On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> Habermas argues that in modernity there is a normative
> ground that is universal: communicative action. It is a ground that anyone
> could agree to - in a theoretical sense. In practice, we run awry of the
> normative ideal that is presupposed whenever we argue, but that's ok -
> until we dispute this normative ground to begin with. The disputation of
> the normative ground of democracy is *always* a deferral of autonomy and
> solidarity and a self-contradictory defense of authoritarian norms: we
> should do this because it was the way it was done. That's fine, but this
> alternative to 'autonomy and solidarity' requires that certain people are
> excluded from politics. Habermas's model generates an inclusive politics.
And autonomy and solidarity are important because . . . they are traditions in a particular society. So we must support this form of rational argument because it supports a way of life (democracy, individual autonomy, and so on) that we are used to. I still think this stinks of ethnocentrism: concepts like rationality and autonomy, created in a specific social nexus, are elevated to necessary components of any "inclusive" society--and then we make profound philosophical judgments about the moral inferiority of any society that does not include these concepts.
Miles