). A means of communicating that operates differently that the one Habermas describes is, well, almost unthinkable. What would it mean to have a social relation with someone without a communicative structure, a structure based on understanding, which serves the purpose of social exchange and social reproduction?
In short, a communicative relation exists whenever there is more than one person involved and understanding one another is an element in their relation. Note, I say communicative relation, not communicative action. The distinction is important.
The master and slave have a communicative relation, unless the master is simply beating the slave and there is absolutely no exchange whatsoever. If language is involved, the relation is communicative, however asymmetrical, distorted, deceitful and so on.
Communicative *action* are those relations whereby participants in a practical discourse are working together to coordinate their actions consensually. In this sense, communicative action is teleological: understanding and agreement is the end -- and purposive, the goal is to act in accord with others. We engage in communicative action far less (if ever) than we engage in communicative relations. Habermas is arguing that in instances of communicative action, only the force of the better argument carries weight. In instances of communicative action, we make four thematically distinct idealizations: that what we say is comprehensible (it is a well formed sentence, for instance), that what we say is about something (facts), that what we say is normative (in the sense of regulative), and that what we say is honest (that we're not faking communicative action). Any four of these can be challenged. The most serious challenge, of course, is honesty. If you think someone is lying, this will prompt others (most likely) to take up instrumental actions toward the non-truthful person. The first point, comprehensibility, is the least problematic, it is straightforward. When we talk, we assume we will be understood. The question or facts and norms is the most controversial. One person claims one set of facts, and another a different set of facts. In instances of communicative action, disputes along both of these lines lead to argumentation: where anyone in the process can say yes or no to any of the propositions regarding fact sand norms. The decision will be decided upon by good reasons *insofar* as the participants are interested in conducting their actions consensually. If this breaks, at any point, then we are not talking about communicative action.
All Habermas is saying is that this is possible.
That's his theory of communicative action in as few words as I can manage it.
Habermas moral theory of discourse is an extension of this. If this is possible, then what does the moral point of view look like? Well, until an actual discourse (Habermas's term for communicative action) takes place, we can't say. We cannot determine ahead of time what is and what is not moral. But, Habermas does argue we can justify the conditions under which a moral conversation could take place: under the rubric of communicative action. We can consider a norm valid that meets (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.
Should we treat people as equal? A theory of communicative action and a moral theory of discourse cannot answer that question. But - they can provide a philosophical justification for the conditions required for such a question to be answered that could be considered legitimate.
Can this be put into practice? Theory doesn't address its own self-application.
The question is this: is this a fair and accurate assessment of communicative structures? that's Habermas's question too, and he's been struggling with it since the early 60s.
I decided not to mention the ISS or UCC or ICC because, as Habermas admits, it causes more trouble than it is worth. I should have paid more attention to that.
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