>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 16:43:46 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Miles Jackson <cqmv at pdx.edu>
>Subject: Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4736
>
>On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
>
> > You can't make this judgement (about whether or not autonomy, for instance,
> > is universal or conventional) until you've already entered into a discourse
> > with 'the other' - which can only take place under conditions of autonomy
> > and solidarity and reasoning...
>
>This is simply empirically incorrect. People make judgments everyday
>without these conditions. Autonomy, solidarity, and reasoning as you
>define it are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for
>human judgment. Look around.
See Kell's response below. Remember, there is a distinction between a discourse and an everyday conversation. A discourse takes place under formal conditions, which a theory of communicative action spells out.
Let me ask you this: in order for a propositional claim to be considered valid (just, legitimate, true, or right) what are the necessary conditions required for its validity? Really, this is what Habermas is addressing. He arguing that a claim can be considered valid when, and only when, an actual discourse has taken place, a discourse that takes place under formal conditions - whereby the force of reason alone decides its merit. Such reasons must be generated by the community of participants for the community of participants (ie. this is what links validity to meaning and motivation). He isn't saying that it happens this way, Habermas is just pointing out: in modernity, only a procedure, which entails universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, can satisfy the conditions required for a valid claim (about truth or rightness, science or morals). Only then can we say that a judgement is impartial.
> > Which is another way of saying: moral judgements require universal
> > participation. The only 'society' that could at all be deemed 'morally
> > inferior' is one that is actively trying to destroy communicative relations
> > of 'the other' (because this amounts to a self-defeating and closed logic).
>
>So if a society does not meet your standards of communicative relations,
>it is in fact inferior. In what sense is this *not* blatant
>ethnocentrism?
No society meets these standards, which is why Habermas is a critical theorist. It is essential here to grasp the distinction between a formal reconstruction of competence (the theoretical elaboration of the stages of cognitive development) and the objective capacities of a given social form. Habermas theoretically defends Kohlberg's notion of 'stage 6' in moral development. And he argues that this has been institutionalized, somewhat (and in however fragmented a form) in democratic societies. I have a difficult time considering that a society who organizes their practices around the ritual sacrifice of women as a means of making it rain in the spring is the moral par of a society whereby everyone, in principle, is protected by legal rights. I'd wager that you have no problem condemning capitalism for being a violent system of exploitation. A question might be this: is democracy inseparable from capitalism. I suspect it is, at least Habermas's theory points to the way in which communicative action can steer the mechanisms of instrumental control and so on. But would you not agree that a society that facilitates its of self-critique (in however weak or strong a form) is superior, in a moral and a political sense, to a society where institutions have been arranged to make criticism unthinkable? I think we can make such distinctions, between 'closed' and 'open' socieites, between myth and enlightenment...maybe some want to get rid of these distinctions. I would submit that getting rid of such distinctions is regressive. If we can determine what is alive and what is dead, then it stands to reason that we can differentiate good ideas from bad ideas.
> > Habermas isn't claiming that universality exists in the middle of us,
> > he's arguing that we possess the capacity to create it. There is a
> > sense, in this, that Habermas is being eurocentric, but in order to
> > disagree, you have to acknowledge the importance of reasoning giving,
> > which makes him correct.
> >
>
>So no matter what anyone says or does--Habermas is correct. Isn't this
>a bit facile? I'm going to develop a theory that people speak because
>a little angel whispers the words in their ears. Look, every time
>people speak, I've got more evidence for the existence of these
>invisible angels. Next time Ken posts--see, I'm right! The angels
>exist!
>
>Miles
Frustrating isn't it. That Habermas has illuminated a aspect of our everyday lives that cannot be denied without contradiction... in a non-ontological way... is a remarkable insight. It isn't that he is incorrect, its just that his theory happens to rest on good arguments. Habermas's theory can be refuted, but not on this point. That fact is, socialization carries with it socialization into normative behavioural expectations. Such expectations are linked up with the relation of language to action and vice versa.
>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 16:47:50 -0700 (PDT)
>From: Miles Jackson <cqmv at pdx.edu>
>Subject: Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4737
>
>On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
>
> > Dear Barbie,
> >
> > Amazing, eh? We've been arguing for over a month now that arguments matter,
> > and that social forms are reproduced communicatively. And all we're getting
> > in return is arguments that arguments don't matter, and communications that
> > society isn't reproduced communicatively.
> >
>
>I am astounded and appalled that this is all you've heard from everybody's
>posts on this. If you think I'm arguing--or Justin, or Dennis--that
>arguments don't matter, your own ability to communicate is severely
>impaired.
>
>Miles
You just argued that argumentation is ethnocentric, that not all societies share an understanding of autonomy, solidarity and reasoning. This means that you are using an argument to say that argumentation is a specific to one historical form of life, a life you happen to share... which seems to me to argue that arguments don't matter for certain people. Kell and I have both pointed out that you can't make this judgement until you argue with other people.
>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 20:18:23 -0400
>From: Kelley <kwalker2 at gte.net>
>Subject: Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4737
>
>At 04:47 PM 8/13/01 -0700, Miles Jackson wrote:
>
> >I am astounded and appalled that this is all you've heard from everybody's
> >posts on this. If you think I'm arguing--or Justin, or Dennis--that
> >arguments don't matter, your own ability to communicate is severely
> >impaired.
> >
> >Miles
>
>
>i pretty much agree with ken. very few criticisms have been raised that
>make any sense. i post at length explaining it all and not one of you has
>bothered to engage what i've written. now, sure, you might not have time to
>learn what it is we're talking about, but then, why bother other than
>you're just interested in railing against H like some here rail against
>Judith Butler or Singer or whomever.
