>Habermas's theory would be much more coherent without the transcendental
>presuppositions he'd have us accept (which could be made plausible only by
>defining communication in such a way as to fit his presuppositions -- the
>problem of circularity here).
1) they aren't transcendental 2) he doesn't ask anyone to accept them
> Since Habermas's politico-philosophical project is a defense of
> desirable aspects of modernity (esp. the spirit of the Enlightenment)
> from Adorno, Heidegger, post-modernists, neo-conservatives, etc., it
> makes sense to analyze an idealized counterfactual that is the ISS as a
> historical product of modernity, not as a transcendentally derived
> condition of all communication throughout history. To do so, Habermas
> would have to move away from Kant and toward Marx.
Habermas is only pointing to the potential for rationality within communicative relations, one which is ground in everyday speech. His theory of moral discourse must be treated separately from his theory of communicative action. Habermas's TCA is a reconsruction of Marx and the legacy of historical materialism with an eye toward synthesizing contributions by Mead, Parsons, Durkheim and Weber.
His moral theory of discourse is not a social theory like TCA. One can disagree completely with one analysis and agree completely without the other without much contradiction. Habermas's discourse ethics is neo-Kantian in a similar way that Rawls's is, but unlike Rawls's Habermas does not need an "original position" or a "veil of ignorance." In its place, he focuses more on cognitive development, drawing on Kohlberg's research on the one hand and Robert Selman's research on the other. The key here is the capacity of a subject for reciprocal role-taking (an idea he appropriates from Mead) [incidentally, the idea of the ideal communicative community does not come from Kant, it comes from the american pragmatist Peirce].
>>>Habermas, unlike you, suggests that his desire for universal
>>>participation in reason-giving in the public sphere is tied up with his
>>>concern for political legitimacy & stability of constitutional democracy
>>>within a given nation (hence the limit on universality), marrying Kant
>>>with Rousseau so to speak.
>>
>>This is what happens when you start with BFN. Habermas doesn't mention
>>law until 1973 (not in any sustained way). Here, is probably more in debt
>>to Lukacs and the Frankfurt School than anyone else. He certainly wasn't
>>thinking of law when he synthesized Chomsky, Wittgenstein and Gadamer -
>>although surely he had a direction in mind. The exception here is his
>>second book, the one on the Public Sphere, which is a study in the
>>formation of a category, and is prior to having read the bulk of what
>>constitutes his theory of communicate action, certainly 10 years prior to
>>his theory of communicative competence. Yes, Habermas is interested in
>>legitimacy, but you have to demonstrate that this interest turns into an
>>unwanted presupposition in his empirical research. In other words,
>>criticize genetic-structuralism before marrying off anyone.
>
>I'm not criticizing his concern for legitimacy altogether. I'm not the
>one to say that reason-giving in public spheres is no progress over
>unreflective obedience to feudal customs! I'm saying, first of all, that
>a more historicized account of communication would help Habermas make his
>political arguments better.
This is precisely the problem, Habermas argues, and why there is disagreement between Gadamer and Habermas.
Gadamer argues that all of our arguments are ground in history, which Habermas equates with nature. According to Habermas, hermeneutics cannot advance beyond a conventional stage of development, it requires a historical 'guide' as authoritative (the rehabilitation of prejudice, for instance). Habermas argues that at the post-conventional stage the naturalism of conventional thought is sublimating in the capacity of those in a discourse to be context-independent - one can debate moral principles without having to ground them a historical form -i.e. they become self-legislated rather than being coopted from history. At this level of reflection, the abstraction required for the autonomous justification of principles must then be UNDONE through discourses of application. What it sounds like you are asking Habermas to do is not take the postconventional step, which means that all politics are doomed to remain determined by historical or natural forces. Habermas argues that we can move beyond this, potentially and identifies the a priori limiting of politics to historical forms as conservative.
>>>It appears that you are not only making the ISS ahistorical but also
>>>depoliticizing Habermas, perhaps against his intentions, since he has
>>>been prolific in polemical interventions (against neo-conservatism,
>>>against pacifism with regard to Kosovo, etc.) in current affairs.
>>
>>Whatever. Throughout I've been defending a program that preserves the
>>critique of ideology from sliding off into groundlessness (if this is
>>ahistorical and depoliticizing, then I suppose these terms have been
>>redefined along with virtue, eh?).
>
>You might revisit Justin's essays on the subject, which seek to criticize
>both relativism & ahistorical universalism. Norms don't have to be
>constituted in a neo-Kantian fashion.
We need to distinguish between theory and practice there. Positing a moral or normative principle is part of a practical discourse. Demonstrating or providing grounds for that principle is a theoretical task.
We propose moral principles as participants, like Rawls's two principles of justice as fairness. But we ground them theoretically or philosophically. This distinction is absolutely essential for understanding Habermas.
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