lbo-talk-digest V1 #4706

C. G. Estabrook galliher at alexia.lis.uiuc.edu
Wed Aug 8 13:49:15 PDT 2001


On Wed, 8 Aug 2001, Carrol Cox wrote:


> ... I haven't read all of this thread, but I've read enough to
> establish pretty clearly that the study of communicative action
> belongs in the same rhetorical category as a Senate filibuster.

[I'm beginning to think that's right, and at this late date in the discussion I'll mention another reason. I'm not entirely happy with the article below, nor do I want to suggest that bad politics necessarily means bad philosophy -- no one can be wrong all the time -- but the conjunction here is suggestive. --CGE]

__________________________________________________________________________

Bestiality, humanity and servility

--How Jürgen Habermas defends the Balkan war

By Ulrich Rippert

5 June 1999

The renowned German weekly Die Zeit provided the noted Frankfurt

philosopher Jürgen Habermas with three full pages and a headline. The

editorial board knew for certain it would be no easy task for him to

complete. The sixth week of war had just begun. With each night's

bombing the doubts and questions increased.

The talk about humanitarian aims and the defence of the Kosovars had

long been turned into an absurdity by the stark reality of the war.

Foreign Minister Fischer and Defence Minister Scharping resorted to

the most inappropriate and inane comparisons between the regime in

Belgrade and Nazi Germany. This caused a few more sober historians to

wag their index finger in warning. Moreover, the Green party's special

conference was about to start.

The situation called for a real expert in morals.

Against all the doubters, Professor Jürgen Habermas stepped forward to

defend the NATO bombing, under the headline "Bestiality and

Humanity--a war on the borderline between law and morality".

This is by no means the first time that Habermas has intervened into

the political debate. In the past there was hardly a social issue on

which he refrained from stating his position. What is new is that he

now baldly acts as a propagandist for war. Seven years ago, when he

supported the bombing of Iraq, it was still hesitantly and "with a

heavy heart". Now, he completely adopts the arguments of NATO

headquarters. "Critical theory" functions as war theory.

Habermas embodies the political transformation that can be observed in

many of those from the late 1960s who at one time protested against

the prevailing political conditions, and particularly against the

Vietnam War. To mention but a few: Daniel Cohn-Bendit calls for the

rapid deployment of NATO ground troops into Kosovo. Thomas Schmid, who

for years called for a boycott of Axel Springer's press empire, raises

the same demand. For some time now he has been earning a crust as a

chief correspondent of Die Welt (published by Springer). Bernd Rabehl,

once a legendary student leader alongside Rudi Dutschke, is now a

professor at the Free University in Berlin. He gives interviews to the

right-wing rag Freie Welt and warns that Germany is being swamped with

foreigners. Then there is Joschka Fischer, the former Frankfurt

radical and squatter, now Germany's foreign minister.

The trend these political turncoats represent is fed by many sources.

For one, many of Germany's rebellious sons have, over the years,

become heirs. Along with their wealth has grown social power and

recognition. This leads to "respect for the institutions", as Thomas

Schmid once put it so aptly. This conversion was always combined with

a radical transformation of their arguments, and here Habermas was not

infrequently the trend setter. His role in this regard flows directly

from his theoretical conceptions.

If one asks, "How could the Critical Spirit descend to the point of

becoming a crass apologist for the military?" one is obliged to seek

the answer in an investigation of the evolution of this theoretician

of the "Frankfurt School".

In 1964, when Jürgen Habermas took over the Chair of Philosophy and

Sociology from Max Horkheimer, the long-standing leader of the

Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, the "Frankfurt School" played

a big role in student debates. Horkheimer's 1940s paper about the

"Authoritarian State" caused feelings to run high. Horkheimer not only

demonstrated the connection between fascism and capitalism, but he

also opposed Stalinism, which he defined as "state socialism". He

warned against illusions in the proletariat as the "objectively

predetermined bearer of the revolution". Instead Horkheimer said the

social transformation that would "put an end to rule" would arise out

of the conscious "will of the individual".

Horkheimer's thoughts about the "authoritarian state" strongly

influenced the concepts of the anti-authoritarian student movement,

with its conceptions of "direct action". Habermas quickly came to

oppose such actions and condemned them as "fake revolution". Instead,

he proposed seeking collaboration with the trade unions and groups

with a "major chance to influence", that had "access to the mass

media". Later, he stressed that the decisive question in social change

was how various interests were justified and discussed.

In his main work, Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas underscores

this social "Discourse Theory". There are two distinctive

"cognition-conductive mechanisms": human labour, and, on the same

level, but separate from it, language. Through labour, external nature

is appropriated; through language humans make themselves understood

and organise their life together. Reality is divided into two spheres,

each with its own logic.

