On Mon, 10 Dec 2001, Justin Schwartz wrote:
> Social scientific theories aren't probablistic in the same sense that
> quantum mechanics is. QM allows for predictions that are extremely precise,
> including the areas where, according to the theory, no precise predictions
> of singular events are possible. Social scientific theories are more like
> Darwinian explanation, they don't allow for precise predictons at all. They
> are more narrative. They are powerful retrospectively, once we know the
> history, but they depend on too much from outside taht is merely contingent.
This is a pretty pessimistic view of the theories in social science. We have plenty of examples of reasonable a priori predictions that have been verified by empirical study in the social sciences. For instance, clinical theorists have developed a cognitive theory of depression, suggesting that maladaptive thinking habits (e.g., selective focus on negative events and negative reactions from others) can provoke and intensify depressive episodes. Clinical researchers have dutifully conducted experimental research on the efficacy of cognitive therapy, in which therapy focuses on changing maladaptive thinking patterns, compared to other common therapies (e.g., drug therapies, Freudian psychoanalysis). In fact, this cognitive approach is an effective therapy for depression (for moderate depression, more effective than Prozac!).
In what sense is this not valid scientific research?
Miles