Yes, this is precisely what has been so frustrating. I know that email is an imperfect medium, but Kell and I have both put extraordinary effort and understanding into responding to these questions and most of the questions that keep coming up have already been answered. I think it would be worthwhile, for everyone that is interested, to at least download (several links have already been posted) or pick up some introductory material on Habermas. It should be readily apparent now that Kell and I aren't just fooling around and rousing trouble for the sake of trouble. Together we've posted well over a hundred messages, which probably amounts to more than about a 100 pages on Habermas's critical theory. I'm interested in objections to Habermas that have not yet been raised, questions that demonstrate real limitations to his work. Thus far, no such objections have been raised, let alone alternative conceptions of linguistic analysis or communicative theory that substantively challenge most of his conclusions. I'm being pedantic here, I apologize, I really don't want to sound like a twit. Much of the discussion has been good - really good - and I would agree that most of posts have highlighted the truly salient points of Habermas's theory, targeting some of the weak points that Kell and I have both found reason to exaborate, sometimes in a creative way that Habemas has not envisioned. But, with Kell, I find that there is a lot of noise when there really shouldn't be, given what has already been posted. But, have no fear, there is always a rejoinder.
I am Jack's asshole.
ken
>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 20:23:20 -0400
>From: Yoshie Furuhashi <furuhashi.1 at osu.edu>
>Subject: Theology (was Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4736)
>
>No room for argument about argument
>("irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable...irrefutable"),
>so I gather Habermas is for some God, & his theory of communicative
>action, theology.
>
>:-0
>
>Yoshie
Dude, read closely. Obviously my point was rhetorical. In the enlightenment, there are only participants. Everything is open to criticism.
>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 20:53:56 -0400
>From: Gordon Fitch <gcf at panix.com>
>Subject: Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4737
>
>Miles Jackson wrote:
> > >I am astounded and appalled that this is all you've heard from everybody's
> > >posts on this. If you think I'm arguing--or Justin, or Dennis--that
> > >arguments don't matter, your own ability to communicate is severely
> > >impaired.
>
>Kelley:
> > i pretty much agree with ken. very few criticisms have been raised that
> > make any sense. i post at length explaining it all and not one of you has
> > bothered to engage what i've written. ...
>
>Well, I gave it a light try, but y'all Habermas fans seem
>pretty impervious. That might seem like "not bothering to
>engage" from the inside. If you really, really wanted to
>be understood, you'd want to overcome that by understanding,
>but what we have here seems to be a debate, that is, an
>exchange in which no one understands anything and the only
>thing which passes back and forth are moves in the game.
>That's okay, but it's not the thing you seem to be claiming
>to promulgate. Or do I have that wrong?
Well, I hope not. As far as I can tell, Kell and I have been misunderstood more than we've misunderstood the objections (which is why the subject keeps changing after we respond).
>Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 18:19:42 -0700
>From: "Peter Kosenko" <kosenko at netwood.net>
>Subject: Re: Theology (was Re: lbo-talk-digest V1 #4736)
> So "communicative action" already seems to me to be a subset (superset?)
> of language, not "language" in the whole of its messy glory.
Right, but invert this. Instrumental action is a subset of communicative action, communicative action is not a subset of language in general.
>I am almost tempted to think of "communicative action" as already implying
>"any circumstance that requires giving reasons for a collective
>decision." Possibly even implied is that authoritative reasons -- reasons
>given by authority -- are given because people expect SOME sort of
>rationale for social action, even when they aren't allowed to participate
>in the generation of it. So, one could say that right there is the
>potential for differences, based on unhappy outcomes for some.
I'm not sure what you mean here...
>But I think some are being unfair to Habermas if they conclude that these
>are only "differences of language." It may look that way because Habermas
>is developing a theory of the
Did this get cut off?
>By the way, I'm going to risk being very politically incorrect here. If
>it is a difference between the "traditional" Taliban or Christian "fungal
>menaces" (my term of affection for them) and "eurocentric rationality," I
>think I'll stick with rationality (although I really don't think it is the
>whole of life).
>
>Let's see what the Habermasians have to say.
>
>Peter Kosenko
I think Habermas calls this an irreversible gain. This is why the following keeps coming up: I agree with Habermas in practice (ie. I'll opt for arguments) but disagree in theory (because that's not how things are). This is a awkward position. I'll try to elaborate on what I think the problem is.
When one agrees in practice, ie. agrees that communicative rationality is superior to other forms of reasoning when it comes to freedom and solidarity, but disagrees in theory - one is splitting their position between two incompatible points. One is a pragmatic agreement, the other is a metaphysical objection.
The reason why one "objects in theory" is because one takes the viewpoint of the Other, someone who is not present in the discourse. In Habermas's thought, this is precisely what is forbidden, because it is a theological position: "Well, I agree, but others [whom I will now speak for] won't." This position entails that one person speak for another person ('in theory'). That's the problem. In a discourse, one can speak only for oneself, because the formal conditions of a discourse require that other people actually be present. We don't speak for them because they must be part of the discourse (ie. if they aren't, then we can self-reflectively realize that the discourse is exclusive). So the thought, "I buy it, but others won't" is an authoritarian gesture, it overscripts the actual participation of others which is why Habermas is arguing that a discourse must actually take place. I'm not sure if this is clear. We must be clear on this point though. We speak for ourselves, which is what links motivation and rationality together (the anticipation of truthfulness). We can't go into an argument speaking for other people, which is exactly what is performed in these kind of statements. One speaks for oneself.
Now, there are times, in a discourse, that we find ourselves obligated to speak on the behalf of others (as advocates). But again, we must not confuse our position with the position of the other. Speaking as an advocate requires self-consciously speaking as an advocate, the recognition that those who cannot be present remain potential partners in communication. In this sense, any discourse must remain open to rejoinder (critique) from a variety of positions.
ken