On Wed, 8 Aug 2001, Carrol Cox wrote:
> ... I haven't read all of this thread, but I've read enough to
> establish pretty clearly that the study of communicative action
> belongs in the same rhetorical category as a Senate filibuster.
[I'm beginning to think that's right, and at this late date in the discussion I'll mention another reason. I'm not entirely happy with the article below, nor do I want to suggest that bad politics necessarily means bad philosophy -- no one can be wrong all the time -- but the conjunction here is suggestive. --CGE]
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Bestiality, humanity and servility
--How Jürgen Habermas defends the Balkan war
By Ulrich Rippert
5 June 1999
The renowned German weekly Die Zeit provided the noted Frankfurt
philosopher Jürgen Habermas with three full pages and a headline. The
editorial board knew for certain it would be no easy task for him to
complete. The sixth week of war had just begun. With each night's
bombing the doubts and questions increased.
The talk about humanitarian aims and the defence of the Kosovars had
long been turned into an absurdity by the stark reality of the war.
Foreign Minister Fischer and Defence Minister Scharping resorted to
the most inappropriate and inane comparisons between the regime in
Belgrade and Nazi Germany. This caused a few more sober historians to
wag their index finger in warning. Moreover, the Green party's special
conference was about to start.
The situation called for a real expert in morals.
Against all the doubters, Professor Jürgen Habermas stepped forward to
defend the NATO bombing, under the headline "Bestiality and
Humanity--a war on the borderline between law and morality".
This is by no means the first time that Habermas has intervened into
the political debate. In the past there was hardly a social issue on
which he refrained from stating his position. What is new is that he
now baldly acts as a propagandist for war. Seven years ago, when he
supported the bombing of Iraq, it was still hesitantly and "with a
heavy heart". Now, he completely adopts the arguments of NATO
headquarters. "Critical theory" functions as war theory.
Habermas embodies the political transformation that can be observed in
many of those from the late 1960s who at one time protested against
the prevailing political conditions, and particularly against the
Vietnam War. To mention but a few: Daniel Cohn-Bendit calls for the
rapid deployment of NATO ground troops into Kosovo. Thomas Schmid, who
for years called for a boycott of Axel Springer's press empire, raises
the same demand. For some time now he has been earning a crust as a
chief correspondent of Die Welt (published by Springer). Bernd Rabehl,
once a legendary student leader alongside Rudi Dutschke, is now a
professor at the Free University in Berlin. He gives interviews to the
right-wing rag Freie Welt and warns that Germany is being swamped with
foreigners. Then there is Joschka Fischer, the former Frankfurt
radical and squatter, now Germany's foreign minister.
The trend these political turncoats represent is fed by many sources.
For one, many of Germany's rebellious sons have, over the years,
become heirs. Along with their wealth has grown social power and
recognition. This leads to "respect for the institutions", as Thomas
Schmid once put it so aptly. This conversion was always combined with
a radical transformation of their arguments, and here Habermas was not
infrequently the trend setter. His role in this regard flows directly
from his theoretical conceptions.
If one asks, "How could the Critical Spirit descend to the point of
becoming a crass apologist for the military?" one is obliged to seek
the answer in an investigation of the evolution of this theoretician
of the "Frankfurt School".
In 1964, when Jürgen Habermas took over the Chair of Philosophy and
Sociology from Max Horkheimer, the long-standing leader of the
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, the "Frankfurt School" played
a big role in student debates. Horkheimer's 1940s paper about the
"Authoritarian State" caused feelings to run high. Horkheimer not only
demonstrated the connection between fascism and capitalism, but he
also opposed Stalinism, which he defined as "state socialism". He
warned against illusions in the proletariat as the "objectively
predetermined bearer of the revolution". Instead Horkheimer said the
social transformation that would "put an end to rule" would arise out
of the conscious "will of the individual".
Horkheimer's thoughts about the "authoritarian state" strongly
influenced the concepts of the anti-authoritarian student movement,
with its conceptions of "direct action". Habermas quickly came to
oppose such actions and condemned them as "fake revolution". Instead,
he proposed seeking collaboration with the trade unions and groups
with a "major chance to influence", that had "access to the mass
media". Later, he stressed that the decisive question in social change
was how various interests were justified and discussed.
In his main work, Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas underscores
this social "Discourse Theory". There are two distinctive
"cognition-conductive mechanisms": human labour, and, on the same
level, but separate from it, language. Through labour, external nature
is appropriated; through language humans make themselves understood
and organise their life together. Reality is divided into two spheres,
each with its own logic.