If, in the sphere of labour, this logic follows the structure of

"rationally directed and success-oriented activity", then in the

"context of communicative action" it follows "binding consensual

norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour and must

be understood and recognised by at least two active individuals". "The

institutional framework of a society", according to Habermas,

comprises such "norms that direct the linguistically mediated

interaction". (Quoted from the German original: J. Habermas, Erkenntis

und Interesse [Knowledge and Human Interests], Frankfurt 1973).

"Good old dualism..." commented Christoph Türcke, private lecturer in

philosophy at Kassel University, in his essay "Habermas, or how

Critical Theory became acceptable in good society." Türcke makes clear

what lies behind the bombastic "yawn-inducing complicated

science-speak overloaded with foreign terms". The pompous

"sociological terminologic-chatterism" only serves to hide the

threadbare theoretical kernel, that one can critically discuss and

interpret everything, without changing reality one iota.

Türcke draws the conclusion that Habermas's critical communication

theory raises "critique of rule to a level where it no longer needs

fear a ban on being employed by the state or falling into

resignation". Behind the verbosely championed "de-constraining of

communication"--that is, unlimited communication--is hidden the call

for everyone to say whatever he wishes to say. In Habermas's hands the

demand for the democratisation of social relations is transformed into

the demand for the "democratisation of the relations of

communication".

With no less than 80 talk shows every week on German television, and

many politicians, like Schroeder and his foreign minister, conducting

politics as if it were a permanent talk show, this theoretician of

general palaver has become a much-quoted and highly fashionable

philosopher.

But now, let us turn to Habermas's justification for the war.

What is most noticeable here as well, is that reality is completely

left out. The professor is not interested in questions about the

origins of the war--the real reasons why 19 NATO states are reducing a

small country to ruins and terrorising the population, by means of a

relentless bombardment that makes use of the most modern weapons. He

simply repeats the war propaganda that the bombing is a "punitive

military action against Yugoslavia" which became unavoidable following

the collapse of Rambouillet. Its supposed aim is "to ensure a liberal

resolution of Kosovar autonomy inside Serbia".

This is written after six weeks of a most brutal war, in which the

foundations of life both in Serbia and Kosovo have been largely

destroyed.

In better times, Habermas, resting on Hegel, spoke about form and

content, and pointed out that the form of a social development is

moulded by its content, and that form is essential. What then must be

deduced from the brutal form of this war about its aims and content?

Here the good professor remains silent.

The more the reality of the war belies the propaganda, the more

professor Habermas raises the debate to the level of complete

abstraction--as if abstract terms had taken up arms. According to his

Communication Theory, the warmongers and opponents are on the same

level. In his eyes, both are pacifists. "conscientious pacifists", on

the one hand, and "legal pacifists" on the other. And both can marshal

good arguments. The "legal pacifists" orient towards international law

and condemn the war because it contravenes international law, just as

it contravenes the constitutional proscription on wars of aggression.

The "conscientious pacifists" make human rights their starting point

and legitimise the war as a humanitarian intervention "preventing

crimes against humanity".

Then comes his main argument: the "legal pacifism" (here Habermas uses

the English term) of Germany's Red-Green government places "the

transformation of international law into international civil rights on

the agenda". For the first time, the German government is taking human

rights seriously. "Direct membership in an association of world

citizens would even protect national subjects against the arbitrary

actions of their own government." The war should be "understood as an

armed peace-enforcing mission, authorised by the international

community (even without a UN mandate)." It represents "a step on the

path from the classical international law of nations towards the

cosmopolitan law of a world civil society".

Such hocus-pocus is employed to obscure the simple fact that a little

country is being terrorised by a coalition of imperialist great

powers, in order to establish a type of NATO protectorate in Kosovo.

This theoretician would have us believe that NATO terror will produce

a democratic world civil society. But where, pray tell, were the

citizens themselves consulted about this? Where have they agreed to

it? Do the Serbs not also belong to this "world civil society"? The

arguments of this social philosopher recall the comments of an

American general in the Vietnam War, who justified the torching of a

village by saying it had to be destroyed in order to be "saved."

The rejection and mistrust of this kind of "humanitarian intervention"

becomes greater with each night's bombing, even if this growing

opposition is only able to articulate itself in a very limited way, as

those parties and social movements that had earlier organised protests

now comprise the governments of the belligerent nations.

As democratic legitimisation of the war, Habermas cites the "19

undoubtedly democratic states" of the NATO coalition. "The `air

attacks' have so lowered Habermas's democratic standards, that even

Turkey is raised to the level of an `undoubtedly democratic state',"

commented Josef Lang in the Swiss weekly Wochenzeitung on May 20.

Professor Habermas's war propaganda provides no new thoughts about the

tragedy unfolding in the Balkans. However, it does clarify the fact

that the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School belongs to a period

that is coming to an end together with this war.

_________________________________________________________________

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