On Mon, 10 Dec 2001, Hakki Alacakaptan wrote:
>
> || -----Original Message-----
> || From: Miles Jackson ||
> ||
>
> ||
> || This is a pretty pessimistic view of the theories in social science.
> || We have plenty of examples of reasonable a priori predictions that
> || have been verified by empirical study in the social sciences. For
> || instance, clinical theorists have developed a cognitive theory of
> || depression, suggesting that maladaptive thinking habits (e.g.,
> || selective focus on negative events and negative reactions from
> || others) can provoke and intensify depressive episodes. (...)
> ||
> || In what sense is this not valid scientific research?
> ||
> || Miles
> ||
>
> In many senses: You can't define maladaptive thinking formally. The thought
> itself and the negative value attributed to it are subjective and culture -
> specific. Moreover, the term "maladaptive" itself is politically loaded. It
> assumes that the goal of therapy is to ensure the individual's adaptation to
> society (assuming also, as a corollary, that social conditions for such
> adaptation exist: e.g. a classless, non-racist, non-sexist society with full
> employment).
>
> Hakki
>
This hyperbolic distinction between ideologically charged, politically loaded quackery that is "social science" and real scientific research (I would assume, in fields like physics and chemistry) is very odd to me. All operational definitions in science are contingent: to say that maladaptive thought is not formally defined is not the same thing as saying it's not scientific. There are local and agreed upon rules-- as in any scientific field--for the definition, measurement, and verification of the effects of "maladaptive" thought processes. The fact that these local rules may not apply in all contexts is simply another topic of study--it doesn't invalidate the research!
And have psychologists at times used concepts like Freud's "masculinity complex" as blunt ideological instruments? Certainly. But for every example you find in the "human sciences", I will respond with an example of the ideological application of research in the "hard" sciences.
All scientific work is contingent upon observation, and observations are contingent upon theories and background assumptions. To point out that the human sciences have theoretically laden concepts simply demonstrates my point: the difference between physics and a field like psychology is not as huge as Hakki implies.
Miles