If, in the sphere of labour, this logic follows the structure of
"rationally directed and success-oriented activity", then in the
"context of communicative action" it follows "binding consensual
norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behaviour and must
be understood and recognised by at least two active individuals". "The
institutional framework of a society", according to Habermas,
comprises such "norms that direct the linguistically mediated
interaction". (Quoted from the German original: J. Habermas, Erkenntis
und Interesse [Knowledge and Human Interests], Frankfurt 1973).
"Good old dualism..." commented Christoph Türcke, private lecturer in
philosophy at Kassel University, in his essay "Habermas, or how
Critical Theory became acceptable in good society." Türcke makes clear
what lies behind the bombastic "yawn-inducing complicated
science-speak overloaded with foreign terms". The pompous
"sociological terminologic-chatterism" only serves to hide the
threadbare theoretical kernel, that one can critically discuss and
interpret everything, without changing reality one iota.
Türcke draws the conclusion that Habermas's critical communication
theory raises "critique of rule to a level where it no longer needs
fear a ban on being employed by the state or falling into
resignation". Behind the verbosely championed "de-constraining of
communication"--that is, unlimited communication--is hidden the call
for everyone to say whatever he wishes to say. In Habermas's hands the
demand for the democratisation of social relations is transformed into
the demand for the "democratisation of the relations of
communication".
With no less than 80 talk shows every week on German television, and
many politicians, like Schroeder and his foreign minister, conducting
politics as if it were a permanent talk show, this theoretician of
general palaver has become a much-quoted and highly fashionable
philosopher.
But now, let us turn to Habermas's justification for the war.
What is most noticeable here as well, is that reality is completely
left out. The professor is not interested in questions about the
origins of the war--the real reasons why 19 NATO states are reducing a
small country to ruins and terrorising the population, by means of a
relentless bombardment that makes use of the most modern weapons. He
simply repeats the war propaganda that the bombing is a "punitive
military action against Yugoslavia" which became unavoidable following
the collapse of Rambouillet. Its supposed aim is "to ensure a liberal
resolution of Kosovar autonomy inside Serbia".
This is written after six weeks of a most brutal war, in which the
foundations of life both in Serbia and Kosovo have been largely
destroyed.
In better times, Habermas, resting on Hegel, spoke about form and
content, and pointed out that the form of a social development is
moulded by its content, and that form is essential. What then must be
deduced from the brutal form of this war about its aims and content?
Here the good professor remains silent.
The more the reality of the war belies the propaganda, the more
professor Habermas raises the debate to the level of complete
abstraction--as if abstract terms had taken up arms. According to his
Communication Theory, the warmongers and opponents are on the same
level. In his eyes, both are pacifists. "conscientious pacifists", on
the one hand, and "legal pacifists" on the other. And both can marshal
good arguments. The "legal pacifists" orient towards international law
and condemn the war because it contravenes international law, just as
it contravenes the constitutional proscription on wars of aggression.
The "conscientious pacifists" make human rights their starting point
and legitimise the war as a humanitarian intervention "preventing
crimes against humanity".
Then comes his main argument: the "legal pacifism" (here Habermas uses
the English term) of Germany's Red-Green government places "the
transformation of international law into international civil rights on
the agenda". For the first time, the German government is taking human
rights seriously. "Direct membership in an association of world
citizens would even protect national subjects against the arbitrary
actions of their own government." The war should be "understood as an
armed peace-enforcing mission, authorised by the international
community (even without a UN mandate)." It represents "a step on the
path from the classical international law of nations towards the
cosmopolitan law of a world civil society".
Such hocus-pocus is employed to obscure the simple fact that a little
country is being terrorised by a coalition of imperialist great
powers, in order to establish a type of NATO protectorate in Kosovo.
This theoretician would have us believe that NATO terror will produce
a democratic world civil society. But where, pray tell, were the
citizens themselves consulted about this? Where have they agreed to
it? Do the Serbs not also belong to this "world civil society"? The
arguments of this social philosopher recall the comments of an
American general in the Vietnam War, who justified the torching of a
village by saying it had to be destroyed in order to be "saved."
The rejection and mistrust of this kind of "humanitarian intervention"
becomes greater with each night's bombing, even if this growing
opposition is only able to articulate itself in a very limited way, as
those parties and social movements that had earlier organised protests
now comprise the governments of the belligerent nations.
As democratic legitimisation of the war, Habermas cites the "19
undoubtedly democratic states" of the NATO coalition. "The `air
attacks' have so lowered Habermas's democratic standards, that even
Turkey is raised to the level of an `undoubtedly democratic state',"
commented Josef Lang in the Swiss weekly Wochenzeitung on May 20.
Professor Habermas's war propaganda provides no new thoughts about the
tragedy unfolding in the Balkans. However, it does clarify the fact
that the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School belongs to a period
that is coming to an end together with this war.
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