Also, below your post, find a couple of reports on the DRC by the Establishment. Sounds like Imperialism can work with Kabila Jr, if not Kagame.
Nearby, ex-President Mandela just had the Burundian leaders agreeing to a power-sharing deal, with 600 or so SA troops moving in as bodyguards last month; several hundred more are in the DRC. Subimperialism appears to be on the horizon. Pretoria's extremely controversial US$5 billion arms purchases, are going ahead, in the wake of a recent official declaration of non-corruption, but in spite of the 55% crash of the SA currency these last two years. Those fast corvette ships, new submarines, and fighter jets will have to be justified--though I don't see how they help with the kind of peace-keeping needed when the WB/IMF screw up an economy.
Speaking of which, I'm off tomorrow to Zimbabwe for a few weeks so if I don't follow up, it's not out of interest. (I'll be at patrick_bond at yahoo.com)
Cheers, P.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Yoshie Furuhashi" <furuhashi.1 at osu.edu> To: <lbo-talk at lists.panix.com> Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 5:06 PM Subject: Rwanda Update
> In a recent LBO-talk thread titled "Shaw on Herman," Rwanda was
> tangentially mentioned. Anyone here still paying attention to
> Central African goings-on, even though they have been off the major
> media for some time? Leftists had better have a longer attention
> span than media consumers on the average do.
>
> Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy
> March, 2001
> SECTION: EN CLAIRE; Pg. 3
> HEADLINE: Evidence Mounts of Kagame Atrocities in Rwanda
>
> Defense & Foreign Affairs has obtained a copy of the letter of
> resignation of Maj. Alphonse Furuma, a senior member of the Rwandan
> Patriotic Front (RPF) and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), to Rwandan
> military leader Maj.-Gen. Paul Kagame, in which he gives more than 50
> pages of detailed information on crimes committed by the RPF/RPA
> against Rwandans. Furuma's last position was Military Assistant to
> the RPA Army Chief of Staff, and he had been a founder-member of the
> RPF/RPA in 1987. He had also served as the RPA representative to the
> joint Rwandan/Ugandan Command and Control Center in Kisangani, in the
> Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1999 and 2000. Maj. Furuma's
> document has now begun circulating among Rwandan expatriates.
>
> Among his many allegations are the claim that the RPF/RPA security
> institutions were being used "to intervene in preparations for the
> coming elections by openly manipulating and/or intimidating the
> population into voting for candidates favored by the RPF/RPA
> leadership in Kigali. In essence, these organs have been sent to
> unleash terror on the population and non-RPF institutions." He said,
> in his letter to Kagame: "You and some of your senior Government
> officials, including Police and Army officers, have illegally
> acquired large stretches of land for modern dairy farming by
> displacing innocent peasants using force, intimidation, money or any
> other means. Some of the very many cases of complaints by peasants
> have been brought to you personally." He continued: "Some Ministers
> are on record for having deposited Ministerial funds [into] personal
> accounts. In record time, some of these Ministers and their business
> allies are busy buying and raising mansions in Kigali City and
> abroad."
>
> Maj. Furuma gave details of some murders carried out by the RPF,
> including citing one particular case: "Former RPF Ministers and
> especially Seth Sendashonga could not compromise their positions.
> Consequently, he was forced to resign, fled to Nairobi, where he was
> assassinated to destroy evidence concerning deliberate Hutu
> killings." Furuma said: "Some of these killings which were carried
> out in broad daylight and witnessed by relatives and neighbors of
> victims were reported to you and yet most of those responsible for
> these crimes still hold senior Government posts and some have since
> been promoted. As the war resumed during the genocide, you ordered
> the RPA Field Engineers to launch a campaign to destroy by mining all
> premises; residential, commercial, or industrial, identified as
> belonging to Hutus. The towns of Kibungo, Kigali City, and Gitarama
> serve as very good examples."
>
> Maj. Furuma noted: "When the RPF/RPA launched the offensive to stop
> genocide, every Hutu was assumed to be a killer. For months and from
> one border to another, Hutus were chased and massacred on sight." He
> also noted: "All along in the armed struggle, Military Intelligence,
> which was your personal creation and which directly reported to you,
> tortured and killed civilian suspects. Military Intelligence bases
> everywhere were associated with graves for such victims."
>
> Significantly, Defense & Foreign Affairs was told that former US
> (Clinton Administration) Assistant Secretary of State for African
> Affairs Dr Susan Rice had promised Maj.-Gen. Kagame that she would
> continue to support him when she left the US State Department. It is
> known that several of her former assistants remain in the State
> Department and continue to support the Kagame Administration inside
> Rwanda.
>
> Meanwhile, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who has now broken
> completely with Kagame, said on April 4, 2001, that his country would
> withdraw two more battalions from the DRC, where Ugandan soldiers had
> fought alongside rebels against Kinshasa since 1998. The Ugandan
> withdrawals contrast with the sustained RPA presence inside the DRC.
