> That seems to me a Humpty-Dumpty theory of language!
>
> "There's glory for you!"
> "I don't know what you mean by 'glory,' " Alice said.
> Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I
tell
> you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!' "
> "But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,' " Alice
objected.
> "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it
> means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
> "The question is, " said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many
> different things."
> "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty. "which is to be
master-that's
> all."
========
And power has nothing to do with naming social kinds? Dodgson's satire
on nominalism has it's uses.
> I usually dont know what you are talking about but my guess is that
you are
> claiming that some issues that would be moral issues in some
societies are
> not in others , or that were moral issues at one time in one society
are not
> at other times It is not a moral issue for us whether we stir a pot
> clockwise or counterclockwise but it is in some societies. Stirring
in the
> wrong direction is believed to cause serious harm. But how would
this work
> out for abortion? A considerable number of people in our society
think that
> a fetus has the same right to life as any adult of our species. Are
u saying
> that like Humpty-Dumpty you are going to legislate that it is
nonetheless
> not a moral problem because you as a liberal are not going to use
moral
> discourse re the matter?
========
We need not legislate that it is not a moral problem. That would not
accomplish anything. One can use Hohfeld's scheme for distributing
rights etc without resorting to the use of moral terms. Is it not
possible to [re]write Roe v. Wade without moral terms of any kind? If
it is, what sense can we make of moral discourse being necessary on
this issue? It seems the issue is as much about on what conditions
some human beings are prepared to constrain other human beings from
making a choice. The abortion debate is, among other things, about who
gets to coerce who. Once we admit that into the conversation then the
moral/nonmoral / becomes an issue of coercion as regards the
conditions of the possibility of [ir]resolvability as to what types
of discourse are sanctioned by the participants. What would be the
terms under which we coercively constrain nonmoral discourse from
being used and how could we decide whether that decision was
legitimate?
> Well of course Habermas actually says something approaching this
degree
> of arbitrary semantic legislation re what is moral within his own
set of
> distinctions between ethics and the moral. And Finnis is pointing
out what
> an evasion this is. It has been assumed not proved that the fetus
doesnt
> have status as a person. Of course this is really a weird thing for
Habermas
> to assume since he has just admitted that the conservative has an
equally
> good arguments to liberals on these matters.
=========
I don't think we can prove the fetus is a person and in the absence of
proof, resolving the dilemmas and trilemmas as well as whether we
choose to use metaethical provisions of setting the context of what
terms are to be used and which we are to refrain from using seems to
lead to interminableness.
> Both Habermas and Finnis present arguments. Why don't you examine
them and
> evaluate them critically. I mean any post on anything is going to
make
> assumptions about language. If your position is that we ought no
longer use
> moral discourse to talk about abortion give us an argument for that.
I would
> like to see it.
>
> Cheers, Ken Hanly
=======
That would take a book and you know that. Thousands of books and
essays have been written about the issue; it has not been resolved.
Nor is it likely to given medical advances and the limitations of
language. There seems to be no apriori necessity in using moral terms
to resolve the issue of abortion. This does not mean we aren't free to
do so, but it can no way be used to privilege some parties to the
debate. If we agree that non-moral descriptions of the issue are
legitimate we seem to be on the verge of interminable complexity, no?
Or do those who wish to make decisions without the use of moral terms
have no say in *that* choice-- ie their opponents in the debate refuse
to acknowledge the legitimacy of non-moral descriptions and
explanations-- and, they if do not, what legitimates the exemption of
free speech considerations with regard to the terms of discourse on
this particular issue?
Ian