>One of Justin's problems, also, seems to be that
>he doesn't believe that an "ideal speech
>situation" is "built into" language in a way that
>necessarily "gives rise" to reason somehow
>by itself because people are "social beings" and
>"need to understand one another,"
>not that he doesn't share ideals of fair argument
>and social justice.
I agree, I don't think Justin buys the argument, not to I think he thinks that it is necessary that such idealizations remain 'theorized.' And I certainly think many of us shared the ideals of fair argumentation and justice, even if only in the emphatic sense.
With that being so: I have yet to come across any explanation about speaking and understanding and communicating that dissuades me from thinking that Habermas is correct about this. The ISS is not built into language, it is built into communication. The ISS doesn't give rise to reason, it is simply the idealizing part of the relationship, a description - and this is all that it is - a description - of the normative expectations of participants in a dialogue.
> And, like me, he probably
>also would agree that human beings can and do
>exhibit the ability to "understand" each other.
>But in what sense do you mean "understand"? You
>seem to be using it in a non-epistemological way,
>investing it with human warmth.
Semantic and grammatical.
>But, it is perfectly possible to "understand"
>someone but NOT be empathetic (which is also
>required by the ISS).
Of course (nothing is required of the ISS, see above). Understanding is not agreement.
> In fact, I would say that
>to be really good at evil, you should practice
>understanding people so that you can fool and
>exploit them, and learn to argue well so that you
>can baffle them with bullshit (I'm not accusing
>you of trying to do that, by the way -- you seem
>perfectly honest in trying to explain yourself).
Exactly. I seem to be honest. I seem to be honest because you have the expectation that I will not lie to you. This expectation is normative (for you) and, as it turns out, for everyone involved in speaking.
Habermas argues that the acquisition of linguistic skills goes hand in hand with behavioural expectations: ie. part of the process of learning a language is the expectancy aspect of speaking and communicating. This question must be solved on the empirical level.
>Just read the concluding chapter of "Moral
>Consciousness and
>Communicative Action." There seems to be an
>unspoken distinction between
>"communication" (which doesn't have to be
>argumentative or all that conscious) and
>"discourse" (argumentation) there.
Not unspoken at all. Habermas hammers the point in TCA. This distinction is crucial for understanding Habermas.
>Are you sure that Habermas isn't just projecting
>an overdose of what he feels OUGHT to
>be the case onto language (and is often the case,
>but not always)?
No.
> Then arguing it adamantly
>to try to make the projection stick (which it can
>do because we have the potential
>to reach agreement and cooperate -- but consider
>that that is also because we tend to be the kind
>of animal that develops strong affective ties and has
>a strong imagination).
I don't know if I'm trying to make it stick. We're talking about the ethical foundations of the left, I proposed Habermas's moral theory of discouse as a foundation. Everything kind of flew apart from there. At this point, all we're really trying to do is create the longest thread in LBO history.
> Is what we
>are talking about just the human POTENTIAL to
>argue and behave fairly?
Yes. A lot of this was covered in a response to Justin yesterday, the largest of my posts.
>The other thing that nags at me in the discussion
>is the sense that there isn't
>much talk of how one gets from HERE to THERE,
>which it now occurs to me
>has been a background issue in what I have
>written.
That's great. I'm interested in theory. If a 'from here to there' argument eventually emerges, then I'll back off.
>P.S. I can't help it if I am not a Habermas
>expert, but the discussion at least made me go get
>the book and read some of it.
I'm sorry.
ken