> Maj.-Gen. Kagame is aware that withdrawing Rwandan units to Rwanda
> would likely result in his overthrow: the RPA forces deployed into
> the DRC are of the French-speaking Tutsi groups, not the
> English-speaking, so-called "Uganda Akazu (clan)" of Kagame.
>
> Pres. Museveni noted in Kampala: "We're going to pull out another two
> battalions soon, in addition to the two we pulled out recently." He
> did not give a date for the pullout. In March 2001, Uganda withdrew
> two battalions of about 726 men each from Bunia in north-eastern DRC
> and Gemena in the north-west. Pres. Museveni said Uganda was "very
> happy" with the situation in the DRC, following a meeting held in
> Kinshasa on April 3, 2001, between DRC President Joseph Kabila and
> Ugandan Foreign Minister Eriya Kategaya. By April 29, 2001, there was
> only one Ugandan battalion reportedly left in the DRC.
>
> Pres. Museveni said the Kinshasa meeting, also attended by Ugandan
> Security Minister Muruli Mukasa and military intelligence chief Noble
> Mayombo, was held to try to "normalize relations with DRC". Foreign
> Minister Kategaya said there were plans to reopen Uganda's embassy in
> Kinshasa.
***
Congo (Kinshasa): Disarmament Date distributed (ymd): 011217 Document reposted by APIC
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for Africa at http://www.africapolicy.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: Central Africa Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This posting contains (1) the executive summary and recommendations from a new report on disarmament in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the International Crisis Group, (2) a short note released by the World Bank prior to the Dec. 20 "technical update meeting" on the Congo with donors in Brussels.
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
International Crisis Group http://www.crisisweb.org
Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR* to Prevent Further War
* disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement
Nairobi/Brussels, 14 December 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[full report available on http://www.crisisweb.org]
The Democratic Republic of Congo remains a failed state, occupied by six foreign armies, tormented by militias and unable to meet the most basic needs of its people. The war, which began in August 1998, has not yet ended. The cease fire agreement signed at Lusaka in July 1999 is respected on the conventional front lines, but the underlying causes of conflict remain to be resolved, and people are still dying every day from fighting, hunger and disease. This report addresses in detail one of the factors critically necessary for peace: the process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of the armed rebel groups.
There are in fact three interlocking processes that must succeed if peace is ever to be achieved. First, is the disarmament of the non-Congolese armed groups based in the DRC, addressed in this report. The most significant of these predominantly Hutu rebel forces, the Armee de Liberation du Rwanda (ALiR), is led by the masterminds of the Rwandan genocide who fled to the Congo in 1994. They are still supported by the government in Kinshasa because the DRC lacks an effective military force against the occupying forces of Rwanda and Uganda. The Hutu groups, fed and armed by Kinshasa, have become proxy fighters for the DRC.
DDRRR is not well advanced. There is very little contact by MONUC or other international officials with the AliR leaders, many of whom fear arrest because of their alleged role in the Rwandan genocide. Resolving the AliR leadership's demands for amnesty and political dialogue with the Rwandan government is further complicated because the government understandably refuses to negotiate with genocidaires. But the AliR members, most of whom were recruited after 1994, have legitimate security and political demands, and the Rwandan government is also keen for these men to disarm and return to society, or be reintegrated as soldiers in the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), so long as their leaders face justice.
The second process that must be successfully completed if the country has any chance of survival is the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. Tutsi-dominated regime in Rwanda, afraid of renewed Hutu attacks, maintains its own occupying forces in eastern Congo, refusing to withdraw until the Hutu groups are disarmed. And for reasons of their own Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda and Burundi all have forces in the Congo as well.
The third factor that will be vital to peace in the Congo is the Inter-Congolese Dialogue - the only forum through which DRC can rebuild its political institutions. But this too is stuck in a deadlock . President Joseph Kabila and his backers, Angola and Zimbabwe, refuse to consider power-sharing through the Dialogue with anti-government rebels without guarantees of Rwanda and Uganda's full withdrawal. The rebels and their sponsors, on the other hand, refuse to consider withdrawal until a transition government is established through the Dialogue and Rwanda's border security is guaranteed. These external demands have to be addressed as part of Congo's political transition. In total these challenges appear to present a near-impossible Catch-22. But they can be resolved if the international community, and especially the UN, is prepared to make a greater commitment to completing all three parts of the peace process.
There is room for cautious optimism at the moment - especially on the issue of disarmament. The United Nations Observer Mission to the Congo (MONUC) has recently taken the lead in a limited, voluntary disarmament program of AliR. In November the DRC authorised MONUC to conduct a census of about 1800 unarmed AliR combatants in the Kamina military camp in the DRC and further screening is taking place in hospitals in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa.
