>At 3:37 PM -0700 7/30/01, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
>>We coordinate our action with other people. This is irrefutable.
>>Human beings have the capacity to learn. This is irrefutable.
>>Language is inherent to cognitive development. This is irrefutable.
>>Linguistic interaction constitutes the medium of our capacity to
>>understanding. This is irrefutable.
>>When we seek to understanding something with someone, we presuppose,
>>like it or not, that understanding (of some sort) is possible. This
>>is irrefutable.
>
>At 9:56 AM -0400 8/9/01, Gordon Fitch wrote:
>>I don't know about anyone else, but I mentioned communication
>>among primitive organisms and so on to show that communication
>>was not, materialistically speaking, purposed on understanding.
>>Thus I attempted to refute Habermas as represented, but it
>>seems Habermas is irrefutable since if one representation is
>>refuted, two more appear in its place.
>
>At 4:43 PM -0700 8/13/01, Miles Jackson wrote:
>>So no matter what anyone says or does--Habermas is correct. Isn't this
>>a bit facile? I'm going to develop a theory that people speak because
>>a little angel whispers the words in their ears. Look, every time
>>people speak, I've got more evidence for the existence of these
>>invisible angels. Next time Ken posts--see, I'm right! The angels
>>exist!
>
>No room for argument about argument
>("irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable"),
>so I gather Habermas is for some God, & his theory of communicative
>action, theology.
>
>:-0
>
>Yoshie
Not really. Habermas probably would not agree to that. But there is some problem with the way people are using "communication" vs. the way Habermas seems to be using it. He seems to imply some sort of argument or debate from the start, as when people have to "come to agreement" when they have differences "deciding what to do" as a social group, even small decisions that we might not think of as involving heavy political ones (and I am not sure that I agree with some here that "traditional" societies never have disagreements). So "communicative action" already seems to me to be a subset (superset?) of language, not "language" in the whole of its messy glory.
I had to put the book down and go back to work ("working" guy, you know). So right now I'm just thinking off the top of my head.
I am almost tempted to think of "communicative action" as already implying "any circumstance that requires giving reasons for a collective decision." Possibly even implied is that authoritative reasons -- reasons given by authority -- are given because people expect SOME sort of rationale for social action, even when they aren't allowed to participate in the generation of it. So, one could say that right there is the potential for differences, based on unhappy outcomes for some.
But I think some are being unfair to Habermas if they conclude that these are only "differences of language." It may look that way because Habermas is developing a theory of the
By the way, I'm going to risk being very politically incorrect here. If it is a difference between the "traditional" Taliban or Christian "fungal menaces" (my term of affection for them) and "eurocentric rationality," I think I'll stick with rationality (although I really don't think it is the whole of life).
Let's see what the Habermasians have to say.
Peter Kosenko
And a note for Miles: It is not whether or not YOU agree to abide by a tradition that requires you to marry your first cousin. The real issue is whether SHE should be FORCED to marry YOU. ;-)