Fw: [syndicalists] Hoffa and the Detroit Newspaper Strike: A Tale of Betrayal

Joe R. Golowka joeG at ieee.org
Sat Aug 4 11:25:08 PDT 2001


----- Original Message ----- From: <MillerMemorials at aol.com> To: <ait-iwa-talk at list.uncanny.net>; <wsa-talk at list.uncanny.net>; <syndicalists at flag.blackened.net> Sent: Saturday, August 04, 2001 11:10 AM Subject: [syndicalists] Hoffa and the Detroit Newspaper Strike: A Tale of Betrayal


> Hoffa and the Detroit Newspaper Strike: A Tale of Betrayal
> by Tom Bernick
> July, 2001
>
> As the Teamsters prepare to cast their ballots for president of their
union,
> they will be interested in learning how and why James P. Hoffa betrayed
the
> Detroit Newspaper Workers. After enduring a 19-month strike and a
subsequent
> lockout of nearly four years, two Teamster locals were forced to accept
> contracts that could not have been worse. Hoffa gave Gannett and Knight
> Ridder, publishers of the Detroit News and Free Press under a joint
operating
> agreement, virtually everything they demanded-open shops, no amnesty for
> workers fired illegally, massive pay cuts (about $5/hour for the mailers),
> and more. Union members were told that all strike benefits would be cut
off
> the month following the scheduled votes and that failure to ratify would
> enable the company to impose even more devastating conditions than those
> already in effect. In fact, the company had already made all of the
changes
> it wanted, and the weakened contracts allow it to make almost any other
> changes it wants in the future. As an added incentive for the locals to
> approve the contracts, Hoffa promised to assist them in organizing the
scabs
> and to provide job training for fired workers. No such help has ever been
> given.
> The sellout of his members began soon after Hoffa took office in March of
> 1999. One of his first acts as president was to fire Mike Zielinski, the
> most effective Teamster field rep working on behalf of the newspaper
workers.
> Zielinski had formed the Workers Justice Committee, a group of strikers
that
> worked on the dispute full time under an enhanced benefits program. The
WJC
> organized demonstrations, picketed company facilities, leafleted parking
> lots and neighborhoods, and engaged in various other activities that
exerted
> pressure on the company. Because of the success of the WJC, newspaper
> executives hated and feared Zielinski more than any other activist. His
loss
> seriously and needlessly weakened the unions. All requests for an
> explanation of why he was fired were ignored.
> Hoffa allowed the WJC to exist after Zielinski's ouster, but forced it to
> spend nearly all of its time working on the Overnite Transportation strike
> rather than the newspaper strike. This, of course, greatly pleased the
> company. When it became clear that his strategy at Overnite was a
failure,
> he abruptly cut off funding for the WJC, giving its members, who had
already
> suffered great economic hardships for nearly five years, less than a
week's
> notice that they would have to find other
> jobs. Shortly after he became president, Hoffa had his minion Jon Rabine
take
> over contract negotiations from local union officials, even forbidding
them
> at times from attending bargaining sessions. Hoffa's goal was to end the
> dispute at all costs, then proclaim victory in a cynical attempt to
portray
> himself as an effective leader. And this is exactly what he did. In an
> interview in the Detroit News after the ratification votes, Hoffa had the
> nerve to boast that he had negotiated "a good settlement" for his members
(4
> February 2001).
> Even more shocking were his subsequent actions. Soon after his shameful
> contracts were signed in December of 2000, Detroiters began to see
billboards
> and signs on buses announcing the end of the strike and urging the public
to
> "support" the unions by again subscribing to the papers. One would assume
> that the papers are financing this continuing campaign; but, in fact,
Hoffa
> and the Teamsters are picking up the tab.
> And there's more. Hoffa attempted to organize a crew of paid fired and
> locked-out workers to go door to door to drum up new subscribers to the
> papers. His budget for this appalling plan is reported to be $300,000.
Not
> surprisingly, the integrity of the would-be recruits seems to have killed
> this program before it could get off the ground. This from a man who
would
> not even put up a "No News or Free Press Wanted Here" lawn sign in front
of
> his Troy, Michigan, home during the strike.
> The obvious question is, why did he take these actions? For one thing,
> high Teamster officials like Hoffa, who are quick to shout, "One day
longer!"
> when the cameras are running, had long since grown weary of the battle.
But
> the main factor was the company's bogus RICO suit against the unions. The
> papers sued for $62 million. If the case had been pursued and they had
won,
> they would have collected triple damages. It was feared that even though
the
> suit was without merit, there were enough right-wing ideologues in the
courts
> that a company
> victory was a possibility. The unions had already learned in July of 2000
> that their faith in a just judicial system was naive and misguided. It
was
> then that a Court of Appeals ruling by three Reagan appointees overturned
a
> unanimous NLRB decision (three Democrats and two Republicans) that
condemned
> the company for causing the strike by violating federal labor laws. This
> immoral decision robbed the unions of much of their bargaining leverage,
> giving Hoffa an excuse for caving
> in. So great was his fear of this company that he also agreed to
contribute
> $1 million to its drive to regain lost circulation. In return for his
> treachery, the papers dropped the suit. Despite the Court of Appeals
ruling,
> the unions still had a powerful weapon with which to punish the company:
the
> boycott. Management was convinced at the beginning of the strike that it
> would collapse within six months.
> But after five and a half years of extensive advertising campaigns and
> deceptive reporting regarding the strike, the circulation of the papers
was
> down over 35% and still falling. Hoffa's contention that the unions were
> left without any bargaining leverage was therefore not true. Another
factor
> motivating Hoffa's actions appears to be his desire to ingratiate himself
to
> the management of Gannett and Knight Ridder in the hope that they will
> support efforts to remove the Teamsters from federal oversight of the
union.
> Owners of well over a hundred papers between
> them, these two companies could exert a great deal of influence if they
> pursued this goal nationwide. Indeed, an editorial has already appeared
in
> the Detroit News taking this position (11 February 2001). But there may
be
> one other element in the mix. As an additional reward for his betrayal of
> the newspaper workers, it comes as no surprise that Gannett and Knight
Ridder
> seem to be supporting his candidacy for president of the Teamsters by
casting
> him in a favorable light through the kind of biased reporting at which
they
> both excel.
> Three days after the contracts were ratified, Hoffa called a news
conference
> to declare an end to the boycott of the papers. This was something he did
> not have to do. It was simply another favor to a company that had just
> weakened two Teamster locals nearly to the point of irrelevancy. Today,
six
> years after the beginning of the strike, many workers remain locked out
and
> illegally fired while others are harassed on the job. Hoffa may claim
that
> the boycott has ended, but
> ask rank and file union members and the thousands of Detroiters who still
> refuse to buy those papers, and they will tell you that it will continue
> until justice in the workplace is restored. >>
>
>
>
> Note: Ron Carey was just as useless during the strike and lockout.
>



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