These small steps forward also stem from the capture of around 2000 AliR fighters by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in May/June this year. The RPA placed the captured fighters in re-education camps and appealed to the international community for assistance in their rehabilitation and reintegration. If the AliR groups in Rwanda and in DRC are properly rehabilitated, their 20,000 (or more) fellow fighters may also be persuaded to return to Rwanda.
The opportunity offered by these events must be seized quickly. Despite the limited progress described above, the war is continuing in eastern Congo between Rwandan armed forces and several DRC-backed Hutu factions. Tensions have also risen between Rwanda and its former ally Uganda, with confirmation of a build-up of armed forces of both countries in the Kivus in eastern Congo. In this context, the DDRRR program may simply recycle demobilised Hutu rebels into a new war with new military alliances.
Bilateral talks between President Kabila and President Kagame have failed to produce results, mainly because of intransigence and a lack of trust on both sides, but also because of the lack of mediation and international involvement in the Congo peace process. In order to avoid another war, it is vital that the international community persuades the DRC and its ally Zimbabwe to stop supporting the armed groups. MONUC and the international community must assist the government in Kinshasa to build up its own army, while pressing neighbouring countries to withdraw their troops.
The peace process would also be greatly assisted if President Kagame would restate his commitment to the withdrawal of his soldiers from the Kivus. This would limit the justification for DRC and Zimbabwe to rearm the rebel groups and help President Kabila maintain his disarmament policy in the face of hard-line opposition inside his own government.
Without considerable improvement in international support, the Democratic Republic of Congo may not survive. The resumption of war would probably mean the partition of the country, hundreds of thousands more dead and millions more refugees. The war and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe have already claimed 2 million lives. Now is the time for the Lusaka signatories and the international community to start the DDRRR process to build momentum, and to take the rest of the peace process forward.
RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
1. Urge a personal, ongoing mediation role for the UN Secretary General between Rwanda and the DRC with the ultimate objective of concluding a non-aggression pact between the two countries and complete withdrawal of foreign forces.
2. Urge the Secretary General to emphasise the importance of the DDRRR process by appointing a new Special Envoy for DDRRR, or by formally including DDRRR in the mandate of the SRSG for MONUC. In either case the envoy's task would be to negotiate a political agreement on DDRRR, local cease-fires in the Kivus and then oversee DDRRR implementation.
3. Assist and co-ordinate political processes in the region, in particular by
- supporting shuttle diplomacy efforts ahead of the next meeting of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in South Africa;.
- supporting a parallel dialogue and inter-community reconciliation effort in the Kivus between the Mai Mai, traditional leaders, civil society leaders and the church; and
- supporting the implementation of the Arusha agreement in Burundi and the efforts of the President of Gabon and the Vice-President of South Africa to reach a cease-fire with the FDD and FNL.
4. Establish a sanctions committee mandated to report support to the armed groups, based on UNSC Resolutions 918, 997, 1011, and 1341, and on the recommendations of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda. All UN members should be required to provide information they have about the resupply of these groups. Consider trips to the field by sanctions committee members, and provide staff experts to evaluate information provided.
5. Support the efforts of MONUC to deploy in eastern Congo and encourage the opening of a DDRRR camp in the Bukavu area in South Kivu where AliR combatants captured and disarmed by the Mai Mai can be cantoned.
6. Desirably, while recognising the significant human, logistical and communications resources needed to carry this out, task MONUC, once deployed in eastern Congo, to monitor and report on the resupply of armed groups.
7. Consider action on the exploitation of DRC resources. Strong consideration should be given to implementing the primary recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the DRC: a moratorium on the purchase and importation of minerals originating in areas where foreign troops are present in the DRC.
8. In this context, initiate action to review and revise all contracts signed since 1997 in the DRC to address and correct any irregularities. This should be used as leverage to accelerate DDRRR and the withdrawal of foreign forces.
TO DONOR GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AHEAD OF THE 19 DECEMBER WORLD BANK MEETING IN BRUSSELS
9. Provide urgent financial support to the DDRRR process, especially for the AliR forces that are already being screened in DRC and Rwanda.
10. Provide international observers in Rwanda to monitor the reintegration and rehabilitation of AliR ex-fighters.
11. Help Rwanda's local authorities and Community Development Committees to absorb and manage international funds for DDDRR, recognising that local control and management of DDRRR is vital to the successful reintegration of former fighters.
12. Provide funds for information campaigns on DDRRR aimed at AliR forces in the Congo, in particular the 1200 men based in the Nyungwe forest in Rwanda.
13. Support a Reconciliation Economic Recovery plan in eastern Congo as an incentive for a peace agreement in the Kivus.
14. Establish an international trust fund to support the DDRRR process. The fund's managers would work to mobilise resources and work with the Rwandan government to ensure transparency in the reintegration process.
TO THE WORLD BANK
15. Clearly distinguish between the existing RPA demobilisation program and the proposed DDRRR programs for AliR, and give priority to DDRRR.
TO THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT
16. Create conditions that will encourage the return of ex-combatants, providing amnesties where appropriate, ensuring strict adherence to the rule of law, and total transparency of the reintegration proces
17. Further and more fundamentally, show commitment to reconciliation and political liberalisation by accepting opposition voices in internal debate, and freeing political activity from interference, recognising that persuading Hutus to return will be difficult if political freedoms continue to be restricted .
18. Accept the demilitarisation of Kisangani and MONUC's deployment in eastern Congo, as required by UNSC Resolution 1376.
19. Reiterate commitment to a full withdrawal of RPA forces from eastern Congo.
TO THE DRC GOVERNMENT AND ITS ALLIES
20. End support for the armed groups immediately, more specifically AliR, now considered by the US government as a terrorist organisation.
21. Arrest and transfer to Arusha all genocide suspects indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
************************************************************
The World Bank AFREX (Africa External Affairs) Media Contacts : Anne Davis Gillet (33) 1 40 69 30 28 Veronique Jacobs (32 2)522 00 42
http://www.worldbank.org (look under Countries and Regions; Democratic Republic of Congo)
Donors reconvene to review progress towards economic recovery in the DR Congo since last July
December 12, 2001
A Donor Information Meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was held in Paris on July 3, 2001. This meeting was aimed at taking stock of recent developments, and at discussing ways by which the international community could support the nascent recovery process.
At that meeting donor representatives observed that the Government had put in place a credible reform program, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They agreed on the need to quickly address the country's debt overhang (estimated at about US$12.9 billion), to organize an orderly demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, to develop effective mechanisms for donor coordination and implementation of assistance, to enhance transparency, in particular in the mining sector, and to support a series of urgent activities. Donors also agreed on the need to ensure that foreign assistance is equitably distributed across the country and to take a regional approach in addressing some issues.
The delegates noted that a number of donor programs worth about US$280 million were currently underway in the country and projects amounting to some US$240 million were planned for the coming months. The planned projects would cover a large part of those contained in a US$156 million request by the government.
At the end of this meeting, donors asked the Bank to organize a follow-up meeting, before the end of 2001. Indeed, much has happened over the last six months, both in Kinshasa and among the DRC's partners. The Technical Update Meeting, to take place in Brussels on December 20, 2001, aims to brief participants on recent developments, in particular with regard to a few critical technical issues which were raised at the July Meeting and which will loom large in the weeks and months ahead, including debt, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), donor coordination, implementation, transparency and urgent activities. It will be preceded by a meeting on December 19, 2001, to discuss a regional DDR initiative for the Greater Great Lakes Region. These briefings will be shared with the press on December 20, 2001.
PRESS BACKGROUNDER
Key Indicators
Area: 2.3 million square kilometers (about one fourth of the United States, more than two thirds of the European Union).
Population: about 55 million (including more than 350 ethnic groups), ranks fourth in Africa.
Impact of the recent conflict: the conflict-induced increased mortality is estimated at 1.5 to 3 million deaths since 1997 (1), including about 200,000 persons, mostly civilians, killed in fightings.
Damage on infrastructure is extensive, including the collapse of the transport system.
Pre-war social indicators:
Life expectancy (1995): 53 years in the cities, 43 years in rural areas.
Illiteracy (1995): 32.7% overall, 42% for women.
Infant mortality (1995): 101 per 1,000 in the cities, 161 per 1,000 in rural areas.
HIV/AIDS prevalence: about 5% (over 2 million people), with large regional disparities (4.6% in Kinshasa, 16% in Goma). In Kinshasa, 15% of the infants less than 5 years old are infected. (2)
GDP (1999): About US$3.9 billion (US$78 per capita), to be compared with about US$10 billion in 1990 (US$250 per capita).
Inflation (2000): in excess of 500%.
Updated December 2001
(1) International Rescue Committee, June 6, 2000. (2) Data provided by the "Programme National de Lutte contre le SIDA".
************************************************************ This material is being reposted for wider distribution by Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Africa Action's information services provide accessible information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and international policies toward Africa that advance economic, political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.
Documents previously distributed, as well as a wide range of additional information, are also available on the Web at: http://www.africapolicy.org
To be added to or dropped from the distribution list write to apic at igc.org. For more information about reposted material, please contact directly the source mentioned in the posting.
Africa Action / Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) 110 Maryland Ave. NE, #508, Washington, DC 20002. Phone: 202-546-7961. Fax: 202-546-1545. E-mail: apic at igc.org. ************************************************************